

SOUTH CENTRAL RAILWAY
HEADQUARTERS SAFETY ORGANISATION
BI-MONTHLY SAFETY BULLETIN – JANUARY & FEBRUARY 2024

DETAILS OF ACCIDENT AND UNUSUAL THAT OCCURED OVER SOUTH CENTRAL RAILWAY.

- I. Brief of the Accident :** On 26.12.2023 at around 09:51 hrs., at Nanded (NED) yard of Nanded Division, Pointsman noticed smoke emission along with Fire from the Spare coach No. SC/SLRD 107708 stabled on sick line and immediately informed to Dy. SS/Outdoor/NED.

This accident is categorized as – B7.

Cause of the Accident :

The exact cause and reason of the fire could not be established due to lack of sufficient evidence. The probable cause of the fire could be miscreant activity since doors of the affected coach were in open condition and suspected person got down from the same compartment of the said coach that indicated outsider interference.

RESPONSIBILITY :

PRIMARY :

1. Shri. Arvind Kumar Singh, Tech-I/NED,
2. Shri. G. Srinivasa Rao, Head Constable/RPF/NED.

SECONDARY :

1. Shri. R. M. Khapekar, SSE/C&W/NED,
2. Smt. Pramila, Woman Constable, RPF/NED.

BLAMEWORTHY :

1. Shri. Raghwendra Kumar, Dy. SS/NED.

RULES VIOLATED :

1. GR Rule No. 2.05(1),
2. GR Rule No. 2.05(2)(b),
3. Divisional (NED) JPO on locking and securing of trains dated 24.05.2022,
4. Fly Leaf No. 06/2012 on prevention of Fire accidents.

MATTERS BROUGHT TO LIGHT

1. The coaches/rakes are not being locked properly as per existing guidelines.
2. Initially Fire extinguishers were taken from the affected and adjacent coaches but they did not work. The fire extinguishers were refilled on 14.07.2023 and are due on 13.07.2024. Quarterly maintenance of the same was done on 17.10.2023 and is due on 16.01.2024
3. Details of coaches recorded in the door closing register maintained by the C&W staff are sometimes not acknowledged by RPF.
4. On duty RPF staff observed at around 09.00 hrs that doors of the affected coach at sick line were in open condition and she went to PF-01 for performing duty of “Meri Saheli” in train no. 12715. C&W office is located in PF-01 itself where she could have informed C&W staff before proceeding to “Meri Saheli” duty.
5. Multiple witnesses during examination have stated that many times outsiders / miscreants are found roaming in the yard and entering the coach unauthorised.
6. Only one RPF staff is deputed to patrol all five beats.
7. Complete CC TV footage of all working cameras from the time of stabling of coach in sick line till the fire incident was not preserved. CCTV footage of only 01 camera i.e., 31 of pit line towards Purna end is preserved from which person getting down from affected coach was observed.
8. CCTV camera no. 33 was not working whereas footage of camera no. 34 was not preserved. Both cameras are nearby fire spot located on PF-04.
9. Preservation of CCTV footage of rest of the cameras in the Nanded yard would have been helpful in ascertaining the condition of the doors of the coaches in the yard and also perhaps the movement of any suspected person.
10. The available CCTV cameras do not cover the entire yard and the resolution of the camera no. 31 was not sufficient to identify the suspected person.
11. TXR staff opens the doors of the last coach on request of operating department for the convenience of shunting operations.
12. There is lack of co-ordination between C&W, RPF & Operating staff in ensuring locking of the doors and integrity of the rakes/coaches.

SUGGESTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Duties at IOH shed have to be clearly defined among the Tech. & Assistant and one person should invariably lock the coaches before release. This may be ensured.
2. Existing guidelines on locking of coaches should be followed strictly and an effective monitoring mechanism be deployed to ensure the same.
3. Real time communication and co-ordination among the concerned staff of all departments including the control must be ensured by phone calls, messages and formation of WhatsApp groups.
4. Entry of the outsiders/miscreants into station premises and yard should be restricted by increasing the frequency of patrolling to avoid the recurrence of such incidents and ensuring active monitoring of CCTVs.

5. CCTV cameras which are not working should be made functional as early as possible and more number of CCTV cameras should be provided for enhanced monitoring of security.
6. Dedicated C&W staff may be deployed to ensure opening and locking of doors of coaches as activity of locking and opening of doors is a continuous process 24×7 at major yard like Nanded.

II. Brief of the Accident : On 09.02.2024, at Timmancherla (TIM) Station of Guntakal Division, Train No. 12976 Jaipur Express with Loco No. 39158/WAP-7/KJM which was started from GTL Station at 09:12 hrs. had passed Timmancherla (TIM) UP main line Starter signal S-38 at “ON” with a speed of 52 Kmph approximately and travelled a distance of 158.8 m beyond Starter at 09:19:42 hrs.

This accident is categorized as – H1.

Cause of the Accident :

Though Timmancherla (TIM) Home signal was passed at Caution aspect, LP has not reduced the speed of the train No.12976 as prescribed and failed to apply brakes to stop the train in front of the Starter signal at danger. Also he failed to apply emergency brakes in time, resulting in train No. 12976 Loco No.39158/KJM passed UP mainline Starter Signal S-38 at “ON” position and stopped after passing 158.8 meters at TIM Station at 09:19:42 on 09.02.2024. After passing Home signal in caution aspect, LP supposed to reduce the speed according to the aspect of signal next stop signal but he assumed he placed throttle in neutral but actual it was in 20% powering side and adding to that it is steep falling gradient (1/136 down–level–1/26 down) resulted in increasing of speed to 88 Kmph. LP & ALP instead of calling out ahead signal aspect along with speed and distance, were involved in discussion and got distracted themselves and did not notice the increasing speed of the train. As soon as they observed the Starter is in danger aspect applied emergency brake before 350 meters of Starter S-38, but the train passed Starter signal at ON by a distance of 158.8 meters.

RESPONSIBILITY :

PRIMARY :

1. Shri. G. Siva Prasad, MLP/GTL has failed to stop the train No. 12976 before the Starter signal and has passed the signal at “ON” position and travelled a distance of 158.8 meters at TIM Station in the GTL – GY section.

This violates Rule No. GR 3.08.4(b) and GR 3.81 (1) of SCR G&SR 2020.

2. Shri. Syed Muqthath Basha, Sr. ALP/GY for not acting well in advance before the Starter signal S-38, independently in applying emergency brakes in time to the train when approaching Danger signal.

This violates the Rule No. GR 3.08.4(b), GR 3.81(1) of SCR G&SR 2020.

SECONDARY : NONE

BLAME WORTHY :

1. Shri. T. J. Monisse, CLI/GTL nominated CLI of Shri. G. Siva Prasad, MLP/GTL, for inadequate counselling of the LP.
2. Shri. S. Vali, CLI/GTL, nominated CLI of Shri. Syed Muqthath Basha, Sr. ALP/GY for inadequate counselling of the ALP.

RULES VIOLATED :

1. LP : Rule No. GR 3.08.4(b) and GR 3.81 (1) of SCR G&SR 2020.
2. ALP : Rule No. GR 3.08.4(b), GR 3.81(1) of SCR G&SR 2020.

MATTERS BROUGHT TO LIGHT

1. LP Shri. G. Shiva Prasad is the Senior most LP with a service of more than 29 years experience but failed to follow rules laid down on SPAD prevention i.e. to call out signal aspect, speed and distance of ahead signal was involved in discussion with ALP on caution order while approaching stop signal which lead to SPAD.
2. Caution Order served to the Crew was not properly read by both LP and ALP and they are involved in discussion on run while approaching stop signal. Though the caution order clearly mentioned that caution order is in the Rd-4 (down loop) not on Rd-3 which they are passing clearly shows they did not spend sufficient time on reading caution order.
3. Caution order in the past are issued with loop or main line nomenclature but presently are issued with line numbers which is leading to confusion among running staff.
4. LP has assumed he kept the throttle in neutral position but the throttle handle was in 20% powering side which lead to accelerating of train while approaching starter signal S-38 which is in danger.
5. ALP instead of alerting LP by calling out Signal aspect, speed and distance of signal by keeping in hand on RS valve was involved in discussion with LP and failed to apply emergency brakes in time which resulted in SPAD.

SUGGESTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. It shall be instructed to all SMs that they shall be restrained to talk on walkie-talkie to the crew while approaching stop signals.
2. Format of Caution order to be reviewed considering recommendations of running staff and to be prepared in such a way which should not rise any ambiguity.
3. When TE/BE handle is brought to 0 from TE or BE (throttle handle), a visual indication along with audible buzzer may be provided in Loco to alert LP that it is in neutral position.
4. KAVACH / TCAS may be introduced earliest possible.
5. LP & ALP shall collect the caution order individually at lobby well in advance and spend sufficient time to go through, if any ambiguity in caution order to be clarified then and there itself.

III. Brief of the Accident : On 17.02.2024 at 08:59 hrs. Train No. TPAK / KI DN Goods train with Loco No.31145 / WAG.9 / LGD passed CKN Station on through signals, while on run between Chintakani - Bonakalu Stations of Secunderabad Division, 25th wagon from Train Engine (trailing trolley, trailing wheel LH Side) became hot axle, further journal broken and same dropped at Km 504/6-8. Wagon travelled for 208.4 m and further wheel dropped and derailed at Km.504/14-16 in the mid-section of CKN – BKL Stations at 09:15 hrs.

This accident is categorized as – D5.

Cause of the Accident :

This derailment was due to breakage of axle journal on left side (in the direction of movement of the train) of trailing wheel set of trailing trolley of 25th wagon No. ECR 22121566142 BOXNHL, from train engine. Breakage of axle journal has led to dropping, resulting in offloading of wheel and consequential derailment took place. Hot axle unidentified, has led to such failure.

RESPONSIBILITY :

PRIMARY :

1. Material Failure (Hot Axle / Catridge Tapered Roller Bearing failure). Invalid Rake.

2. Shri. Ch. Trinadha, TMR / DKJ.

SECONDARY :

1. Shri. M. Krishna Mohan, Dy. SS / CKN.

BLAME WORTHY :

1. Shri. Radha Krishna, PM/PNDP.

MATTERS BROUGHT TO LIGHT

1. After completion of un-loading at RTPM, rake was offered for loading without TXR examination. The rake could have been offered for examination at next en-route TXR points i.e., GY, BZA, GNT or at DKJ examination point before loading at JVRB / PSHP.

SUGGESTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Station passing staff should be sensitised to closely watch the rolling stock for unusual sound, smoke/fire from axle box and should take immediate steps to stop the train immediately.
2. OHE should be switched off immediately in case of any abnormalities such as derailment or infringing the adjacent line.
3. Timely offering of invalid rakes for TXR examination and timely detection of hot axle symptoms by train passing staff that are to be periodically sensitised about the consequences.
4. Proper working of walkie-talkie to be ensured by all crew and at stations to establish proper communication and for taking immediate action to avoid such incidents.
5. Hot axle Hot Box detectors to be installed at all suitable locations at the earliest.
