

**SOUTH CENTRAL RAILWAY**  
**HEADQUARTERS SAFETY ORGANISATION**  
**BI-MONTHLY SAFETY BULLETIN – March & April 2024**

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**DETAILS OF ACCIDENT AND UNUSUAL THAT OCCURED OVER SOUTH CENTRAL RAILWAY.**

- I. Brief of the Accident :** On 30.01.2024 Train No. NMG/IOCD Goods with Loco No. 32205 / WAG9 / ET arrived on Road-12 (F-cabin), Vijayawada (BZA) Yard of Vijayawada Division at 21:00 hrs. Train signaled at 21:35 hrs. from Road-12. The 5<sup>th</sup> and 6<sup>th</sup> wagons from Train Engine got derailed between point No. 173 and 174 at 21:40 hrs.

This accident is categorized as – D5.

**Derailment mechanism / Cause of the Accident :**

The derailment is due to entanglement of right side buffers between 5<sup>th</sup> and 6<sup>th</sup> wagons from engine. The right side wheel of rear truck of 5<sup>th</sup> wagon from TE, mounted on the check rail and travelled a distance of 2.2 meters and got off loaded and derailed to the left side of the track. As the distance between both POM and POD is just 2.2 meters, the derailment happened suddenly.

Some other deviations such as increased wear of side bearer bronze wear piece of the wagon, Versine variation of track geometry, Momentary over speeding and deceleration of train by LP were also noticed. However, these factors may not be attributed for derailment of wagon as the derailment took place at 05 Kmph. speed.

**RESPONSIBILITY :**

**PRIMARY** : NONE

**SECONDARY** : NONE

**BLAMEWORTHY** :

1. Shri. Mukesh kumar Sengar SSE-in-charge / MTN workshop : For failure in replacing the condemned bronze piece of the side bearer during recent POH on 15.12.2023
2. Shri. B. Suresh Kumar, SSE/P. Way/S/BZA : For poor maintenance of track as per IRPWM para 429.8.a, 429.8.b, 429.4.a, 212.2.A, 408.4.a.III.
3. Shri. CH. Raghuvu, LPG/DKJ/SC : For poor engineman ship.

## **RULES VIOLATED :**

1. SCR Lr. No. E 195/TRS/Safety/Vol-XXVI : JPO A.3
2. Maintenance Manual for BG Coaches of ICF Design chapter 309 table 32.
3. IRPWM para 408 2a, 429.8.a, 429.8.b, 429.4.a, 212.2.A, 408.4.a.III.

## **MATTERS BROUGHT TO LIGHT**

1. Counselling to be given to the crew for good handling of locos especially over crossovers.
2. As per Accident manual, Track parameters have to take in loaded condition. But every time supervisors are unable to take track parameters in loaded condition. Clear instructions may be given to concern regarding type of load, speed of load during the time of taking readings, distance of location taking readings from the exact point of action of load and the type of instruments to be utilized for taking the different kinds of readings and further comparison of the readings thus obtained for better correlating the condition of track.
3. First preference to be given to clear the path of adjacent lines. The traffic movements to be carried out by concerned in time to restore as early as possible.
4. Side bearer bronze piece to be replaced as prescribed in the manual.
5. Un-designed/Non-standard layouts to be identified and proper attention is required to minimize the derailments in the Yard.
6. As per the railway board Lr.No.2010/M(C)/650/2NMG, Dt.26.05.2022 point No.3 "while formation of rakes it should be ensured that NMG coaches are not intermixed with NMGH/NMGHS coaches. But as per rake PRO particulars it is observed that both NMG and NMGHS coaches are clubbed together. This is against the board guidelines.
7. Walkie-Talkie with the crew is partially working (Receiver (MIC) is not working).

## **SUGGESTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

1. Extent possible avoid the movement of NMG rakes in 1 in 8 ½ turn outs over multiple cross overs.
2. Brake feel test to be avoided at multiple cross overs.
3. Necessary photographs such as evidences and clues at the accident spot to be produced to safety department.
4. Old F-cabin (BZA Yard) is infringed between Road No.14 and 15. More over if any train occupies in Road No.15 there wouldn't be any visibility of other lines.

**II. Brief of the Accident :** On 22.02.2024 at 19:29 hrs Train No. KSLK with Loco No.31764/WAG9/GY loaded Granite Goods while passing via Common loop line of Rayanapadu (RYP) Yard of Vijayawada Division, to DOWN main line, 4 Wagons 14<sup>th</sup>, 15<sup>th</sup>, 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> from Train Engine were derailed and 1 wagon (13<sup>th</sup> from TE) was floating (Total 5 wagons) at Point No. 39 at Km.575/C6 at 19:35 hrs.

This accident is categorized as – D5.

### **Derailment mechanism :**

The derailment is due to providing different bogies under same wagon on 13<sup>th</sup> & 17<sup>th</sup> (i.e., Mod-I and Mod-II in 13<sup>th</sup> and HS & Mod-I in 17<sup>th</sup>) and difference in bogie clearances of all derailed wagons in combination with track defects obstructed the movement of 14<sup>th</sup> wagon and got derailed.

The shifting of stones might have been due to derailment. However, the loading of stones should have been strictly supervised by the concerned commercial staff as per the local JPO issued by SC division.

### **Cause of the Accident :**

Train No. KSLK / N derailed while negotiating 3 Nos. of points (39, 40A & 40B) at RYP Yard due to increased wheel forces on the track from 13<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> wagons which were provide with MOD-1 and MOD-2 trollies with exceeding lateral clearances between side frame and adaptor and bogie clearances of the wagons obstructed the movement of 14<sup>th</sup> wagon and the variations in track readings like versine in track geometry, super elevation, no uniform gauge have contributed for the derailment.

### **RESPONSIBILITY :**

#### **PRIMARY :**

1. Mechanical : Sri. Raju Kumar, SSE/NWS/KGP. For not maintaining bogie clearances as per wagon maintenance manual chapter-2, 3 & 6. (On 13<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> wagons providing different bogies under same wagon and for not maintaining Wagon clearances as per wagon maintenance manual.)

#### **SECONDARY :**

1. Commercial : Shri. Ch. Revanth Kumar, CGSR / Gangadhara, failed to supervise the loading as per the guide line No.7 of the local JPO No. Granite/01/2021, dt.15.07.2021 issued by SC division.
2. Engineering : Shri. K. Raja Sekhar Babu, SSE / P. Way / N / BZA (Not ensuring good maintenance practices as per IRPWM Chapter-4, Para 429 (8) a & b, Para 410, Chapter-2 Para 212.2(a) of IRPWM, 429(I) (II).

**BLAME WORTHY :** NONE

## **MATTERS BROUGHT TO LIGHT**

1. SSE/C&W/NWS/KGP has not ensured same bogies under each individual wagons and he failed to put proper qualitative supervision in maintaining lateral and longitudinal clearances of wagon as stipulated in wagon maintenance manual.
2. SSE/P. Way/N/BZA has to adhere to good track maintenance practices to enhance safety.
3. As per accident manual AS No.6 pro-forma, track parameters have to be taken in loaded condition. But every time supervisors are unable to take track parameters in loaded condition. Clear instructions may be given to concern.
4. Undersigned/non-standard layouts to be identified and proper attention is required to minimize the derailments in yards / to rectify the defects in layouts.
5. As per railway board letter number : TC-1 / 2020 / 109 / SCR / Granite, dated 15.10.2020 one mechanical supervisor SSE/C&W should have been deputed for ensuring proper loading of granite blocks but Sr. DME/SC failed to depute staff.

## **SUGGESTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

1. While loading, the party has to ensure RDSO guide lines and JPO issued by the division.
2. Work shop staff shall ensure not to mix MOD-1 & MOD-2 trollies on same wagon.
3. SSE/P-Way shall ensure Deep screening of loop lines within due date.
4. Necessary photo graphs such as evidences and clues at the accident spot to be produced by ART staff to Safety Department.
5. Shoulder ballast to be maintained as per IRPWM.
6. After completion of welding of rail joints, grinding to be done without disturbing the profile of the rail.
7. Work shop staff shall ensure bogie clearances as per wagon maintenance manual.

**III. Brief of the Accident :** On 10.01.2024 at about 08:42 hrs. Train No. 12759 (TBM-HYB) Charminar Exp. admitted on PF No.5 of Hyderabad Station of Secunderabad Division, to stop the train on PF as a schedule halt, LP failed to control the train on PF halt as he has not applied the brakes at safe distance in time and train hit to the Dead end caused the sudden bump / impact on train formation, resulted in sudden derailment of 3 coaches i.e., S2 – one trolley, S3 – both trollies and S6 – one trolley. No casualties, 1 Grievous and 5 Simple injuries.

This accident is categorized as – D1.

### **Provisional Findings :**

1. Upon careful consideration of the factual, material and circumstantial evidences available with CRS up till now, CRS has come to the conclusion that the “Dashing of Train No.12759 (Tambaram–Hyderabad) Charminar Express with dead end of Terminal Platform No.5 at Hyderabad Station on Hyderabad – Secunderabad BG electrified double line section of Secunderabad Division of South Central Railway on 10.01.2024 at about 08:42 hrs.” was caused due to Error in Train working.
2. This accident which resulted in grievous injury to one passenger and simple injury to five passengers is classified under the category “Error in Train Working”.

### **IMMEDIATE RECOMMENDATIONS**

1. LPs & ALPs shall be sensitised to follow safety measures while working the trains as per extant instructions in terms of G&SR 4.49.1 & SOBs issued from time to time.
2. Passenger lines on terminal platforms should be provided with High Capacity Dead End Absorption Buffer-Stops.
3. Policy regarding standard design and installation drawings for dead end buffers and responsibility for installation and maintenance to be issued by the Railways.
4. Thorough site survey of existing CSRs to be done and drawings updated.
5. Feasibility of increasing CSRs to be examined in light of extant instructions under IRSEM para 17.2.4(a) and 17.2.5(c) (iii)

**Note :** *Final Report of CRS / SCC is awaited.*

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