

SOUTH CENTRAL RAILWAY
HEADQUARTERS SAFETY ORGANISATION
BI-MONTHLY SAFETY BULLETIN – NOVEMBER & DECEMBER 2011

1.0 Irregularities noticed in the working of staff of Operating Department:

- At majority of the stations the SMs are not writing the 'out report' / 'in report' timings in the TSR as per BWM guidelines as a result there is a variation of 5-7 minutes in the timings recorded at consecutive stations which is incorrect.
- At majority of stations it was noticed that **whenever PLCT working is introduced and is continuing for more than 3 hours, the sectional TI or the nearby Supervisory SM should come to the station and assist the SMs; SCOR shall ensure that there is no crossing / precedence of trains as per the instructions of Railway Board. Such practice is seldom breached than followed.**
- Also noticed that at stations like BPA, RU, PAU, BZA, etc., where Guards are stationed to work are **not considered for the Monthly Safety Meetings** and their acknowledgement is not obtained.
- During safety audit of RJY station it was noticed that while executing shunting operations, whenever 'block forward' and 'block back' is done, the SMs are making only red ink entry **instead of writing the complete details like a normal train entry. This is in violation of Para 5.3 & 5.4 of Part 'C' of (BWMD) Block Working Manual.**
- Though accident siren is kept under the control of Dy.SS/RJY or RU or PAU, etc., the Dy.SS is not maintaining any log book containing time of accident message received, at what time the siren was hooted, at what time the loco was arranged, what time the relief train was ready, at what time the relief train actually started its journey towards accident site, etc.,
- At RJY station **Caution Orders** - acknowledgement from LPs, ALPs & Guards is maintained only to those trains for which crew is changed. **For those trains for which crew is not changed, no record is maintained which is incorrect.** This is in violation of **Para 6.4 of Appendix I of G&SR.**
- **Provision of Intermediate Starter Signal to draw a train ahead and keep near Intermediate Starter Signal in both KZJ – KMTP and KZJ – WL directions and thereby minimize the platform occupation is not achieved since the related working instructions are not incorporated in the SWR/KZJ.**

2.0 Irregularities noticed in the working of Engineering Department:

- At RJY yard, most of the fan shaped layouts in the yard are laid in 2003. But machine packing does not appear to have been done to these P&C. **Getting traffic blocks were a problem and for years together the Points & Crossings are not machine packed. This will result in fast wearing of switches and crossings. One round of machine packing should be done for all P&C immediately.**
- ART/RJY – BCN No.SE 131662 containing P.Way loose fittings. **This BCN wagon may be replaced immediately on top priority since it is in corroded condition. This was also pointed by the Officers during their last Joint Inspection.**
- **3rd Godavari Bridge at RJY is a ballasted deck and no machine packing is said to have been done in the last 4 years.**

3.0 Irregularities noticed in the working of Mechanical Department:

- ART/BZA end pathway connecting platform lines to ART location is not having connectivity for movement of BD material trolley and men.

4.0 Irregularities in the working of Electrical Department:

- The lighting arrangement is inadequate at ART Siding of RJY station, particularly between ART and MRV lines.

5.0 Irregularities in the working of S&T Department:

- **Relay Room Key Register/KZJ:** In the month of November till 29.11.2011, it was opened for 17 times for various purposes and during the month of October it was opened for 11 times. **It was noticed that ESM/Gr. II (identified by his style of signature) is not writing his designation whenever he is taking the key from Dy.SS/RRI.**

DETAILS OF UNUSUALS AND ACCIDENTS THAT TOOK PLACE DURING NOVEMBER & DECEMBER 2011

- ❖ **History of the incident:** On 05.10.2011 at about 01.28 hours while BOX'N' empty Goods was on run, MU locos with two wagons next to train engine derailed by all wheels and third wagon from train engine leading trolley front pair of wheels derailed at KM 92/19 between Pandurangapuram – Ashwapuram stations of SC Division. Through running was obstructed between BDCR – MUGR stations of SC Division for about 19 hours. Prima facie cause of the

accident was due to removal of ERCs and displacement of the rail intentionally by unknown persons, suspected miscreant activity.

Cause: Suspected sabotage.

Suggestions & recommendations: Security check and periodical drives have to be conducted more often to check miscreant activity and instill confidence among travelling public.

- ❖ **Brief of the incident:** On 16.10.2011 at about 0520 hours when Train No. 17064 Ajantha Express was on run between LSR – KJG stations of NED Division one AC coach, 18th from train engine derailed. Through running was affected. There were no casualties. Prima facie cause of the accident was due to coach defects, shifting of wheel disc from its wheel seat.

Cause: Due to shifting of wheel disc from its wheel seat of coach.

Matters brought to light:

- a. There are alterations in register for wheel and axle press-in measurement as submitted by SSE/WS/LGD.
- b. Standard practices in case of ACP have not been followed by train crew.
- c. DRM Special was detailed at LSR for 35 minutes due to mismanagement of SCOR.

Suggestions & recommendations:

1. Quality audit inspection should be rigorous to check the maintenance standard in workshop.
 2. Modern practices of maintenance should be incorporated and upkeep of record should be foolproof.
 3. Staff involved in supervision and inspection of maintenance should be sent on training periodically.
 4. Crew members should be counseled and trained for safety concern at the time of ACP.
 5. ART, MRV and special train which is proceeding to the accident spot should be given priority.
- ❖ On 30.10.2011 at about 1430 hours when Train No. BCN Empty Goods was passing APL station of BZA Division, 4 empty wagons – 14th to 17th from BV derailed. Through running was not affected. Primary cause of the accident was due to cattle run over.

Cause: Cattle run over.

Matters brought to light: The locomotive speedometer timing was behind by 11 minutes to the actual time. The last schedule attended Shed has failed to set the clock correctly or the microprocessor based loco when moved from one time zone to another time zone, the difference in time has crept in. the aspect has to be analysed and corrective action has to be taken.

Suggestions & recommendations:

- 1.** Cattle crossing locations are to be identified on the Division and necessary preventive steps like barricading, digging trenches to be planned.
- 2.** Public campaign against cattle crossing to be organized at identified vulnerable locations.
- 3.** Engineering and Security Departments jointly shall organize drives against cattle crossing and book the defaulters.
- 4.** On 16.11.2011 at about 0243 hours there was a side collision at GTL station of GTL Division.

❖ **Brief of the case:** Shunt movement from Siding No.1 to Road No.3 was given by CASM of South Cabin/GTL by taking 'off' Shunt signal no. 52 to pull the empty rake of train No. 57470 (GTL – KRNT) passenger towards GY direction. At that given time, Road No. 10 of GTL station was occupied by one stabled coaching formation. Behind that stabled formation, coupled light engines were waiting for movements towards GY direction. The Shunter of coupled light engines for reasons better known to him started his locos duly passing Road No. 10 Starter Signal at 'ON' and side collided with the formation of adjacent line which was moving ahead on the aspect of Shunt signal. **Enquiry report awaited.**

As a result of that, side collision took place and two coaches derailed; however, there was no obstruction to through traffic.

- ❖ On 21.12.2011 at about 0230 hours while PLMD/KLMR Goods was passing Home Signal of GWM station of BZA Division, rear truck of loco derailed and UP Mainline was obstructed for about 4 hours. Prima facie cause of the accident was due to suspected sabotage. **Enquiry report awaited.**
- ❖ On 30.12.2011 at about 0510 hours MOO 'N' Goods hauled by MU arrived incomplete on to Mainline, i.e., the train parted between Home and Distant Signals while entering the station. The MU locos were detached and given forward movement to come onto loop line from where he is supposed to enter back into the blocked block section to pick up the parted portion. But, the LP failed to stop near the Starter which was at 'on' and as a result he entered into the sand hump and derailed. **Enquiry report awaited.**

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ORGANISATION**