

SOUTH CENTRAL RAILWAY
HEADQUARTERS SAFETY ORGANISATION
BI-MONTHLY SAFETY BULLETIN – JANUARY & FEBRUARY 2013

1.0 Irregularities noticed in the working of staff of Operating Department:

- During the internal safety audit inspection of KCG station of HYB Division on 22nd February 2013 it was noticed that SWR of the station do not contain **Index containing details of amendment slip issued, such as A.S. No., date, Para No. which is amended / modified and page number which is replaced is not written.**
- **SWR of KCG** - Amendment Slip No. 1 to SWR of 07.01.2013 was received just three days ahead of Safety Audit, i.e., on 19.02.2013 containing 13 replacement pages to SWR. **The interesting point noted was that 38 staff (11 SMs + 4 Shunting Masters + 23 Pointsmen) have blindly acknowledged in the SWR Assurance Register on the same day, i.e., 19.02.2013 without knowing the contents of it.**
- **SWR – KCG** - As many as **21** failures were noticed because of which train passing document was issued **but the related failure entries are not made in the failure register.**
- **Operating Stores record of Guards at KCG** - **No inventory of stock is being maintained as seen from the records which are necessary since 138 Guards are stationed to work at this station.**
- T. 431 (Train Examination Advice) at KCG – **printed book and format is not being used.** Acknowledgement and 'fit' memos are specifically not available for Train Nos. 57620, 17603, 57623, 57660 and 17639.
- **Caution Order Message Register at KCG** - It was noticed that the **staff are not aware of the procedure of brought forwarding the caution order messages (at the end of the calendar year) as per Para 12.4 of Appendix I of G&SR.**
- On 4.1.13, it was noticed at LCGate14/T between VLG-RMNP stations of GNT Division that one HS lamp is not working and PN sheets are not supplied for use during interlocking failures.
- At Valigonda station of GNT Division - **Block Instrument failures occurred** on 08.11.12 & 28.12.12 but **failure entries were not made** in the S&T Failure Register though T. Nos. 77674 and 17230 were dealt on PLCT. Similarly, on 08.12.12 mainline Starter signal failure entry was made in the failure register **but no train passing document for T. No 17230** Express.

- On 14.02.2013, it was noticed that Rear SLR No. SR 05701 of T.No.11028 GTL-AD, Guard of the train was not having the copy of BPC, stretcher was not available & one wooden wedge was found in broken condition.
- On 14.02.2013, it was noticed at Adoni station of GTL Division that red Ink entries were not made in TSR and in Station Diary after stabling AD BOX'N' rake on road No.5 at 2345hrs on 13.02.13.
- On 21.01.2013 at BDCR station of SC Division, it was noticed that **T.431 book is not available**, rake of 57145 was stabled on pitline **but the stabling precautions of the rake was not ensured neither by Operating Branch nor by Mechanical Branch, hand brakes of either end SLRs are not applied.**

2.0 Irregularities noticed in the working of Engineering Department:

- It was noticed at LC No. 77/E at KM 67/0-1 between MDVL – KCLR stations of BZA Division on 10.01.2013 that wicket gates are not available, gate lamps & gate bells are not provided, condition of road surface within the track portion is very bad. And the Gateman has committed three mistakes in writing the PN given by the SM for three trains on 10.01.2013.
- On 4th January 2013 it was noticed at Pennar Bridge No. 357 in DN direction at KM 175/6 between NLR – Padugupadu stations of BZA Division that ballast retaining wall length of 13m is not provided as a result the ballast is rolling down on the slopes. Minimum cess of 90cm was not provided, the wooden sleeper adjacent to abutment on bridge approach is perished and canted bearing plates are fully corroded.
- Between BZA – VVM stations of BZA Division, it was noticed that the speed boards are not retro-reflective at KM 2/2 and also the “W/L” boards are not retro-reflective at KM 3/8 and 5/0.

3.0 Irregularities noticed in the working of Mechanical Department:

- During the ambush check conducted at KCG on 22.02.2013 on the subject of CUG/personal mobile phone of LP/ALPs in 'off' condition, it was noticed that LP of T. No. 77679 DEMU Sri. D. Lingaiah R mobile phone was in 'call wait' condition which is in violation of the JPO issued from Railway Board.
- Lis of KCG headquarters are due for EMU Refresher Course from 2007 onwards.
- Pitline at KCG - Pit lights and side lights for undergear examinations are not available.
- Sri. K. Babu Rao, LP/SNF was not supplied with CBC lock key as noticed at LPI station of SC Division on 11.01.2013.

DETAILS OF UNUSUALS AND ACCIDENTS THAT TOOK PLACE DURING JANUARY & FEBRUARY 2013

Brief of the incident: On 28th January 2013 at about 2049 hours, LP of Train No. 77675 (DEMU) passed DN Home Signal of Malkajgiri station of HYB Division at 'ON'. This train was planned to be received on Common Loop as per SCOR instructions after despatching the coupled engines and wait at MJF for crossing of Train No. 77673 MRGA – KCG DEMU which will start from MLY on clearance of Venkatadri Express. Till such time, the KCG – MRGA DEMU is supposed to be at DN Home Signal No. S-40 of MJF. LP of **77675** KCG – MRGA DEMU stopped at the Home Signal of MJF for about **32** seconds, i.e., from **20.49.42** to **20.50.14** hours as per speedometer chart. And, subsequently passed **S-40** DN Home Signal at 'ON' (semi-automatic signal) as per data-logger report and entered onto DN Mainline and stopped in spite of alerting on walkie-talkie by the Dy.SS/MJF who noticed track down on the panel for DN Mainline.

Other matters: LP/Passenger was Sri. Jeelani Basha from SC Depot of SC Division who signed 'on' at KCG by 1845 hours after availing 34 hours of home station rest and started the train from KCG at 2020 hours. Sr. Goods Guard Sri. S.T. Singh also belongs to SC Depot of SC Division who signed 'on' at KCG by 1855 hours.

Matters brought to light: SLI/SC of SC Division did not monitor his LP in DN direction of this section. He has last monitored this LP in April 2012 in UP direction of this section. He failed to conduct night foot-plate inspection in this section.

Suggestions & Recommendations: Proper LR to be imparted to all LPs working in the section. Nominated LIs should monitor all the nominated LPs as per schedule. Guard and LPs should have clear communication before starting the train. The crew should go through all SOBs and safety literature before working the train and while renewing Automatic Block Competency, the LIs should impart one day training strictly to LPs which is mandatory.

Staff held responsible: LP Sri. Syed Jilani Basha, LP/SC as primary and Sri. P. M. Prasad Rao, CLI/ SC as 'blameworthy'.

Brief of the incident: On 18th February 2013 at about 2315 hours, Train no. 16324 Shalimar Express dashed against a ready mixer concrete truck No. AP 27TT 7494 at UMLC No. 195 at KM 275/3-5 between SDM – TNR stations of BZA Division. At this UMLC location concrete work was going for casting RUB bottom slab for which four loads of ready mix concrete was planned to facilitate provision of RUB to eliminate UMLC.

At the time of incident, it is reliably learnt that ADEN/Bridges/North/BZA and SE/Works/Bridge Organisation/BZA were available and supervising the work. Pouring of concrete from the ready mixer was planned by keeping the track on the approach road of UMLC and connecting the RUB slab with the ready mixer truck by means of a pipe.

Cause: Driver of the truck tried to reverse the truck in between UP & DN lines and during that period the train came and dashed with the truck resulting in damages to loco and ten coaches. Supervision for this was not made from the Railway Administration side. The private truck owner did not possess adequate knowledge of railway working.

Matters brought to light: Sectional ADEN was unaware of the work being done by the Bridge Organisation. This shows inadequate co-ordination. ADEN should have ensured that contractor's representative acquires adequate knowledge about safety precautions and a certificate also is issued to that effect which is missing in this case. Competent authority should have issued a written permission for carrying out the work during nights.

Brief of the incident: On 22ND February 2013 at about 2150 hours, LP of Train No. CSAS Goods hauled by WAG-7 loco with a load of 44/3755 BOOST Wagons passed DN Home Signal of SKZR station of SC Division at 'ON' by one loco length.

Cause: LP of the train misjudged the braking distance and overshot the signal. The LP has agreed that he had switched 'on' his CUG and spoken with his wife after SRUR station which resulted in deviation of concentration, subsequently leading to SPAD. The datalogger report also confirmed the SPAD. The LP also agreed that he has backed the train without any authority in the panic condition. LP also deposed that the ALP alerted and warned him to control the speed and avoid SPAD but he assured him that there is a slight raising gradient near the Home Signal and the train will certainly stop short of the signal.

Staff held responsible: LP of the train as primary and ALP as secondary.

Matters brought to light: LC No. 77 was closed for admission of UP AC LE which was to arrive at 2140. The Gate was opened immediately after the arrival of LEs on common loop whereas DN Home signal was operated by ASM of 'A' Cabin at 2138 hours. The DN Home signal could not be taken 'off' as the slot was not released by ASM 'B' Cabin due to opening of LC Gate. **LP was in a state of worry during the trip since his pregnant wife is not well and he spoke to** her on CUG after SRUR station for about 90 seconds.

Suggestions & recommendations: Railway Board JPO on usage of CUG / Personal mobile phones advising them to switch 'off' their mobiles (loco crew) while the train is on run should be strictly implemented. When two trains are to be admitted into a station simultaneously from either end involving cross-over movement, the loaded train as far as possible be given preference for admission first over empty / light engines for safe operation.

**CHIEF SAFETY OFFICER
HEADQUARTERS SAFETY
ORGANISATION**