

SOUTH CENTRAL RAILWAY
HEADQUARTERS SAFETY ORGANISATION
BI-MONTHLY SAFETY BULLETIN – MAY & JUNE 2013

1.0 Irregularities noticed in the working of staff of Operating Department:

- a. Guard of Train No. 77683 (J-NSL) while working the DEMU **failed to ensure the provision of LV Board as per SR 4.16.5.1.**
- b. SM/PG of NED Division **failed to exchange 'all-right' signals** with the crew of Train No. 17057 Devagiri Express on 25th June 2013.
- c. SMs/MAGH of SC Division **are not adhering** to the laid down instructions (Para 3 of Annexure VII of Appendix II of G&SR) of treating the interlocked LC Gate as non-interlocked LC Gate and exchange PNs with the Gateman whenever Tower Car is permitted to enter into the section between MAGH and BPQ and to return back to MAGH
- d. On 18th May 2013, during the rake check of Train No. 57473 at KCG station, it was found that **stretcher is not loaded in both front and rear SLRs and no remark was passed on VG at GTL station to that effect.**
- e. On 9th May 2013, it was noticed at Bye-pass Cabin and North Cabin of RU station in GTL Division that SMs are **not writing the details of Patrolman** in TSR in red ink.
- f. On 9th May 2013, it was noticed that SMs of RU station are **not entering the PN** exchanged with SCOR in the Stabled Load Register.
- g. On the night of 23/24-5-2013, Gatemen of Interlocked Traffic LC Gate No.40 at PBP station of SC Division, **was found sleeping.** Also, it is noticed that only 2 LED lamps are available against 3 as per SWR and in that one is not working.
- h. On 23/24-5-2013, Dy.SS/PBP Sri. Bikshapathi **was having expired competency** (due from August 2012) for operating the isolator switches in emergencies.
- i. On 6th June 2013, at MVO station of NED Division, Gateman of Interlocked Traffic LC Gate No. 105 **was found sleeping.**

2.0 Irregularities noticed in the working of Engineering Department:

- a. The location of FSP (Fog Signal Posts) and the colour of FSP **do not match** with the modified instructions of SR 3.61.5 between J – MUE section of NED Division.
- b. **Released material** like PSC sleepers, rails, fittings are **kept in mid-section** between J – NED section of NED Division **which is unsafe** for train

movement apart from giving wide scope for anti-social element activities as noticed during the window-trailing inspection on 25th June 2013 by Train No. 17057.

- c. At MTKD station of NED Division, a wall / barricading to be provided between Goodshed Siding and mainline towards NED end to prevent the movement of lorries and to ensure safe running of trains on mainline.
- d. MGC station of NED Division, Point No.7 – **sand hump track needs attention** and sand to be replaced.
- e. On 1st May 2013, Gateman of LC Gate No. 307/E between PRCA – NLPD stations of GNT Division **was found sleeping**.
- f. On 9th May 2013, it was noticed at Bye-pass Cabin of RU station in GTL Division that during hot weather patrolling, the **Patrolman are not obtaining the signature of Gatemen** enroute as per Engineering Standing Order.

3.0 Irregularities noticed in the working of S&T Department:

- a. Out of 2 Satellite phones, only one was available in ART/PAU.
- b. Signal Warning Board **is not available** for Gate Stop Signal No.33 between MTV – ZB stations of SC Division.

4.0 Irregularities noticed in the working of Mechanical Department:

- a. LP of 77683 J-NSL DEMU on 24.6.2013 at 0740 hours failed to follow the SR 4.49 (1), i.e., stopping the train near Starter.
- b. BA equipment kept in MRV/NZB is overdue for calibration.
- c. Crew Lobby/NZB – **CC in night shift is not posted**.

DETAILS OF UNUSUALS AND ACCIDENTS THAT TOOK PLACE DURING MAY & JUNE 2013

- ❖ **Brief of the incident (Derailment at PBN):** On 2nd May 2013 at 2115 hours, while performing shunting of pulling out BCN Empty formation from GL2 of PBN station in Nanded Division, one wagon, 3rd from train engine derailed.

Cause: One boulder rolled and obstructed the movement of formation resulting in derailment of wagon.

Staff held responsible: Truck drivers and unloading labour are primarily held responsible. CGSR/PBN was held under 'blameworthy' since he failed to give written memo to SS/PBN who also failed to make inspection of Goods Shed and get it repaired in time make necessary lighting arrangement.

- ❖ **Brief of the incident (Derailment at PAU):** On 5th May 2013 at 1900 hours one dead loco which was placed in MRV Siding of PAU was asked to be cranked and brought for fuelling. The LP/Shunter cranked the loco which rolled back and derailed in trap point no.37.

Cause: The LP/Shunter failed to ensure proper building of air pressure and released hand brakes of the loco without ascertaining the required level of pressure. Due to this, the loco rolled towards PBN end and derailed in trap point.

Staff held responsible: LP/Shunter/PAU is primarily held responsible for violation of SR 5.23 and loco hand brake releasing norms.

- ❖ **Brief of the incident (Derailment of loco at VNUP station after SPAD):** On 10th May 2013 at 1225 hours, after placement of formation in the ICL Siding, the LP of Goods train passed Shunt Signal No. 14 at 'on' and derailed.

Cause: Passing Shunt Signal at 'on' (SPAD).

Staff held responsible: LP/Goods/GNT is primarily held responsible for passing Shunt Signal at 'on' and derailed in trap point.

- ❖ **Brief of the incident (SPAD at VKB):** On 16th May 2013, at 2330 hours, LP of DN BCN Empty Goods passed DN Home Signal of VKB station in SC Division at 'on' and caused SPAD.

Cause: Momentary lapse on the part of LP & ALP.

Staff held responsible: LP and ALP of the train are held primarily responsible for the accident.

- ❖ **Brief of the incident (Derailment between MAG-KCC DN line):** On 24th May 2013, at 1710hours, when Ballast Train was working between MAG – KCC stations of GNT Division on DN line, one wagon derailed during unloading of ballast.

Cause: Uneven loading. JE/P.Way unloaded ballast one one side and caused uneven load in the wagon resulting in wheel floating at 4⁰ curve.

Staff held responsible: JE/P.Way/GNT.

- ❖ **Brief of the incident (Equipment failure leading to detachment of coach):** On 8th June 2013, at about 0800 hours, DN 22693 Rajdhani (YPR-NZM) rolled onto PF 10 of SC station of SC Division. Rolling-in examination was done which has shown 68⁰ temperature through non-contact thermometer for SLR-cum Power car No. SWR WLRRMDAC 10894. The Mechanical Staff have informed the on-board Mechanical Staff to keep a watch on that particular coach. Further, when the train was held up at IB Signal short of JMKT station for clearance of Goods train, the on-board staff have checked and found temperature of 130⁰ and after reaching JMKT, it has shown 145⁰. The on-board staff has advised for detachment of the coach and as a result of this, the train suffered a detention of 230 minutes.

Cause: Enquiry report awaited.

- ❖ **Brief of the incident (Equipment failure leading to detachment of coach):** On 16th June 2013, Train No. 12085 VSKP – SC Janmabhumi Express arrived BZA station at 1225 hours. During the rolling-in examination, the Mechanical Staff has found axle box cover punctured in second coach from train engine ECoR GS 12433 and sent one TXR to accompany the train due to paucity of time at BZA. On reaching TEL station at 1305 hours, the axle box cover was opened and noticed that ‘axle box stud’ given up resulting in detachment of the coach. The train suffered a detention of 75 minutes.

Staff held responsible: SSE/C&W/BZA is primarily held responsible for the failure to take cognisance of the hole in the cover and conduct further investigations but rather solely depended on other tell tale signs of temperature, grease oozing, axle box discolouration and failure to replenish the axle box cover immediately which was consumed for similar incident on previous day.

SE/C&W/BZA, Tech.III/BZA are secondarily held responsible for failure to follow the instructions given by in-charge.

**CHIEF SAFETY OFFICER
HEADQUARTERS SAFETY
ORGANISATION**