

## **SOUTH CENTRAL RAILWAY**

### **HEADQUARTERS SAFETY ORGANISATION**

#### **BI-MONTHLY SAFETY BULLETIN – NOV & DEC 2013**

##### **1.0 Irregularities noticed in the working of staff of Operating Department:**

- It was noticed at majority of stations that SMs have divorced the use of block telephone; instead they are using hotline overlooking the priority of authorised means of communication.
- During the surprise night inspection of **YS station** of GTL Division on 05.12.2013 that **first aid box is due for replenishment** from October and available **Paracetamol tablets and ointment was expired in November 2013**.
- It was noticed at Krishnapatnam station of BZA on 26.11.2013 that Weather Warning Messages-Acknowledgement copies **were not pasted** in the register. **And after 16.09.13 six weather warning messages were repeated by Control organization BZA but were not recorded** in the register.
- Also, noticed at Krishnapatnam station from the details of **stabled load register that Guards are not signing the register. Secondly, LPs are not signing when the load is stabled with loco. SM is not ensuring the same.**
- **During the surprise night inspection of NLR and VKT stations of BZA Division on 12/13.12.2013, it was noticed that Fire Service Station No. 101 was in disconnected condition. There is no alternate contact number.** Division need to ensure that the Fire Service Station contact numbers (DOT and mobile) at all stations are obtained and written on the DM Display Board.
- **As a part of ambush check, during footplate inspection by Train No. 12677 between GDR – BTTR stations on 13.12.2013, LP was advised LP to react as if ‘lurch’ is experienced short of UP IBS – the LP, instead of stopping near IBS and alerting the SM in rear, has proceeded further and stopped near UP Home Signal of NLR station.** However, the LP followed all other rules correctly. But, **following Train No. 12509 was allowed to leave at 10.36 hours as per TCO No. 13/12 by the Controller before the track ‘fit’ certification given by PWI/NLR at 10.50 hours.**
- On 13.12.2013, during safety audit inspection of BTTR station South Cabin, it was noticed that **as many as 30 times** route cancellation was initiated in the month of November 2013 **due to change in the planning.** But, advising the LP in writing as per SR 3.36 was not followed. Also, noticed from the recorded details that CASMs are resorting to putting back the signals and opening the LC Gate frequently **for the passage of 108 ambulance which is improper.**

##### **2.0 Irregularities noticed in the working of Engineering Department:**

- **Gateman of Engineering LC No. 220/E between YS – CK stations of GTL Division at 00.45 hours of 5.12.2013, was found in the habit of keeping the LC Gate in ‘closed’ condition inspite of its normal condition of ‘open’ to road traffic; and taking ‘off’ Gate Signals on either direction though SM/CK did not advise about train movements in both directions.**
- On 04.12.2013, during footplate inspection by 11303 Express between GTL – BAY section of GTL Division, **nose block was missing** on Bridge No.326/E. **T/G & T/P**

**boards are not provided** for SR of 75KMPH at KMs 212/4-0 between HDD and BAY stations.

- On 13.12.2013 during the footplate inspection from GDR – BTTR by Train No. 12677 (Janshatabdhi), the LP was asked to react ‘if lurch/jerk is experienced’. And in the course of action, it was noticed that **PWI/NLR proceeded by road to the location instead of proceeding by rail to certify the track.**
- During the safety audit inspection of BTTR station on 13.12.2013, it was noticed that avoidable joints to be welded in point no.14A, 12A (after crossing portion one side combination joint is welded and other side fish plated). **One meter fish plates are not provided** in P&C locations. **Fish plate joints gaps are widen & not in squaring** in Road no.4. **GR pads are missing/dropped** from SRJ of P.No18A to one rail length.

### **3.0 Irregularities noticed in the working of S&T Department:**

- **Cable meggering is overdue** from 7.6.2012 at HYB station of SC Division as noticed on 11.11.2013.

### **4.0 Irregularities noticed in the working of Mechanical Department**

- On 12.11.2013, it was noticed during the check of Pantry Car No. SC97817 in the formation of Train No. 12715 at NED station of NED Division that **gas cylinders are not secured, heavy dust accumulation around exhaust fan, chimneys were not provided. Similar shortfalls were noticed in Pantry Car No. SC94803** in Train No. 17618 at NED station. In addition to this, emergency lights are not available in this Pantry Car.
- During the inspection of C&W Depot of NED station on 12.11.2013, it was noticed that **out of 12 Supervisors, 29 Technicians out of 49 are overdue for Refresher Course. Also, noticed that 23 Khalasi Helpers out of 94 have not undergone initial training.** Also, noticed that staff are not supplied with safety helmets though undergear examination was in progress.
- During the surprise BA test conducted at 06.30 hours of 13.12.2013, **Sri. Kareemulla, SE/C&W/GDR who was performing rolling ‘in’/‘out’ examination was tested positive** with 40 and 49 mg/100ml of blood.

### **5.0 Irregularities noticed in the working of Electrical Department:**

- During the ambush check conducted at VKT station of BZA Division in the early hours of 13<sup>th</sup> December 2013, it was noticed that **Crew of Train No. 12760 failed to respond to the danger hand signal exhibited.** And **Crew of 12864 failed to follow the rule when SM failed to exchange ‘all-right’ signals** and Guard did not bother to look towards station; instead kept green hand signal outside.

\*\*\*\*

## **DETAILS OF UNUSUALS AND ACCIDENTS THAT TOOK PLACE DURING NOVEMBER & DECEMBER 2013**

- ❖ **Brief of the incident** (road vehicle hitting UP 11020 Konark Express): On 17.11.2013, at about 10.20 hours, while UP Konark Express was on run between BG – PGDP stations of SC Division, Gateman of Engineering interlocked LC Gate No.28/E put back the Gate Signal and opened the gate. As a result of this, the train which approached the gate at 89 KMPH collided with a loaded truck which was passing through the gate. At the time of

accident, the speed of the train was 40 KMPH since the LP saw the Gate Stop Signal being put back to 'on'. As a result of this, the lorry had fallen on the adjacent DN track. However, no injuries / death.

**Cause:** Negligent working on the part of Gateman of Engineering LC Gate No.28/E in putting back the Gate Signals which were taken 'off' for the passage of the train for clearing the road traffic.

**Staff held responsible:** Gateman of Engineering LC Gate as primary as 'primary' responsible and LP of Express train as 'blameworthy'.

**Matters brought to light:**

- a. No established system to verify the communication between ASM and Gateman with regard to nomination of trains.
- b. ASM has communicated the nomination of UP and DN trains to three Gatemen simultaneously by Group telephone and not clearly confirmed from each of the Gateman whether they have followed and recorded nomination of both the trains.

**Suggestions and recommendations:**

1. Immediate implementation of the following which is mandatory as per Addendum & Corrigendum Slip No.6 to IRSEM Part II (2001 edition) to Para 14.1.7 dated 11.10.2010;
  - a. **Type of lifting barrier:** EOLBs (Electrically Operated Lifting Barriers) are mandatory at all 'special' class, 'A' Class, B-1 and B-2 Class LC Gates situated within or outside station limits..
  - b. **Approach locking:** Mandatory at all LC Gates where EOLBs are provided to provide dead approach locking with timing of 30 seconds.
  - c. **Approach warning:** Mandatory at all 'special' class, 'A' Class, B-1 and B-2 Class LC Gates.

- ❖ **Brief of the incident (bumping of UTV+BFR with UP 17405 Krishna Express):** On 25.12.2013, 'line block' was given on UP line between CLE – WL stations of SC Division from 15.35 to 16.20 hours. During the period of 'line block, UTV machine with BFR went into the section. SM/CLE, at 16.35 hours signalled for reception of Train No. 17405 UP Krishna Express onto UP Mainline. UP Krishna arrived onto UP Mainline at 16.39 hours. At 16.42.37 hours, the UTV Machine with BFR (loaded with rails) in pushing condition entered the station and collided with the loco of Krishna Express. As a result of this, the loco sustained damages and loco was changed at KZJ. However, no injuries to travelling public as well to Railway employees.

**Cause:** The UTV Operator and JE/in-charge supervising the machine movement failed to follow the SR 15.06 which stipulate that while entering on wrong line, they should stop at wrong line LSS or right line FSS whichever they see first and further piloted 'in' on a written memo given by the SM. Instead, they directly entered without knowing the condition of the line in the station.

SM/CLE did not exhibit presence of mind and failed to act swiftly in altering the points to loop line after the arrival of UP Krishna onto UP Mainline. There was a clear gap of 3 ½ minutes which is adequate to alter the points.

SM/CLE also returned the LC Gate control to the Gateman to open the LC Gate situated in between UP Starter and UP Advanced Starter signals. As a result of this, the LC Gateman opened the gate and the UTV Machine passed it in 'open' condition which is another grave mistake.

**Staff held responsible:** Accident Enquiry report awaited.

- ❖ **Brief of the incident** (derailment of loco): On 28.12.2013, at 18.52 hours, WAP/7/LGD loco No. 30326 planned to be admitted on Calling-On signal onto the obstructed line No.5 of LPI station of SC Division. Road No.5 was obstructed with the empty rake of Gautami Express and the loco is required to work the rake to SC for further departure of the train. SM/LPI taken 'off' Calling-on signal setting the route to Road No.5.

**Cause:** Immediately after the passage of the loco beyond the signal, SM/LPI applied route cancellation. By the time the loco could completely pass Point No.20, SM/LPI had an opportunity to alter the point since the route got cleared. SM/LPI without observing the completion of the desired movement of loco on the panel altered the point. As a result of altering the point, the loco taken two routes and derailed. Repercussion of this derailment caused late departure of the Gautami Express.

**Matters brought to light:**

- It is observed that SMs are resorting to Calling-on cancellation immediately after the train passes the Home Signal which is incorrect.
- SMs are also failing to depute competent Railway servant to exhibit Stop Hand Signal 45m before the obstruction and also to stop the train near the facing point leading to the obstructed line which is in violation of GR 5.09(3) & (4).

**Staff held responsible:** Accident Enquiry report awaited.

- ❖ **Brief of the incident** (SPAD): On 23.12.2013, while SEM Goods hauled by loco 24540+459 with a load of 58+1 was on run between Rukmapur and Tandur stations of SC Division, at about 06.25 hours, the LP of the train passed UP Home Signal of TDU at 'ON'. As per the datalogger report, the train travelled a distance of 40m beyond the Home Signal before coming to a halt. Joint measurements was taken by SMR/TDU, CSI/TDU and JE/P.Way/TDU in the presence of Guard and further admitted the train by piloting method. The crew taken charge of the train at SNF station in the early hours of 23.12.2013, i.e., at 02.05 hours.

**Matters brought to light:**

- The LP/SNF availed a rest of 88 hours before signing 'on' (PR+2 days of LAP).
- Though instructions already prevail not to book such LPs who resume duty after leave / sick / PR before 08.00 AM, the same appear to have been overlooked in this case.

**Cause & Staff held responsible:** Accident enquiry report awaited.

**CHIEF SAFETY OFFICER  
HEADQUARTERS SAFETY  
ORGANISATION**