

**SOUTH CENTRAL RAILWAY**  
**HEADQUARTERS SAFETY ORGANISATION**  
**BI-MONTHLY SAFETY BULLETIN – JANUARY & FEBRUARY 2012**

**1.0 Irregularities noticed in the working of staff of Operating Department:**

- At NZB station, three stabled load registers are maintained, one for coaching, one for goods and another for safety drive purpose which is incorrect. Also noticed that two coaching trains are stabled on 2nd loop but stabled load register entry is made combined which is not proper.
- The accident siren hooter installed in Dy.SS Office of NZB station, but it was noticed that no separate register or record is maintained containing details such as what time the message on accident was received, who has informed, at what time the siren hooted, at what time the relief train was ready, etc.,
- Shunting Order T.806 is not issued at NZB station of HYB Division for all shunt movements performed. At the same time it was noticed that there is no exemption given by Sr.DOM from issuing the same.

**2.0 Irregularities noticed in the working of Engineering Department:**

- Hectometer posts between SC – NZB section of HYB Division were found faded and needs repainting. It is also observed that there is a need to increase the font size.
- Fog Signal Posts in SC – NZB section of HYB Division – its colour as per amended SR is not painted, secondly the post is not relocated (presently it is placed before Distant Signal in the direction of the train against the amended location of before Home Signal) as per amended SR.
- At KM 597/0-2 – between MED – GDPL stations of HYB Division, guard rails are not provided below ORR ROB.
- 1st loop and mainline track of NZB station of HYB Division do not have required ballast. Mainline track is found with heavy vegetation which is something uncommon
- As observed in the footplate inspection by 12723 A.P. Express on 18.01.2012, Engineering Indicators were not provided at the following locations:
  - a. KM 206/40-442 between CHZ – GT stations of SC Division.
  - b. KM 230/6-8 at PGDP yard of SC Division.
  - c. KM 246/32 – 247/34 between BG – WP stations of SC Division.

**3.0 Irregularities noticed in the working of Mechanical Department:**

- Crew lobby/NZB - noticed that there is no shift in-charge. It is essential to keep one Supervisor in each shift on par with other locations like KCG,SC, SNF, CT, BIDR who should be responsible to ensure that all the defects / irregularities

noticed by the crew should invariably be intimated under clear exchange of PNs with SPCOR / TLC on time.

- ART/NZB - Functioning of the 132 T inflatable airbag was checked and was found not working.
- ART/NZB - Demonstration of underwater cutter equipment could not be seen as the nozzles were malfunctioning.

#### **4.0 Irregularities in the working of Electrical Department:**

- Loco No. WAP4 22226/LGD – during footplate inspection on 04.01.2012 by Train No. 12791 SC – Patna Express, it was noticed that the VCD was kept in suppressed mode.

#### **5.0 Irregularities in the working of S&T Department:**

- Emergency Socket pillar / posts in SC – NZB section of HYB Division are not painted as per the standard design and also no numbering which is essential.
- The pro-forma of Relay Room Key Register at NZB station of HYB Division was not in conformity with the Appendix XIII of G&SR and as per SWR. The important column 'reasons for taking the key' is missing.

### **DETAILS OF UNUSUALS AND ACCIDENTS THAT TOOK PLACE DURING NOVEMBER & DECEMBER 2011**

**History of the incident:** On 19th January 2012 at about 2150 hours at SNF station of SC Division one Goods train with multi electric locos (of which one loco is a dead loco) arrived. The planning is to detach the dead loco at SNF station. Accordingly the shunting staff brought the multi locos onto L- 1 for detaching the dead loco. Immediately after detaching the dead loco, it escaped and derailed in the trap which was in 'open' condition.

**Cause:** LP failed to secure the dead loco by application of hand brake and also failed to keep wedges below the wheels to secure the loco before detaching.

**Suggestions & recommendations:** Every LP including Shunters shall ensure that the securing the locos is their responsibility and that can be ensured by application of hand brake, placing wedges apart from application of parking brakes.

**Brief of the incident:** On 1st February 2012 while coupled engines (one working and one dead loco) were on run between NKDO – TIM stations of GTL Division, the dead loco got uncoupled due to knuckle breakage and rolled back.

**Cause:** Knuckle breakage led to parting of locos and the cause for roll back was due to failure of ensuring manning.

**Matters brought to light:** The dead loco was not manned by a minimum rank of employee in the designation of ALP, not certified 'fit' by the SE/LI/PCOR, not ensuring continuity between the two locos.

**Suggestions & recommendations:** Whenever dead loco is required to be moved along with working loco (not along with the formation), manning shall be ensured, continuity shall be connected, certification from SE/LI/PCOR should be obtained for the movement of the dead loco.

**History of the incident:** On 19th February 2012 KPCC Goods train was signaled for reception into KPU station of GTL Division. But, as per the instructions of SCOR, the Dy.SS put back the reception signals taken 'off' in the face of an approaching train which resulted in SPAD.

**Cause:** Putting back the signals before the arrival of the train by Dy.SS resulted in SPAD.

**Matters brought to light:** The incident came into light during GM's Annual Inspection of the RU-GTL section during March 2012 by noticing the failure entry in the ST Failure Register. Section TI/HX failed to notice this incident during his inspection of the station.

**Suggestions & recommendations:** SMs shall strictly follow the instructions laid down in the SR 3.36.5.1 which stipulate that reception signals once cleared for a train shall not be put back to 'on' except for averting an accident.

**CHIEF SAFETY OFFICER  
HEADQUARTERS SAFETY  
ORGANISATION**