

**SOUTH CENTRAL RAILWAY**  
**HEADQUARTERS SAFETY ORGANISATION**  
**BI-MONTHLY SAFETY BULLETIN – JULY & AUGUST 2012**

**1.0 Irregularities noticed in the working of staff of Operating Department:**

- On 11<sup>th</sup> July 2012 while inspecting Engineering LC Gate No. 125 at KM 272/8-9 between KPU – GPY stations of Guntakal Division, it was noticed by Dy.CSO/T that the Guard of Train No. RTPM Goods which passed the LC Gate at 0220 hours failed to look towards the Gateman which is in violation of SR 4.43.
- SM/Krishnapuram made DN Home signal failure entry on 4<sup>th</sup> April 2012 at 2100 hours due to panel blank in the S&T Failure Register **but no corresponding T.369(3b) was issued for two trains, i.e., 12798 and 11027 Express trains as per the records.**
- At Krishnapatnam station of BZA Division on 5<sup>th</sup> July 2012, it was noticed by Dy.CSO/Electrical that **SM failed to alter the points after stabling of Goods train on Road No.2.** Also noticed that **stabled load register is not available.**
- At Krishnapatnam station of BZA Division on 5<sup>th</sup> July 2012, it was noticed that the Dy.SS is not filling up the BA test column at the time of sign 'on'/'off'.

**2.0 Irregularities noticed in the working of Engineering Department:**

- As observed on 8<sup>th</sup> August 2012 at WPR station of HYB Division, it was noticed that though two weather warning messages were received on 26<sup>th</sup> July and 5<sup>th</sup> August 2012 at 1540 and 1545 hours respectively, **the Engineering Officials have failed to introduce line patrolling which is in violation of Para 2.3.3 of Amendment Slip No. 7 issued to Accident Manual.**
- On 31<sup>st</sup> August 2012, it was noticed by Dy.CSO/Electrical during his inspection of worksite at PQL station of SC Division that caution indication board is located at 900m instead of 1200m, banner flag is placed at the actual work spot instead of 600m ahead of the work spot, Lookout man was not available, green notice not available, track levels are raised by more than 10 cm of permissible limits near Point No. 18B.
- On 3<sup>rd</sup> July 2012 during the inspection of LC Gate No. 80/E at KM 191/18-20 between VEM – SRUR stations of SC Division, it was noticed by Dy.CSO/S&T that two Gateman Sri. Varghese Kurian and Sri. Yesub Pentaiah is due for RC from 29.6.2012 and 13.6.2012 respectively. Also noticed that Gateman Sri. M.D. Yousuf of LC Gate No. 76/E at KM 204/22 – 203/38 between SKZR – RLT stations of SC Division is due for PME from 02.11.2011.
- On 11<sup>th</sup> July 2012 during surprise night inspection of LC Gate No. 250/E at KM 344/27-28 between CLX – SPF stations of BZA Division, it was noticed by Dy.CSO/S&T that the Gateman Sri. R. Madar **did not make any entries in the LC Gate Register since he has forgotten his spectacles at this house.**

**3.0 Irregularities in the working of Electrical Department:**

- On 4<sup>th</sup> July 2012 during footplate inspection by Dy.CSO/T by Train Nos. 47189 from LPI – SC and Train No. 47165 from LPI – FM it was noticed that the Motormen /LP of these trans failed to call out the signal aspect which is in violation of general instructions issued for Motormen in the Operating and TSD for MEMU.

- At Krishnapatnam station of BZA Division, it was noticed by Dy.CSO/Electrical on 5<sup>th</sup> July 2012 that staff bio-data is not properly filled up in the CMS, example one Shunter attended ETTC on 04.01.2011, due on 04.01.2014, G&SR attended on 03.01.2011 and due on 03.01.2014 which is hypothetical since RC cannot be completed in one day.

## **DETAILS OF UNUSUALS AND ACCIDENTS THAT TOOK PLACE DURING JULY & AUGUST 2012**

- **History of the accident:** On 3<sup>rd</sup> July 2012, LP of 22605 PRR – VM Express passed UP loop Starter at 'on' of Eluru station in BZA Division.  
**Cause:** Non-application of brakes in the formation due to obstruction of broken plastic dummy cover of COAC resulting in non-venting of BP Pressure during brake application by LP has resulted in SPAD.  
**Staff held responsible:** Staff and Supervisor of Perambur Workshop where the coach underwent POH repairs on 31.5.2012 during which the COAC and air hose were replaced.  
**Matters brought to light:** When loco crew experienced that brakes in the formation was not applied by positive act from the loco, they should have alerted the Guard to apply brakes in time which should have saved the incident of SPAD as the train finally stopped with Guard's emergency brake application. Guard and ALP should have been more alert in applying emergency brakes when the train entered loop line at more than the prescribed speed limit. After the incident of SPAD, the train was started without any C&W certification, no speed restriction was imposed, no competent staff like SLI had been deputed to escort the train.
- **History of the accident:** On 18<sup>th</sup> July 2012 at 2104 hours when UP BVG'N' Goods was being despatched on signals from Road No.5 of MQR station of SC Division towards WADI direction, 3 BCNHL wagons loaded with Cement (29<sup>th</sup> 30<sup>th</sup> and 31<sup>st</sup> from TE) derailed involving Point. No.20B leading portion.  
**Cause:** Uneven loading coupled with defects in P.Way.  
**Staff held responsible:** Siding Authorities are primarily held responsible for not loading evenly and for not following adequate discipline in proper loading which resulted in poor and uneven loading to an extent of 23 MT in some wagons. Commercial Clerk who supervised the loading of the rake for not ensuring even loading as per the loading pattern issued by Zone and Division and JE/P.Way/SEM for not maintaining the track as per laid down standard are held secondarily responsible. ROH staff of BZA are made 'blameworthy' for not ensuring proper maintenance of wheel gauge of front pair of wheels of front trolley of the wagon.  
**Matters brought to light:** Original BPC was not seized. Divisional Authorities failed to record and preserve the evidence which is in violation of Para 206 (i) of Accident Manual. Divisional Authorities also failed to take track readings in 'under load' condition on the day of derailment. Divisional Authorities have allowed uneven loading knowingly keeping in view the interest of railways to increase earnings instead of giving priority to safety.

- **History of the accident:** On 29<sup>th</sup> July 2012 at 1815 hours, BT passed Road No.9 Starter Signal No. 34 and Shunt Signal No. 54 of GTL station of GTL Division at 'on' and trailed through point No. 79 & 80.  
**Staff held responsible:** LP, ALP and Guard were held responsible.
- **History of the accident:** On 30<sup>th</sup> July 2012 at about 0430 hours when UP 12622 NDLS-MAS Tamilnadu Express was on run between NLR – VDE stations of BZA Division, fire broke out in S-11 sleeper coach resulting in casualties of 30 passengers apart from serious and simple injuries.  
**Cause:** Presence of crackers in the coach.  
**Staff held responsible:** Under investigation and final report of CRS/SC Circle is awaited.
- **History of the accident:** On 2<sup>nd</sup> August 2012 at 1615 hours, Tower Car hit one tractor while proceeding on DN Mainline in wrong direction at LC Gate No.155/E at KM 222/16-18 between SVPM – KVZ stations of BZA Division resulting in derailment of Tower Car.  
**Cause:** T.1708 was issued by SM/KVZ to Tower Car Driver without completing the communication of intimating the Gatemen of LC Gate Nos. 156, 155 and 153 under exchange of PN treating these interlocked LC Gates as non-interlocked LC Gates when movement is from wrong line for the Tower Car. Coupled with this failure, Gateman of LC Gate No. 155/E opened the LC Gate immediately after the passage of one UP Goods train though informed by SM/KVZ about Tower Car. The Tower Car also failed to be alert and attentive while proceeding on Wrong line.  
**Staff held responsible:** SM/KVZ was primarily held responsible for the incident while Gateman and Tower Car Driver are held secondarily responsible for the accident.  
**Matters brought to light:** LC Gate Nos. 153, 154, 155 & 156 were not maintaining the LC Gate Register in the prescribed pro-forma. Supervisors who are issuing PN Sheets to staff should maintain proper record of it with details such as station name, LC Gate No. and date of issue. Tower Car (Mark-II) should be provided with speedometer. One properly greased transition coupling should be kept in ART to avoid detention to ART due to non-opening of transition coupling of Goods locos which are rarely used. And all necessary documents and caution order should be issued and handed over to ART Loco-Pilot promptly to ensure quick movement of ART to the site of accident.
- **History of the accident:** On 2<sup>nd</sup> August 2012 at 1400 hours, LP of UP 12841 HWH-MAS Coromandel Express while entering on to UP Mainline of NLR station of BZA Division passed UP Mainline Starter Signal at 'on' and caused SPAD.  
**Cause:** Late application of brakes leading to overshooting of UP Mainline Starter signal at 'on'.  
**Staff held responsible:** LP and Co-LP/BZA who were working the train were primarily held responsible for the accident.  
**Matters brought to light:** Procedure stipulated to restart the train was not initiated by LP, Guard and Dy.SS/NLR. Distance by which the train has passed fixed stop signal before coming to a stand in the presence of LP and Guard was not reckoned by Dy.SS as given in

Para 204 of Accident Manual. SM of the station failed to conduct BA test on the crew as per Para 206(i)(1)(a) of Accident Manual. SM also failed to collect blood and urine samples of crew. SM and Control Organisation failed to arrange relief crew from NLR.

- **History of the accident:** On 3<sup>rd</sup> August 2012 Shunter of GTL station in GTL Division passed Road No.3 Starter at 'on' and Shunt Signal No. 38 at 'on' towards North Cabin and derailed on Point No.80 by all wheels.  
**Staff held responsible:** Shunter/GTL was held responsible.
- **History of the accident:** On 7<sup>th</sup> August 2012 at 0620 hours while backing the loco in to new Carriage Siding, LP/GTL working as Shunter bumped into two ICs resulting in derailment of one IC.  
**Staff held responsible:** LP/GTL working as Shunter is held responsible.
- **History of the accident:** On 22<sup>nd</sup> August 2012, UTV of RVNL Authorities with 2 BFRs while passing South Cabin from Road No.10 of GTL station passed signal at 'on' and trailed through Point No.80.  
**Staff held responsible:** UTV Operator.
- **History of the accident:** On 24<sup>th</sup> August 2012 at about 0235 hours, DN 12429 YPR-NZM Rajdhani Express crew passed DN Mainline Starter signal of AD station of GTL Division at 'on'.  
**Cause:** Late application of brakes leading to overshooting of DN Mainline Starter signal at 'on'.  
**Staff held responsible:** LP and Co-LP/SC who were working the train were primarily held responsible for the accident. And CLO/SC and SM/AD were held under 'blameworthy'.  
**Matters brought to light:** Dy.SS/AD does not have adequate knowledge related to when to display danger signal in case of any unusual. CLI/SC does not have adequate knowledge of minimum continuous visibility of stop signals in MACLS though he is one of the members of the Signal Sighting Committee. Scheduled crossing is not mentioned in the WTT No.68. LP and Co-LP were not having adequate knowledge about minimum continuous visibility of stop signals in MACLS.
- **History of the accident:** On 29<sup>th</sup> August 2012 at about 1449 hours, LP of DN JSWT Goods passed DN Home Signal of Komali station of GTL Division. Crossing of two Goods trains were planned and SM/KMQ planned to receive DN JSWT Goods onto first loop. There was no power supply from 1442 to 1449 hours. There is no IPS at the station and there is no Pointsman. Hence, SM went for starting the generator and in the meantime, the LP of DN JSWT Goods passed Home signal in blank condition.  
**Staff held responsible:** Enquiry report awaited.

**CHIEF SAFETY OFFICER, HEADQUARTERS SAFETY ORGANISATION**