

SOUTH CENTRAL RAILWAY
HEADQUARTERS SAFETY ORGANISATION
BI-MONTHLY SAFETY BULLETIN – SEPTEMBER & OCTOBER 2012

1.0 Irregularities noticed in the working of staff of Operating Department:

- At RDM 'A' Cabin, it was noticed on 5th September 2012 that though night monsoon patrolling is in force, the **details** of Patrolman such as name, designation, time of arrival / departure, etc., was **not written in the TSR**.
- At RDM 'A' Cabin, it was noticed on 5th September 2012 that the SMs failed to make '**block forward**' / '**block back**' entries as per BWM instructions in the TSR **though shunt movements were carried out involving entry into block section**.
- On 5th September 2012 at PPZ station of SC Division, it was noticed that the Guard of CHZ Special Goods Sri. Sk. Moinuddin / KZJ **did not fix the BP gauge**.
- At KZJ station of SC Division, it was noticed on 21st September 2012 that the SMs are not exchanging PNs with the SCOR (many times as per the record) whenever loads are stabled.
- At COA station, it was noticed on 16.9.2012 that only one BA equipment was available and that too the old conventional one and not fuel-cell sensed with printer facility.
- At DHNE station of GTL Division, as noticed on 20th October 2012 at Combined Crew Lobby, it was noticed that booking in-charge of Guards did not sign against 20 entries from 2210 hours of 19.10.2012 to 0930 hours of 20.10.2012.
- At KCG station of HYB Division, it was noticed on 9th October 2012 that T.431 (Train Examination Advice) is not issued for rake examination.
- Stabled load register entries are improper and safe stabling precautions are not taken up at RU station of GTL Division as noticed on 12.10.2012.

2.0 Irregularities noticed in the working of Engineering Department:

- Large number of ERCs is missing / seized / broken between GNT – NDJ section of GNT Division as noticed during rear-window inspection on 27.9.2012.
- Between DHNE-PDL stations of GTL Division, it was noticed during motor trolley inspection on 20.10.2012 that 350 Nos. of PSC sleepers were in broken condition out of which 124 are replaced.

- On 7th September 2012, it was noticed that man refugee was not provided on UP line girder bridge no. 239 after leaving SC yard towards WADI direction.
- No marking of danger level and HFL on the abutments at Bridge No. 239 as noticed on 7th September 2012 at SC yard.
- On 21st September 2012, it was noticed at LC Gate No. 155 at KM 221/16-18, Gate No. 154 at KM 219/32-220/2, Gate No. 153 at KM 219/18-20, LC Gate No. 152 at KM 218/4-6, LC Gate No. 151 at KM 216/20-22, LC Gate No. 150 at KM 215/23-25 and LC Gate No. 148 at KM 214/24-26 between KVZ-SVPM stations of BZA Division that still K.Oil lit HS lamps are in use against the LED type.

3.0 Irregularities in the working of Mechanical Department:

- Pitlines at KZJ does not have lighting facilities though rake maintenance is done during night.
- Pitline no. 1 and 2 at KCG station of HYB Division do not have lighting provision and for pitline no.3 partial lighting is provided of which many lights are not glowing as noticed on 9th October 2012.

4.0 Irregularities in the working of S&T Department:

- It was noticed on 12.10.2012 at South Cabin of RU station of GTL Division that the S&T staff has failed to give S&T Disconnection / Reconnection notice after collecting failure memo from SM for the failure of LC Gate 112 damages on 03.02.2012.
- Similarly, it was noticed on 12.10.2012 at North Cabin of RU station of GTL Division that on 4 different occasions (11.4.2012, 14.4.2012, 25.4.2012 and 06.5.2012) the S&T staff have obtained failure memos but failed to issue S&T Disconnection / Reconnection Notice.
- On 7th September 2012, it was noticed at SNF station of SC Division that S&T staff attended the failure of no slot indication from station and 'B' Cabin without obtaining failure memo from Dy.SS/'A' Cabin/SNF.

DETAILS OF UNUSUALS AND ACCIDENTS THAT TOOK PLACE DURING SEPTEMBER & OCTOBER 2012

- **History of the accident:** On 11th October 2012 at 1525 hours at HYB station of SC Division there was an unusual incident. Shunt movement was taking place from Washing Siding No. 6 to Washing Siding No. 2 via shunting neck. The incoming rake of Train No. 12604 Chennai – HYB Express is kept in two portions. Primary maintenance of the rake is at Chennai and platform attention is given at HYB station. First portion of 12 coaches is placed in washing siding no.6 and the remaining 11 coaches in washing siding no.2. After picking up the 12 coaches from washing siding no.6, the rake was pulled into shunting neck and further pushed towards washing siding no.2 to pick up the remaining 11 coaches. At that time, one Pointsman was in the leading coach and another Pointsman was travelling along with the Shunter in the loco.

Cause: Due to some communication gap, the Shunter gave a bump to the formation resulting in coach damages (S-8 No. 91239) and the details of damages were head stock damage, side sole bars bent and toilet portion bulged. The coach was booked for heavy repairs.

Matters brought to light: BA test was conducted on the staff by SLI and TI in which one Pointsman was tested positive with 38/39 mg per 100 ml blood in first and second tests respectively. The train suffered a detention of 75 minutes for replacing the coach.

- **History of the accident:** On 1st September 2012 at Virapur station of GTL Division, Train No. 56502 passenger was signaled for reception onto mainline (scheduled stop) since loop line was blocked with SNAG Goods. The LP of the passenger train passed Mainline Starter Signal at 'on' and stopped after a distance of 18m beyond the Starter.

Cause: Error on the part of the loco crew.

Staff held responsible: LP of the train was primarily held responsible. ALP and Guard of the train were held secondarily responsible.

- **History of the accident:** On 23rd September 2012 when Train No. 51426 Passenger was on run between Ghatnandur – Parli stations of SC Division, loco and 5 coaches derailed. However, there were no casualties.

Cause: Over-speeding

Staff held responsible: LP of the train was held primarily responsible.

- **History of the accident:** On 9th October 2012 one shunting engine collided in rear of Train No. 17644 at BZA station of BZA Division which was ready to depart. However, there were no casualties.

Cause: Shunter was not vigilant and did not control the engine.

Staff held responsible: Shunter was primarily held responsible. One Pointsman was secondarily held responsible and another Pointsman was held under 'blameworthy'.

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