

SOUTH CENTRAL RAILWAY
HEADQUARTERS SAFETY ORGANISATION
BI-MONTHLY SAFETY BULLETIN – NOVEMBER & DECEMBER 2012

1.0 Irregularities noticed in the working of staff of Operating Department:

- At NDD station of BZA Division it was noticed from the Caution Order Register that there are 2 SRs which could have been brought under PSR since they are existing from 2002.
- It was noticed at NDD, TNKU, BVRM stations of BZA Division that the SMs are in the habit of not writing the details in the PN Sheet other than writing the Train No. it is to be understood by them that the PNs are issued for different purposes and to different work centres in addition to granting line clear for a train such as Dy.SS/PF, CASM, Gateman, imposition of Caution Orders, to the SCOR after stabling of a rake, etc.,
- It was noticed from the SWR of NDD of BZA Division that Amendment Slip No. 1 of 12.12.2012 was received just one day ahead of Internal Safety Audit, i.e., on 13.12.2012 containing 30 replacement pages. The interesting point noted was that 12 staff (ASMs and Pointsmen) have blindly acknowledged in the SWR Assurance Register without knowing the contents of it. Also noticed that CASMs are communicating one PN to Dy.SS/PF for complete arrival, another PN for altering the points. The activity of giving two PNs to Dy.SS/PF who in turn write them in a separate column in the register is not warranted and will only contribute for additional work + time for them. Apart from this, SR 14.10 and Para 6.5 of SWR do not specify for this procedure to be followed.
- At BVRM station of BZA Division, it was noticed that SWR Assurance was not obtained from M.P. Prasad, DY.SS and Kalyan Babu who resumed duties after continuous absence of 15 days which is in violation of SR.5.06.
- At BVRM station of BZA Division it was noticed that Sri. K. Jaganatha Rao, Pointsmen was overdue for PME from 12.09.2012 and was directed for PME on 02.10.2012 as per the record. But, on checking the muster rolls, it was noticed that he was continuously utilized for operational duties from 12.09.2012 without directing him for PME which is incorrect and misleading the Inspecting Officials.
- At BVRM station it was noticed that as per BA unit record on 10.12.12, Guard of Train No. 77237 Sri P.S. Murthy Pass/GD/RJY was tested Positive. But, Dy.SS/BVRM has passed a remark as 'Negative' and allowed the employee to perform his duty.

2.0 Irregularities noticed in the working of Engineering Department:

- It was noticed during the Internal Safety Audit of NDD-BVRM section of BZA Division that the Engineering Officials are issuing chatty and imposition messages under one notice which is improper.

- **Point No.21A/NDD:** Lead rail corroded, 1m fish-plate not provided, bearing plates corroded, no painting/oiling, station numbers and date of laying point is not painted.
- **Point No. 20A/NDD:** Crossing gap joint is 15mm against gapless, ERCs are dropping, mismatching of lead rail at crossing block joint, LH lead rail flange portion corroded, 1m fish-plate not provided.
- **Point No. 17B/NDD:** LH side housing one sleeper against 4, non-standard GR pads are provided for 2 sleepers, gauge in turn-out is +11 to +19mm, a total of 38nos. of ERCs are missing.
- **FOB at NDD:** FOB steps bottom surface (waist slab) is very bad which made reinforced slabs exposure.
- It was noticed that steel girder Bridge No.7 (4x12.20M) at KM 151/8-9 Laid on 01/2003 between NDD – KLDI stations bridge sleeper numbers are not marked, pathway plates are corroded, fishplate joints are not square and have become supported on sleepers, vertical cracks were noticed on the abutment, rebuilding of abutment to be planned, one weld has come on the channel sleeper resulting in point load.
- Interlocked LC No. 120/E, at KM 110/6-7 in SLO yard of BZA Division, wicket gates are not provided, painting on speed breaker is faded, road width (7.80m) and length of check rails (10.30m) are to be revised as per 'special' class standards, road sign board of LC is non-standard, single strip & double strip boards are not available, vertical clearances of lifting barriers are 0.96m, 0.84m against 0.80-1.0m.
- It was noticed on the intervening night of 7/8-11.2012 that no night patrolman were on duty between VNUP – KDPL stations of GNT Division. One Patrolman was found sleeping on trolley refuge at KM 61/9 between SRMR – CTYL stations, no watchman was available at Moosi Bridge between RMNP – VLG stations.

3.0 Irregularities in the working of Electrical Department:

- At NDD station of BZA Division, UP AT / DN AT / Local supply automatic changeover (CLS panel) at 'A' cabin, sometimes chattering as stated by ASM on duty. Hence, IPS is momentarily shutting down due to which IPS may fail at any time.

4.0 Irregularities in the working of S&T Department:

- **NDD:** Last cable meggering was done on 24.11.2011 and overdue from November 2012.
- **'C' Panel/BVRM:** Bridge axle counter of Bridge No.232 between 'B' Panel – BVRT is failing frequently.

DETAILS OF UNUSUALS AND ACCIDENTS THAT TOOK PLACE DURING NOVEMBER & DECEMBER 2012

1. SPAD at Tadipatri station of GTL Division:

Brief history of the accident: On 20th December 2012, LP of PKPK loaded BCN load while working the train from GY towards RU station passed UP Home Signal of TU station at 'on' at 0840 hours. The train passed the Home signal by a length of loco + 4 wagons. ALP applied emergency and stopped the train. LP/NRE taken over charge of the train at GY station at 0615 hours and started his journey. He availed outstation rest of 12 hours, i.e., from 1815 hours of 19.12.2012 to 0615 hours of 20.12.2012. The LP had taken initial LR of MOO – GY – MOO section from 15.7.2012 to 27.7.2012 (**3 UP and 3 DN trips**). Subsequently, he had taken LR of the same section from 08.11.2012 to 11.11.2012 and worked the train/s from MOO to GY direction only. However, from GY to MOO direction this is the first trip in which the SPAD has resulted. The LP was graded 'B' initially but the nominated LI/NRE under whose control this LP was working has brought down the safety gradation of the employee from 'B' to 'C' on 21.7.2012 since the employee resumed duties after being under sicklist for the last 6 months (from January to June); and added to this, the general performance of the LP was also poor and did not show any upward improvement.

Staff held responsible: LP of goods train (Accident enquiry report awaited).

2. Unusual incident at Chirala station of BZA Division:

Brief history of the accident: On 23rd December 2012 at 1344 hours UP Home Signal was cleared towards MAS direction for mainline at CLX station for UP BOX' N' Empty Goods bound to KAPT **but the train entered onto loop line at 1349 hours as per the datalogger report.**

Cause of the incident: ESM-I/CLX was working on the Point No.19 without issuing S&T Disconnection Notice (T. 351) to the Dy.SS violating the instructions given under Part 'C' of Appendix XIII to G&SR. However since the loop line was vacant a possible collision was avoided. The train was further despatched by Dy.SS/CLX by applying route cancellation for mainline Starter. The LP started his train and stopped at next immediate station, i.e., Vetapalem and gave 'all concerned' message.

Staff held responsible: Prima-facie the ESM-I/CLX, JE/Signals/BPP and SSE/Signals/OGL were suspended.

Other matters brought to light:

- The LP failed to stop and issue a written complaint to Dy.SS/CLX since the train entered onto loopline when the signal was cleared for reception onto mainline.

- Dy.SS/CLX knew pretty well that he has signalled for mainline and the train entered onto loop line, **but he failed to give 'all-concerned' message. Instead, it appears that he colluded with S&T staff and tried to suppress the facts.**

3. Derailment of 17209 Express (SBC-CCT) at BZA station of BZA Division:

Brief history of the accident: On 26th December 2012 at about 0230 hours while Train No. 17209 SBC-CCT Express was signalled for reception onto Road No.1 (PF 1) at BZA station of BZA Division, train engine derailed blocking movements towards South direction, i.e., towards GDR.

Cause of the derailment: Prima-facie cause is due to the breakage of check rail while passing acute crossing of diamond portion of scissor cross-over.

Staff held responsible: JE/P.Way/BZA initially suspended and the enquiry is in progress and enquiry report is awaited.

4. Derailment of wagon at BZA Marshalling yard of BZA Division:

Brief history of the incident: On 26th December 2012 at about 1630 hours while performing shunting, LP of shunting engine (diesel loco with long hood leading) with one wagon (engine pushing) onto Road No.18 in marshalling yard/BZA side collided with another wagon which was on Road No.17 in fouling condition.

Cause of the derailment: Prima-facie cause is due to the failure of Shunting Master and other shunting staff who did not ensure fouling clearance on Road No. 17 and allowed movement onto Road No. 18.

Staff held responsible: Shunting Master and Pointsmen involved in shunting operations.

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