



## DETAILS OF UNUSUALS AND ACCIDENTS THAT TOOK PLACE DURING MAY & JUNE 2014

- 3.3 During surprise night inspection of MKDI station of SC Division on 05.6.2014 UP & DN BPACs failed between MDKI – SRUR stations at 22.50 hours of 4th June 2014. S&T Officials who came for attending the failure did not demand for the failure memo and did not bother to issue S&T Disconnection Notice T. 351. In fact, the SE/Signals did not even come to station; instead they started attending the gear from outside location. At 02.30 hours, the S&T Officials insisted the Dy.SS to take 'off' the LSS for the Goods train without S&T Disconnection / Reconnection, without obtaining failure memo, etc., At 03.00 AM, ESM prepared S&T Disconnection Notice with back time of 00.35 hours which was even signed and accepted by the Dy.SS.
- 3.4 During the surprise night inspection of MKDI station of SC Division on 5th June 2014, it was noticed from the Signal Failure Register that as many as 13 failures were recorded in the failure register for April 2014 (Signal Failures – 4, Axle Counter failures – 3, Track Circuit failure – 1, Block Failure – 1, IBS failures – 2, double entry – 2). In addition to the recorded failures, two more failure were found which were not recorded, i.e., as per failure memo record, on 1st April and 2nd April 2014 there were failures but failure entry not made.
- 3.5 As per Signal Failure Register of MKDI station, on 15.4.2014 from 23.20 to 01.05 hours of 16.4.2014, UP route was held up. During this intervening period, the S&T Officials have not taken the Relay Room key for attending the failure. However, as per remarks passed, one relay Q.NI, S-30 ASPR-3 was replaced. How this was possible without opening the Relay Room is not understood? As per Relay Room Key Register entry, it was seen that the Relay Room Key was taken from 02.00 to 07.10 hours (5 hours 10 minutes) on 16.4.2014 for attending of 'UP route held up' failure. From this, it can be seen that these two issues are in contrast and not convincing, i.e., taking the Relay Room key after rectification time of UP route held up failure and keeping the Relay Room "OPEN" for above 5 hours is not proper.
- 3.6 At MKDI station of SC Division, it was noticed on 5th June 2014 that Safety Point Alarm efficacy of the equipment was tested by not altering the points for two DN Trains on DN Mainline and found that it is not working in spite of the arrival of trains beyond 5 minutes.

INSPECTING OFFICIALS – Conduct qualitative inspections.

### 4.0 Irregularities noticed in the working of Mechanical Department:

- 4.1 Ramp is not provided for the movement of equipment trolley into LV-9 pit line of BZA station as noticed during the inspection on 06.5.2014 (CAMPTECH Design) and also difficult for the maintenance staff to enter the Pitline since foot steps are not provided. Off side (West side) Rake examination Trolley Pathway is obstructed by OHE mast on LV-9. Catwalk between LV-9 and LV-8 pit lines is obstructed by Drinking water Pipes at three places. Water stagnation is found in more places and Mass formation in layers were noticed in LV-8. Lighting facilities: Out of 200 pit lights in LV-8 only 180 are burning. Out of 200 pit lights in LV-7 only 72 were burning.
- 4.2 On 17.6.2014, ambush check was conducted at LC Gate between KBA – TAT stations of GTL Division by Exhibiting Stop Hand Signal to the LP of T.No.57478 Passenger and found that LP, ALP and Guard of the train failed to look and react which is in violation of G&SR 4.41 and 4.43.
- 4.3 During the inspection of Crew Lobby / DHNE station on 15th June 2014, it was noticed that LP Sri J. Dharma Reddy Pass/DHNE during sign "ON" at 21.24hrs on 10.01.2014 was tested positive with. 222mg/100ml on first occasion and on second occasion at 21.29hrs 225mg/100ml. D&AR action is yet to be initiated.
- 4.4 During the inspection of PAK station on 15th June 2014, it was noticed that Train No. 17615 / 16 KCG - MDU weekly Express – Crew of TPTY Depot take charge of this train at 13.55 hours from DMM and work the train upto PAK after a run of 5 ½ hours. Fresh crew from TPTY will work the train from PAK to KPD for a short journey of 1 ½ hour. The point of concern is that; Incoming crew from DMM and outgoing crew from TPTY are not signing 'off' / signing 'on' at PAK; instead they are going / coming as pilot to / from TPTY. The waiting time for the crew bound to KPD from PAK is about 2 hours and 45 minutes. Both the crews do not undergo BA test at PAK since no sign 'on' / 'off'.

### 5.0 Irregularities noticed in the working of Electrical Department:

- 5.1 On 08.5.2014, it was noticed in Train No. 17213 that in ACCW 96059(A-1): Rope for pulling the emergency window glass at Seat 36 was not provided.. Earth Leakage Test: was done found 'Positive' in ACCW 96059, ACCN 08108 and ACCN 98103. In both ACCNs inverter door glass fittings are not available

**1. Brief of the accident:** Trail through of points at Yerpedu station of GTL Division on 30th May 2014, at 23.40 hours. UP MDKS Goods was signalled for reception onto UP loop line by keeping the trailing points to sand hump since Controller planned to keep that train at YPD station for precedence of coaching path. Train arrived onto loop line at 23.51 hours, but the rear fouling could not be cleared due to inadequate loop length.

Load of the train was 59 + 1 hauled by multi (loco No. 27594 & 856). CSR of the loop line was 686m. Since, the rear fouling was not clear and the route was in locked condition, SCOR/GTL advised SM/YPD to further despatch the train to Renigunta. Accordingly, SM/YPD taken line clear and cleared Advanced Starter signal. Loop line Starter Signal could not be taken 'off' and hence, train passing document T. 369 (3b) was prepared and handed over and PHS was also arranged from the foot of the signal. SM/YPD failed to ensure correct setting, clamping and padlocking of Point No. 12B.

As a result of non-setting of Point No. 12B, the point got trailed through by the Goods train at 00.49 hours. Following the Goods train, Train No. 17230 (Sabari) Express approached Home Signal of YPD and the SM/YPD intended to receive the train onto UP Main line for which Home Signal will not obey since the trailing direction point was flashing (due to bursting of point); and hence, the train was admitted on Calling-on signal.

**Cause:** SM/YPD failed to ensure personally the correct setting, clamping and padlocking of relevant point/s before issuing train passing document to the LP of Goods train. After the arrival of Sabari Express onto UP Mainline, the train could not be despatched which suffered a detention of more than one hour. Finally, after the arrival of Engineering and S&T Officials, the Point was moved by crow bar and clamped before despatching the train.

#### Matters brought to light:

- The length of the line and train is not properly monitored by the SCOR/GTL.
- In fact, the SCOR was of the opinion, that the rolling stock in the train is BCN and not aware of BOXNHL stock carried by the train.
- The theoretical calculation of the length of the stock in the formation along with one BV and multi-loco, will not permit to get accommodated onto the UP Loop line which is only 686m, whereas the physical length of the formation is 696m.

**Staff held responsible:** SM/YPD, Pointsman were made 'primary' and the SCOR was also taken up under D&AR.

**2. Brief of the accident:** Unusual incident of Moped Trolley accident between BZA – RMV stations of BZA Division on 31.5.2014. At 19.10 hours, Moped Trolley occupied by S&T Officials while on run between Ramavarappadu and Vijayawada stations, hit Train No. 57381 (GNT – NS). As a result of this, one Trolleyman instantly died and one ESM died after hospitalisation apart from injury to one Khalasi.

Moped trolley along with staff was engaged from TEL for the movement of RVNL Officials in BZA to BVRM section. After completing the work on 31.5.2014 at AKVD station, CSI/GDV advised the trolley accompanying staff to move the trolley by loading in the SLR of the train.

But, the same could not be loaded in the train for the reason that the trolley cannot be dismantled, being a welded structure. Hence, the trolley was moved in the section duly arranging one ESM upto GDV. Further movement was planned to be taken by lorry. However, due to non-availability of lorry driver, CSI/GDV proposed to move it on Monday. Staff of TEL however, insisted for movement of the trolley themselves by rail. CSI/GDV agreed to the request disregarding safety precautions. Accordingly, the trolley was placed at 16.45 hours duly taking the position of trains at various stations and LC Gates. Next movement of train was verified by ESM from SM/RMV and while resuming their journey, Gateman of LC Gate informed the Officials that correct position of trains can be had from Gateman of LC Gate No. 314 who is having direct communication with SM/VNC Cabin. After passing the bridge, they noticed the approach of the train and four of them jumped for safety while other/s got killed and injured.

**Cause:** Operating the Trolley on track between two block stations beyond Sunset and that too without block protection.

#### Staff held responsible:

##### Primary:

- Sri. K. Hari Krishna, SSE/Signals/BZA responsible for causing the incident for having permitted the trolley into the section at 16.45 hours duly knowing that trolley would not reach its destination before Sunset and permitting the trolley without competent person (SR 15.26.3.2).
- Sri. Baji Saheb, SM/VNC for not arresting the possible incident by not making any attempt to inform the crew of the train about the incoming trolley movement despite being aware of it from Gateman of LC Gate No. 314/A.
- Sri. Joseph Ratna Raju, SM/RMV for not arresting the possible incident by not taking any action in informing the next station despite seeing the movement of the trolley after Sunset.
- Sri. C. Ramakrishna, LP/BZA for failing to stop the train immediately after sensing the incident.
- Sri. Sk. Rahman, ALP/BZA for failing to stop the train immediately after sensing the incident and for not carrying out adequate check of the formation.
- Sri. S. Kishore Kumar, Sr. Passenger Guard/BZA for not conducting adequate check of the formation and for delayed reporting of the incident.

##### Secondary:

- Sri. M. Madhu Babu, SSE/S/M/BZA for not arranging competent person/s along with the trolley while setting off for initial journey.
- Sri. B. Bhavani Prasad, SSE/S/Hqtrs/BZA for not properly planning the movement of the whole trolley journey.

##### Blameworthy:

- ADSTE/BZA for not acting promptly in arranging competent Supervisor for the whole trolley movement.
- Sri. P. Venkata Rao, SSE/PWay/S/BZA failing to remove the tree branches beyond the bridge towards RMV side obstructing the view to the LP/ALP of trains.

LOCO RUNNING STAFF – Do blow intermittent long whistles from W/L board which are provided 600m before level crossing and continuous long whistle from R/W/L boards which are provided at 250m before Level Crossing on single line sections.

### Man of the month Awardees (Oct. Feb. & Mar 2014)

Sri. Anjaiah SS/KDM	Sri. Anwar Basha ALP/GTL	Sri. Ch. Bhima Raju Engineering Gateman
Sri. K.N. Rao LP/BZA	Sri. P. Ramana LP/BZA	Sri. K. J. Suresh SM/'D' Cabin/BZA
Sri. P. T. Prasad ALP/BZA	Sri. M. Hari Krishna ALP/BZA	Sri. B. Sriramulu
Sri. V. N. Rao Guard/SC	Sri. Maske Satish LP/PAU	Sr. Passenger/Guard/RJY
Sri. J. Parasuramulu APM/PDPL	Sri. Akash Kamble ALP/PAU	Sri. Sanjay Kumar Guard/BZA
Sri. Sk. Jaffer Ali Guard / KZJ	Sri. Prahlad Gopala Keyman/KNVT	Sri. T. V. S. Narayana SM/SLO
Sri. R. S. Ashok Guard/KZJ	Sri. G. Edukondalu TrafficGateman/TUNI	Sri. A. Srinivasulu LP/Shunter/BTTR
Sri. P. R. Ganesh Guard/SC	Sri. A. K. Upadhyay SM/NWBH/BZA	Sri. Ch. Ananda Rao LP/Goods/RJY
Sri. K. G. Nawaz Pointsman	Sri. M. Yerram Naidu Engineering Gateman/KYM	Sri. J. Praveen ALP/RJY
Sri. J. Lakshminarayana LRASM/KKM at GPY	Sri. B. Sai Krishna Reddy Tech/III of SSE/PSI/SLO	
Sri. L. V. Naidu Gateman of LC Gate No. 99/T	Sri. G. Suman Engineering Gateman	
Sri. Sherkhan LP/GTL	Sri. B. Konda Naik SS/DIG	

**OPERATING STAFF – Do not allow S&T Officials to interfere with S&T gear without taking “failure memos” during failures; and demand S&T Disconnection Notice (T.351) wherever necessary as per Appendix XIII of G&SR.**

**LP & ALPs – Do pick up the aspect of signals from appropriate locations and control the train accordingly.**

#### Matters brought to light:

1. Trolley movements are planned beyond their jurisdiction of section.
2. Staff accompanying the trolley do not have the knowledge of the section in which it is plying.
3. Staff is not conversant with the rules of trolley movement.

**3. Brief of the accident:** On 25.5.2014 at 19.20 hours, yard derailment took place at Balanagar Station Siding.

BABR Goods with Engine No. 14628 + 13395-3A/MLY arrived BABR station at 17.30 hours and after reversing the loco, the formation was backed into the Siding at 18.30 hours. Subsequently, while the engine was coming out of the Siding, the loco derailed.

**Cause:** Due to lack of track fittings (cotters) and due to formation of trench at shoulders of ballast on RH side.

#### Staff held responsible:

##### Primary:

- Sri. M. Ram Prasad Goud, JE/P.Way/JCL for slack supervision and for not noticing the deficiencies in the Siding where regular unloading of coal activities take place and thus violated IRPWM Amendment Slip No. 132.
- Sri. Chandulal, Gangmate/BABR for not taking immediate action after noticing the deficiencies in the Siding.

##### Secondary:

- Sri. P. Praveen Kumar, SSE/P.Way/KCG for slack supervision in which lack of fittings and due to formation of trench at shoulders of ballast on RH side which led to derailment.
- Sri. Srinaiah, Trackman/BABR for not taking immediate action after noticing the deficiencies in the Siding.

##### Blameworthy:

- Sri. Devi Dass, TI/KCG for not reporting the Siding deficiencies and not taking immediate action on the inspection notes of Sr. DOM who inspected the station and siding on 13.4.2014.
- Sri. Ghose Baig, SM/BABR for not reporting the deficiencies and not taking immediate action on the inspection notes of Sr. DOM and for late reporting of the derailment to Control Organisation (accident took place at 19.20 and information given at 20.20 hours).
- Sri. Rajesh Kumar, SM/BABR for not reporting the deficiencies in the Siding and for late reporting of the accident.

#### Matters brought to light:

- After unloading the coal, removing the same by JCB (private party) caused a depth of 61 cm from rail top table bank adjacent to sleepers; lot of damages to fittings, sleepers and formation.
- SM/ASMs of BABR shown lethargic attitude in not taking any safety precaution and not cared for the inspection notes of High Officials.
- TI/KCG inspected the station in a casual manner and not bothered to take care for rectification of deficiencies noticed by High Officials.

#### Suggestions:

Siding needs PSC track and retaining wall to avoid scooping of formation and ballast near the track.

## Flash News Letter No.3

1. LP/ALPs shall look towards the Gateman and be prepared to stop the train, if 'danger' signal is exhibited by the Gateman as per SR 4.41.
2. Guards shall look towards the Gateman and alert the LP to stop the train, in case 'danger' signal is exhibited by the Gateman as per SR 4.43.
3. Station staff shall obtain the signature of the Guard (if the train is without Guard, SM has to sign) in the Stabled Load Register when any formation is stabled at the station (SR 5.23), and write wagon numbers for which hand brakes are applied and not by copying them from the Vehicle Guidance (VG).

## Irregularities noticed

### 1.0 Irregularities noticed in the working of staff of Operating Department:

- 1.1 At Uppaluru station of BZA Division, it was noticed on 07.5.2014 that acknowledgement copies are not pasted in the Weather Warning Register as per Accident Manual and Disaster Management guidelines.
- 1.2 On 13.5.2014, it was noticed during the inspection of Narsapur station of BZA Division that Shunting staff are not using the reliable hand signals, instead they are entirely depending on walkie-talkie sets. It was also noticed that Coaching rake was stabled on Road-3 which was not secured as per G&SR 5.23. SMs are not obtaining PNs from the Guard of the trains during the BPAC/Block Instrument Failures to ensure the complete arrival of the train.
- 1.3 During surprise night inspection of KBA station of GTL Division on 17th June 2014, it was noticed that though Weather Warning messages from Central Control (one on 26.05.2014 & another on 03.06.2014) are recorded in the Control Office / GTL, the same are not repeated to KBA station. It was also noticed that both these messages were available at PIL station and only one message (03.6.2014) recorded at MPL station. All this indicate irregular working at stations and Control Office/GTL.
- 1.4 During the inspection of "A" Cabin of DHNE station in GTL Division on 15th June 2014, it was noticed that CASM cannot see the LV of trains coming on lines other than Road No. 1 & 2. Till such time BPACs are installed, the CASM shall exchange PNs with the Guard and a suitable modification is necessary to the SWR of the station.
- 1.5 During the inspection of CTO station of GTL Division on 20th May 2014, it was noticed in the SWR of the station that as per Para 2.7 – block section limits is wrongly shown as “commencing from LC Gate No. 27 towards SIE block station” instead of Advanced Starter.

As per Para 2.5.4, DN trains coming from SIE station (KPD direction) received on 2nd Loop line or on Goods loop line, indirection reception (i.e., stop the train at the Home Signal and then take 'off' the signal) should be made due to unfavourable gradient as per CRS/SCC instructions. The interlocking feature is that Home Signal cannot be taken 'off' when planned to receive the train on 2nd loop or Goods loop unless the train comes and stop in the calling-on zone (time lag of 120 seconds) but this feature is not incorporated either under the 'special features' or in Appendix 'B' of the SWR which is essential.

- 1.6 Incoming Golconda Express No. 17201 arrived on PF No.5 of SC station at 16.10 hours on 4th June 2014, Guard Sri. K. Padma Rao/SC failed to apply Guard's handbrake in SC SLR 00728 when the loco was detached.
- 1.7 During the surprise night inspection of MKDI station of SC Division in the early hours of 5th June 2014, Dy.SS Sri. N. K. Tekedar was not in possession of Block Competency and Electrical Competency for operating the Isolator Switch.
- 1.8 During surprise night inspection of MKDI station of SC Division on 05.6.2014 UP & DN BPACs failed between MDKI – SRUR stations at 22.50 hours of 4th June 2014. But, failure entry in the S&T Failure Register was not made till 03.00 hours of 05.6.2014. Failure memo was not prepared.
- 1.9 During the surprise night inspection of MKDI station of SC Division on 5th June 2014, it was noticed three UP trains were received on PLCT from SRUR station from 22.30 hours to 23.30 hours of 4th June 2014 (Train Nos. UP PRLI at 22.48, 16031 at 23.08 and 12707 at 23.26 hours) but the entries in T/B 1425 (Line Clear Reply Book) was not made by the Dy.SS/MKDI.
- 1.10 During inspection of PAK station of GTL Division on 15th June 2014, line block was given vide TC No.5/4 by Control Office on 5th June 2014, from 16.30 to 17.00 hours as per the record available with JE/P.Way/PAK and accordingly Disconnection Notice was also given. But, it was noticed that Dy.SS failed to mention about line block message in TSR, in Station Diary and in Control Message Register which is mandatory and essential. Even, the copy of Caution Order Message given by JE/P.Way/PAK to observe 30 KMPH at KM 63/7-13 at Mainline of PAK yard involving Point Nos. 30 & 28B was not available in the station records.
- 1.11 During inspection of PAK station on 15th June 2014, it was observed that on 16.3.2013, SSE/Signals/PAK vide Message No. PAK/SG/C.O Signal dated 16.3.2013 advised SMs of CGI, MNPT, PAM, PAK, PTT, CTO, SID, RAM
- 1.13 During surprise night inspection of Dupadu station of HYB Division on 15th May 2014, Sri. A. Raja, Pointsman was tested 'positive' with 77mg/100ml of blood.
- 1.14 During the ambush check conducted by exhibiting 'danger' signal to the Guard of Train No. 17240 Simhadri Express at LC Gate No.3/A between GNT – NBR stations to test his reaction and response – Guard / BZA

Sri. P. Jacob Babu though noticed the 'danger' signal did not make any effort to stop the train and enquire for the reasons; instead he was gesticulating at the Gateman as to why 'danger' signal is being exhibited.

1.15 It was also noticed at the above LC Gate, Goods Guard Smt. Mohini Kumari who was working BOX 'N' Goods did not bother to look towards the Gateman, which is in violation of SR 4.43. Even the LP/ALP of the Goods train failed to look towards the Gateman, which is in violation of SR 4.41.2.

### 2.0 Irregularities noticed in the working of Engineering Department:

- 2.1 On 14.5.2014, during the inspection of DIG station of BZA Division, it was noticed that Cold weather patrolling was in force between DIG-TEL & DIG-PVD stations but beat book are not deposited with SS/GIG and the Patrolmen are not obtaining the signature from Gateman as per Engineering Standing Order.
- 2.2 During the push-trolley inspection between DHNE – MYL stations of GTL Division on 15th May 2014, it was noticed that;
  - SSE/P.Way/DHNE is not maintaining the safety drive register, he is not even aware of the safety drive in force.
  - Non-standard Warning boards are provided at Manned LC Gate No. 149 & UMLCs No. 147, 148.
  - ERCs greasing is due. Existing ERCs are seized & half driven, MS liners are missing and most of the PSC sleepers are in broken condition.
  - Road- I (PF No.1) of DHNE station, track portion is full of muck and improper drainage due to which the rails flange is fully corroded. Platform distance pieces are missing.
  - At KM 300/8-9, one PSC sleeper is fully broken due to scabbled rail and not holding the running rail. At the same location, FB weld without joggled fish plate was noticed which needs to be attended on priority.
  - Ballast deficiency was noticed at trespass & isolated locations.
- 2.3 On 4th June 2014, it was noticed at SC station of SC Division that though MMTS trains are dealt on PF No.4, Signage boards such as 'STOP' boards for MMTS, ladies compartment, first class, physically challenged coach position, etc., are not provided.
- 2.4 During rear-window inspection by Train No. 17233 Express from SC – KZJ on 4th June 2014, it was noticed that at BG station – fouling mark needs to be relocated (kept side of the loop line instead of in between two tracks).

### 3.0 Irregularities noticed in the working of S&T Department:

- 3.1 It was noticed during the inspection of DHNE station of GTL Division on 15th June 2014 that Junction arrangements (i.e., interlocking Routing Starter Signals with respective Advanced Starter Signals) is not provided which is essential as a policy matter and as per CSTE/Planning letter No. SG.190/PC/RR1/Vol.5 dated 05.02.2007.
- 3.2 During surprise night inspection of MKDI station of SC Division on 5th June 2014, ESM/SRUR Sri. Chandrasekhar was available at the station and he was not possessing Block Competency Certificate. He has come to attend the BPAC failure during night but was not taking any personal safety care such as wearing shoes, carrying torch, etc.,

**SOUTH CENTRAL RAILWAY**  
**HEADQUARTERS SAFETY ORGANISATION**  
**BI-MONTHLY SAFETY BULLETIN – May & June 2014**

**DETAILS OF UNUSUALS AND ACCIDENTS THAT TOOK PLACE**  
**DURING MAY & JUNE 2014**

**1. Brief of the accident:** Trail through of points at Yerpedu station of GTL Division on 30<sup>th</sup> May 2014. At 23.40 hours.

UP MDKS Goods was signalled for reception onto UP loop line by keeping the trailing points to sand hump since Controller planned to keep that train at YPD station for precedence of coaching path. Train arrived onto loop line at 23.51 hours, but the rear fouling could not be cleared due to inadequate loop length.

Load of the train was 59 + 1 hauled by multi (loco No. 27594 & 856). CSR of the loop line was 686m. Since, the rear fouling was not clear and the route was in locked condition, SCOR/GTL advised SM/YPD to further despatch the train to Renigunta. Accordingly, SM/YPD taken line clear and cleared Advanced Starter signal. Loop line Starter Signal could not be taken 'off' and hence, train passing document T. 369 (3b) was prepared and handed over and PHS was also arranged from the foot of the signal. SM/YPD failed to ensure correct setting, clamping and padlocking of Point No. 12B.

As a result of non-setting of Point No. 12B, the point got trailed through by the Goods train at 00.49 hours. Following the Goods train, Train No. 17230 (Sabari) Express approached Home Signal of YPD and the SM/YPD intended to receive the train onto UP Main line for which Home Signal will not obey since the trailing direction point was flashing (due to bursting of point); and hence, the train was admitted on Calling-on signal.

**Cause:** SM/YPD failed to ensure personally the correct setting, clamping and padlocking of relevant point/s before issuing train passing document to the LP of Goods train. After the arrival of Sabari Express onto UP Mainline, the train could not be despatched which suffered a detention of more than one hour. Finally, after the arrival of Engineering and S&T Officials, the Point was moved by crow bar and clamped before despatching the train.

**Matters brought to light:**

- The length of the line and train is not properly monitored by the SCOR/GTL.
- In fact, the SCOR was of the opinion, that the rolling stock in the train is BCN and not aware of BOXNHL stock carried by the train.
- The theoretical calculation of the length of the stock in the formation along with one BV and multi-loco, will not permit to get accommodated onto the UP Loop line which is only 686m, whereas the physical length of the formation is 696m.

**Staff held responsible:** SM/YPD, Pointsman were made 'primary' and the SCOR was also taken up under D&AR.

**2. Brief of the accident:** Unusual incident of Moped Trolley accident between BZA – RMV stations of BZA Division on 31.5.2014.

At 19.10 hours, Moped Trolley occupied by S&T Officials while on run between Ramavarappadu and Vijayawada stations, hit Train No. 57381 (GNT – NS). As a result of this, one Trolleyman instantly died and one ESM died after hospitalisation apart from injury to one Khalasi.

Moped trolley along with staff was engaged from TEL for the movement of RVNL Officials in BZA to BVRM section. After completing the work on 31.5.2014 at AKVD station, CSI/GDV advised the trolley accompanying staff to move the trolley by loading in the SLR of the train. But, the same could not be loaded in the train for the reason that the trolley cannot be dismantled, being a welded structure. Hence, the trolley was moved in the section duly arranging one ESM upto GDV. Further movement was planned to be taken by

lorry. However, due to non-availability of lorry driver, CSI/GDV proposed to move it on Monday. Staff of TEL however, insisted for movement of the trolley themselves by rail. CSI/GDV agreed to the request disregarding safety precautions. Accordingly, the trolley was placed at 16.45 hours duly taking the position of trains at various stations and LC Gates. Next movement of train was verified by ESM from SM/RMV and while resuming their journey, Gateman of LC Gate informed the Officials that correct position of trains can be had from Gateman of LC Gate No. 314 who is having direct communication with SM/VNC Cabin. After passing the bridge, they noticed the approach of the train and four of them jumped for safety while other/s got killed and injured.

**Cause:** Operating the Trolley on track between two block stations beyond Sunset and that too without block protection.

**Staff held responsible:**

**Primary:**

1. Sri. K. Hari Krishna, SSE/Signals/BZA responsible for causing the incident for having permitted the trolley into the section at 16.45 hours duly knowing that trolley would not reach its destination before Sunset and permitting the trolley without competent person (SR 15.26.3.2).
2. Sri. Baji Saheb, SM/VNC for not arresting the possible incident by not making any attempt to inform the crew of the train about the incoming trolley movement despite being aware of it from Gateman of LC Gate No.314/A.
3. Sri. Joseph Ratna Raju, SM/RMV for not arresting the possible incident by not taking any action in informing the next station despite seeing the movement of the trolley after Sunset.
4. Sri. C. Ramakrishna, LP/BZA for failing to stop the train immediately after sensing the incident.
5. Sri. Sk. Rahman, ALP/BZA for failing to stop the train immediately after sensing the incident and for not carrying out adequate check of the formation.
6. Sri. S. Kishore kumar, Sr. Passenger Guard/BZA for not conducting adequate check of the formation and for delayed reporting of the incident.

**Secondary:**

1. Sri. M. Madhu Babu, SSE/S/M/BZA for not arranging competent person/s along with the trolley while setting off for initial journey.
2. Sri. B. Bhavani Prasad, SSE/S/Hqtrs/BZA for not properly planning the movement of the whole trolley journey.

**Blameworthy:**

1. ADSTE/BZA for not acting promptly in arranging competent Supervisor for the whole trolley movement.
2. Sri. P. Venkata Rao, SSE/P.Way/S/BZA failing to remove the tree branches beyond the bridge towards RMV side obstructing the view to the LP/ALP of trains.

**Matters brought to light:**

1. Trolley movements are planned beyond their jurisdiction of section.
  2. Staff accompanying the trolley do not have the knowledge of the section in which it is plying.
  3. Staff is not conversant with the rules of trolley movement.
- 3. Brief of the accident:** On 25.5.2014 at 19.20 hours, yard derailment took place at Balanagar Station Siding. BABR Goods with Engine No. 14628 + 13395-3A/MLY arrived BABR station at 17.30 hours and after reversing the loco, the formation was backed into the Siding at 18.30 hours. Subsequently, while the engine was coming out of the Siding, the loco derailed.

**Cause:** Due to lack of track fittings (cotters) and due to formation of trench at shoulders of ballast on RH side.

**Staff held responsible:**

**Primary:**

- Sri. M. Ram Prasad Goud, JE/P.Way/JCL for slack supervision and for not noticing the deficiencies in the Siding where regular unloading of coal activities take place and thus violated IRPWM Amendment Slip No. 132.
- Sri. Chandulal, Gangmate/BABR for not taking immediate action after noticing the deficiencies in the Siding.

**Secondary:**

- Sri. P. Praveen Kumar, SSE/P.Way/KCG for slack supervision in which lack of fittings and due to formation of trench at shoulders of ballast on RH side which led to derailment.
- Sri. Srinaiyah, Trackman/BABR for not taking immediate action after noticing the deficiencies in the Siding.

**Blameworthy:**

- Sri. Devi Dass, TI/KCG for not reporting the Siding deficiencies and not taking immediate action on the inspection notes of Sr.DOM who inspected the station and siding on 13.4.2014.
- Sri. Ghouse Baig, SM/BABR for not reporting the deficiencies and not taking immediate action on the inspection notes of Sr.DOM and for late reporting of the derailment to Control Organisation (accident took place at 19.20 and information given at 20.20 hours).
- Sri. Rajesh Kumar, SM/BABR for not reporting the deficiencies in the Siding and for late reporting of the accident.

**Matters brought to light:**

- **After unloading the coal, removing the same by JCB (private party) caused a depth of 61 cm from rail top table bank adjacent to sleepers; lot of damages to fittings, sleepers and formation.**
- **SM/ASMs of BABR shown lethargic attitude in not taking any safety precaution and not cared for the Inspection notes of High Officials.**
- **TI/KCG inspected the station in a casual manner and not bothered to take care for rectification of deficiencies noticed by High Officials.**

**Suggestions:** Siding needs PSC track and retaining wall to avoid scooping of formation and ballast near the track.

\*\*\*\*

### **Flash News Letter No.3**

- 1. LP/ALPs shall look towards the Gateman and be prepared to stop the train, if 'danger' signal is exhibited by the Gateman as per SR 4.41.**
- 2. Guards shall look towards the Gateman and alert the LP to stop the train, in case 'danger' signal is exhibited by the Gateman as per SR 4.43.**
- 3. Station staff shall obtain the signature of the Guard (if the train is without Guard, SM has to sign) in the Stabled Load Register when any formation is stabled at the station (SR 5.23), and write wagon numbers for which hand brakes are applied and not by copying them from the Vehicle Guidance (VG).**

### **Irregularities noticed**

**1.0 Irregularities noticed in the working of staff of Operating Department:**

- 1.1 At Uppaluru station of BZA Division, it was noticed on 07.5.2014 that acknowledgement copies are not pasted in the Weather Warning Register as per Accident Manual and Disaster Management guidelines.**
- 1.2 On 13.5.2014, it was noticed during the inspection of Narsapur station of BZA Division that Shunting staff are not using the reliable hand signals, instead they are entirely depending on walkie-talkie sets. It was also noticed that Coaching rake was stabled on Road-3 which was not secured as per G&SR 5.23.**

- SMs are **not obtaining PNs** from the Guard of the trains during the BPAC/Block Instrument Failures to ensure the complete arrival of the train.
- 1.3 During surprise night inspection of KBA station of GTL Division on 17<sup>th</sup> June 2014, it was noticed that though Weather Warning messages from Central Control (one on 26.05.2014 & another on 03.06.2014) are recorded in the Control Office / GTL, the same are **not repeated to KBA station**. It was also noticed that both these messages were available at PIL station and only one message (03.6.2014) recorded at MPL station **All this indicate irregular working at stations and Control Office/GTL.**
  - 1.4 During the inspection of “A” Cabin of DHNE station in GTL Division on 15<sup>th</sup> June 2014, it was noticed that CASM cannot see the LV of trains coming on lines other than Road No. 1 & 2. Till such time BPACs are installed, the CASM shall exchange PNs with the Guard and a suitable modification is necessary to the SWR of the station.
  - 1.5 During the inspection of CTO station of GTL Division on 20<sup>th</sup> May 2014, it was noticed in the SWR of the station that as per Para 2.7 – block section limits is wrongly shown as “*commencing from LC Gate No. 27 towards SIE block station*” instead of Advanced Starter. As per Para 2.5.4, DN trains coming from SIE station (KPD direction) received on 2<sup>nd</sup> Loop line or on Goods loop line, **indirection reception (i.e., stop the train at the Home Signal and then take ‘off’ the signal) should be made due to unfavourable gradient as per CRS/SCC instructions**. The interlocking feature is that Home Signal cannot be taken ‘off’ when planned to receive the train on 2<sup>nd</sup> loop or Goods loop unless the train comes and stop in the calling-on zone (time lag of 120 seconds) **but this feature is not incorporated either under the ‘special features’ or in Appendix ‘B’ of the SWR which is essential.**
  - 1.6 Incoming Golconda Express No. 17201 arrived on PF No.5 of SC station at 16.10 hours on 4<sup>th</sup> June 2014, **Guard Sri. K. Padma Rao/SC failed to apply Guard’s handbrake in SC SLR 00728 when the loco was detached.**
  - 1.7 During the surprise night inspection of MKDI station of SC Division in the early hours of 5<sup>th</sup> June 2014, **Dy.SS Sri. N. K. Tekedar was not in possession of Block Competency and Electrical Competency for operating the Isolator Switch.**
  - 1.8 During surprise night inspection of MKDI station of SC Division on 05.6.2014 UP & DN BPACs failed between MDKI – SRUR stations at 22.50 hours of 4<sup>th</sup> June 2014. **But, failure entry in the S&T Failure Register was not made till 03.00 hours of 05.6.2014. Failure memo was not prepared.**
  - 1.9 During the surprise night inspection of MKDI station of SC Division on 5<sup>th</sup> June 2014, it was noticed **three UP trains were received on PLCT from SRUR station** from 22.30 hours to 23.30 hours of 4<sup>th</sup> June 2014 (Train Nos. UP PRLI at 22.48, 16031 at 23.08 and 12707 at 23.26 hours) **but the entries in T/B 1425** (Line Clear Reply Book) **was not made** by the Dy.SS/MKDI.
  - 1.10 During inspection of PAK station of GTL Division on 15<sup>th</sup> June 2014, line block was given vide TC No. 5/4 by Control Office on 5<sup>th</sup> June 2014, from 16.30 to 17.00 hours as per the record available with JE/P.Way/PAK and accordingly Disconnection Notice was also given. **But, it was noticed that Dy.SS failed to mention about line block message in TSR, in Station Diary and in Control Message Register which is mandatory and essential.** Even, the copy of Caution Order Message given by JE/P.Way/PAK to observe 30 KMPH at KM 63/7-13 at Mainline of PAK yard involving Point Nos. 30 & 28B **was not available in the station records.**
  - 1.11 During inspection of PAK station on 15<sup>th</sup> June 2014, it was observed that on 16.3.2013, **SSE/Signals/PAK** vide Message No. PAK/SG/C.O Signal dated 16.3.2013 advised SMs of CGI, MNPT,PAM, PAK, PTT, CTO, SID, RAM

stations that “**Auto route cancellation on admission of train on Calling-ON signal**” was given with a copy marked to Sr.DOM and Sr.DSTE/GTL. One copy of this message was also found pasted in the SWR of PAK. **The circuit modification is also executed but till date (in spite of completing 15 months) amendment to SWR is not issued.**

- 1.12 During Rear-window inspection by Train No. 12763 TPTY – SC Padmavathi Express between RU – GDR stations on 15<sup>th</sup> June 2014, **Ambush check** was conducted by removing **LV Board** was removed at KHT station. **SM & Pointsman of Yellakuru station failed to notice and alert the next LC Gate and SM/VKI. Gatemen of LC Gate Nos. 27, 24, 21, 19, 17 & 14 between KHT – YLK – VKI stations also failed to exhibit their alertness by showing danger or by shouting or by waving or by intimating to next Gate / station. Guard of the train Sri. S. Koteswara Rao of BZA Depot provided tail lamp at Venkatagiri station but not bothered to check and enquire about the missing LV Board.**
- 1.13 During surprise night inspection of Dupadu station of HYB Division on 15<sup>th</sup> May 2014, **Sri. A. Raja, Pointsman was tested ‘positive’ with 77mg/100ml of blood.**
- 1.14 **During the ambush check conducted by exhibiting ‘danger’ signal to the Guard of Train No. 17240 Simhadri Express at LC Gate No.3/A between GNT – NBR stations to test his reaction and response – Guard / BZA Sri. P. Jacob Babu though noticed the ‘danger’ signal did not make any effort to stop the train and enquire for the reasons; instead he was gesticulating at the Gateman as to why ‘danger’ signal is being exhibited.**
- 1.15 It was also noticed at the above LC Gate, Goods Guard Smt. Mohini Kumari who was working BOX ‘N’ Goods did not bother to look towards the Gateman, **which is in violation of SR 4.43.** Even the LP/ALP of the Goods train failed to look towards the Gateman, **which is in violation of SR 4.41.2.**

## **2.0 Irregularities noticed in the working of Engineering Department:**

- 2.1 On 14.5.2014, during the inspection of DIG station of BZA Division, it was noticed that Cold weather patrolling was in force between DIG-TEL & DIG-PVD stations but **beat book are not deposited** with SS/GIG and the Patrolmen are **not obtaining the signature from Gatemen as per Engineering Standing Order.**
- 2.2 During the push-trolley inspection between DHNE – MYL stations of GTL Division on 15<sup>th</sup> May 2014, it was noticed that;
  - SSE/P.Way/DHNE is not maintaining the safety drive register, he is not even aware of the safety drive in force.
  - Non-standard Warning boards are provided at Manned LC Gate No.149 & UMLCs No.147, 148.
  - ERCs greasing is due. Existing ERCs are seized & half driven, MS liners are missing and most of the PSC sleepers are in broken condition.
  - Road- I (PF No.1) of DHNE station, track portion is full of muck and improper drainage due to which the rails flange is fully corroded. Platform distance pieces are missing.
  - At KM 300/8-9, one PSC sleeper is fully broken due to scabbed rail and not holding the running rail. At the same location, FB weld without joggled fish plate was noticed which needs to be attended on priority.
  - Ballast deficiency was noticed at trespass & isolated locations.
- 2.3 On 4<sup>th</sup> June 2014, it was noticed at SC station of SC Division that though MMTS trains are dealt on PF No.4, **Signage boards such as ‘STOP’ boards for MMTS, ladies compartment, first class, physically challenged coach position, etc., are not provided.**

2.4 During rear-window inspection by Train No. 17233 Express from SC – KZJ on 4<sup>th</sup> June 2014, it was noticed that at **BG station – fouling mark needs to be relocated (kept side of the loop line instead of in between two tracks).**

### **3.0 Irregularities noticed in the working of S&T Department:**

- 3.1 It was noticed during the inspection of DHNE station of GTL Division on 15<sup>th</sup> June 2014 that **Junction arrangements** (i.e., interlocking Routing Starter Signals with respective Advanced Starter Signals) **is not provided which is essential as a policy matter and as per CSTE/Planning letter No. SG.190/PC/RRI/Vol. 5 dated 05.02.2007.**
- 3.2 During surprise night inspection of MKDI station of SC Division on 5<sup>th</sup> June 2014, **ESM/SRUR Sri. Chandrasekhar was available at the station and he was not possessing Block Competency Certificate. He has come to attend the BPAC failure during night but was not taking any personal safety care such as wearing shoes, carrying torch, etc.,**
- 3.3 During surprise night inspection of MKDI station of SC Division on 05.6.2014 UP & DN BPACs failed between MDKI – SRUR stations at 22.50 hours of 4<sup>th</sup> June 2014. **S&T Officials who came for attending the failure did not demand for the failure memo and did not bother to issue S&T Disconnection Notice T. 351. In fact, the SE/Signals did not even come to station; instead they started attending the gear from outside location. At 02.30 hours, the S&T Officials insisted the Dy.SS to take ‘off’ the LSS for the Goods train without S&T Disconnection / Reconnection, without obtaining failure memo, etc., At 03.00 AM, ESM prepared S&T Disconnection Notice with back time of 00.35 hours which was even signed and accepted by the Dy.SS.**
- 3.4 During the surprise night inspection of MKDI station of SC Division on 5<sup>th</sup> June 2014, it was noticed from the Signal Failure Register that **as many as 13 failures were recorded in the failure register for April 2014** (Signal Failures – 4, Axle Counter failures – 3, Track Circuit failure – 1, Block Failure – 1, IBS failures – 2, double entry – 2). In addition to the recorded failures, **two more failure were found which were not recorded**, i.e., as per failure memo record, on 1<sup>st</sup> April and 2<sup>nd</sup> April 2014 there were failures but **failure entry not made.**
- 3.5 As per Signal Failure Register of MKDI station, on 15.4.2014 from 23.20 to 01.05 hours of 16.4.2014, **UP route was held up.** During this intervening period, the **S&T Officials have not taken the Relay Room key** for attending the failure. However, as per remarks passed, one relay Q.NI, S-30 ASPR-3 was replaced. How this was possible **without opening the Relay Room is not understood?** As per Relay Room Key Register entry, it was seen that the Relay Room Key was taken from 02.00 to 07.10 hours (**5 hours 10 minutes**) on 16.4.2014 for attending of **‘UP route held up’ failure.** From this, it can be seen that these two issues are in contrast and not convincing, i.e., taking the Relay Room key after rectification time of ‘UP route held up’ failure and keeping the Relay Room “OPEN” for above 5 hours is not proper.
- 3.6 At MKDI station of SC Division, it was noticed on 5<sup>th</sup> June 2014 that **Safety Point Alarm efficacy of the equipment was tested by not altering the points for two DN Trains on DN Mainline and found that it is not working in spite of the arrival of trains beyond 5 minutes.**

### **4.0 Irregularities noticed in the working of Mechanical Department:**

- 4.1 Ramp is not provided for the movement of equipment trolley into LV-9 pit line of BZA station as noticed during the inspection on 06.5.2014 (CAMPTECH Design) and also difficult for the maintenance staff to enter the Pitline **since foot steps are not provided.** Off side (West side) Rake examination Trolley Pathway is obstructed by OHE mast on LV-9. Catwalk between LV-9 and LV-8 pit lines is obstructed by Drinking water Pipes at three places. Water stagnation is found in more places and



Mass formation in layers were noticed in LV-8. Lighting facilities: Out of **200 pit lights** in LV-8 only **180 are burning**. Out of **200 pit lights** in LV-7 only **72 were burning**.

- 4.2 **On 17.6.2014, ambush check was conducted at LC Gate between KBA – TAT stations of GTL Division by Exhibiting Stop Hand Signal** to the LP of T.No.57478 Passenger and found that LP, ALP and Guard of the train failed to look and react which is in **violation of G&SR 4.41 and 4.43**.
- 4.3 During the inspection of Crew Lobby / DHNE station on 15<sup>th</sup> June 2014, it was noticed that LP Sri J. Dharma Reddy Pass/DHNE during sign “ON “at 21.24hrs on 10.01.2014 was **tested positive** with. 222mg/100ml on first occasion and on second occasion at 21.29hrs 225mg/100ml. D&AR action is yet to be initiated.
- 4.4 During the inspection of PAK station on 15<sup>th</sup> June 2014, it was noticed that Train No. 17615 / 16 KCG - MDU weekly Express – Crew of TPTY Depot take charge of this train at 13.55 hours from DMM and work the train upto PAK after a run of 5 ½ hours. Fresh crew from TPTY will work the train from PAK to KPD for a short journey of 1 ½ hour. The point of concern is that; Incoming crew from DMM and outgoing crew from TPTY are not signing ‘off’ / signing ‘on’ at PAK; instead they are going / coming as pilot to / from TPTY. The waiting time for the crew bound to KPD from PAK is about 2 hours and 45 minutes. **Both the crews do not undergo BA test at PAK since no sign ‘on’ / ‘off’.**

#### **5.0 Irregularities noticed in the working of Electrical Department:**

- 5.1 On 08.5.2014, it was noticed in Train No. 17213 that in ACCW 96059(A-1): **Rope for pulling the emergency window glass at Seat 36 was not provided.. Earth Leakage Test:** was done found ‘Positive’ in ACCW 96059, ACCN 08108 and ACCN 98103. In both ACCNs inverter door glass fittings are not available

#### **Man of the month Awardees (Oct. Feb. & Mar 2014)**

Sri. Anjaiah SS/KDM	Sri. Sherkhan LP/GTL	Sri. G. Suman Engineering Gateman
Sri. K.N. Rao LP/BZA	Sri. Anwar Basha ALP/GTL	Sri. B. Konda Naik SS/DIG
Sri. P. T. Prasad ALP/BZA	Sri. P. Ramana LP/BZA	Sri. Ch. Bhima Raju Engineering Gateman
Sri. V. N. Rao Guard/SC	Sri. M. Hari Krishna ALP/BZA	Sri. K. J. Suresh SM/’D’ Cabin/BZA
Sri. J. Parasuramulu APM/PDPL	Sri. Maske Satish LP/PAU	Sri. B. Sriramulu Sr. Passenger/Guard/RJY
Sri. Sk. Jaffer Ali Guard / KZJ	Sri. Akash Kamble ALP/PAU	Sri. Sanjay Kumar Guard/BZA
Sri. R. S.Ashok Guard/KZJ	Sri. Prahlad Gopala Keyman/KNVT	Sri. T. V. S. Narayana SM/SLO
Sri. P. R. Ganesh Guard/SC	Sri. G. Edukondalu Traffic Gateman/TUNI	Sri. A. Srinivasulu LP?Shunter/BTTR
Sri. K. G. Nawaz Pointsman	Sri. A. K. Upadhyay SM/NWBH/BZA	Sri. Ch. Ananda Rao LP/Goods/RJY
Sri. J. Lakshminarayana LRASM/KKM at GPY	Sri. M. Yerram Naidu Engineering Gateman/KYM	Sri. J. Praveen ALP/RJY
Sri. L. V. Naidu Gateman of LC Gate No. 99/T	Sri. B. Sai Krishna Reddy Tech/III of SSE/PSI/SLO	

**LOCO RUNNING STAFF** – Do blow intermittent long whistles from W/L board which are provided 600m before level crossing; and continuous long whistle from R W/L boards which are provided at 250m before Level Crossing on single line sections.

**INSPECTING OFFICIALS** – Conduct qualitative inspections.

**LP & ALPs** – Do pick up the aspect of signals from appropriate locations and control the train accordingly.

**OPERATING STAFF** – Do not allow S&T Officials to interfere with S&T gear without taking “failure memos” during failures; and demand S&T Disconnection Notice (T.351) wherever necessary as per Appendix XIII of G&SR.

**CHIEF SAFETY OFFICER  
HEADQUARTERS SAFETY  
ORGANISATION**