

**SOUTH CENTRAL RAILWAY**

# **VIGIL**

**QUARTERLY SAFETY BULLETIN NO.3**

**SEPTEMBER - 2014**

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**My dear Railwaymen**

**This quarter, i.e., September 2014 ending, the overall trend of accidents increased by 50%. Steep increase was noticed in yard derailments which have gone up by 400% (i.e., from 1 to 5). Hyderabad, Vijayawada and SC Divisions have contributed for more yard accidents.**

**There were two cases of SPAD, one at KVR station of BZA Division and another in SC Division. This is apart from incidences of backing a train on trailed through points resulting in derailment, cranking the dead loco without ensuring the required brake power resulting in derailment at TPTY, backing the Goods train from Siding of YDLP station of GTL Division without obtaining permission of SM resulting in derailment in trap point, etc., which are preventable incidences**

**Since majority of accidents are preventable, I urge the field staff to follow the laid down instructions and safety procedures to achieve 'zero' yard accidents and enhance the safety performance of the Railway.**

**(S. P. SAHU)  
CHIEF SAFETY OFFICER**

**Section "A" KNOWLEDGE**  
**Extracts of Railway Board letters**

**Sub: Running of trains at 160 KMPH on Indian Railways network.**

**Ref: Railway Board letter No. 2014/Safety (DM)/7/12 dated 03.7.2014.**

Railway Board has decided to upgrade speeds upto 160 KMPH in three identified sectors, namely; Delhi – Agra, Delhi – Kanpur and Delhi – Chandigarh. Further, some additional sections are being identified for running trains at 160 KMPH.

LHB coaches and WDP-4 diesel locomotives have already undergone necessary oscillation trials and RDSO has issued speed certificate for running the rolling stock at 160 KMPH. In these identified sections and as and when new sections are identified, Zonal Railways should accordingly process to obtain the CRS sanction to run trains at 160 KMPH.

Action may please be initiated accordingly at the earliest.

**(Sanjay Garg)**  
**Advisor/Safety**

**Sub: Conducting mock exercises for handling actual crisis situations.**

**Ref: Railway Board letter No. 2013/Safety (DM)/6/4/CM dated 02.7.2014.**

Secretary (Security), Cabinet Secretariat has desired details of mock drills / test carried out by the Railway since 2009 with dates for handling actual crisis situation.

In this connection, it is stated that instructions are issued from time to time to conduct mock drills not only with local Administration, example Civil Administration, Police, Health, Fire, etc., but also with NDRF for preparedness to deal with actual crisis situation. Mock drills are also to be conducted for ARTs / ARMVs.

It is requested that details of such mock drills / test carried out by the Railways since July 2009 with dates along with action taken to revise Crisis Management Plans in the light of experiences gained during these exercises may please be furnished within a fortnight so as to apprise Secretary (Security), Cabinet Secretariat.

**(P. Srinivas)**  
**Director / Safety-III**

**Sub: Meeting between Zonal Railways and  
Commissioner of Railway Safety.**

**Ref: Railway Board letter No. 2013/Safety  
(A&R)/CCRS meeting dated 03.7.2014.**

In the letter under reference, decision of Board was intimated that General Managers of Zonal Railways shall hold meeting with CRS before the meeting at Board's level is organized. In this regard, compliance has been received only from SER, SECR and WR. It is requested to kindly hold a meeting at the earliest with the concerned CRS under intimation to Board.

**(Sanjiv Garg)**  
**Advisor / Safety**

**Sub: Operation of Moped Trolleys.**  
**Ref: Railway Board letter No. 2014/Safety (A&R)/19/13 dated 07.7.2014.**

Recently, there has been an accident involving Moped Trolley and Train No. 57381 between Vijayawada – Ramavarappadu stations of BZA – GDV section of BZA Division of South Central Railway in which one Moped Trolley coming from opposite direction, dashed with the train engine.

In this connection, on perusal of G&SR of some of the Zonal Railways, it has come to notice that provisions have been made in Subsidiary Rules that Cycle Trolleys and Moped Trolleys shall be treated as push trolley in all respects for the purpose of these rules except where otherwise provided for.

It has been decided by Board that with a view to prevent probability of such accidents, henceforth, light Motor Trolley / Moped Trolley / Scooter Trolley be treated at par with Motor Trolley. Accordingly, all the rules regarding working of Motor Trolley will be applicable to light Motor Trolley / Moped Trolley / Scooter Trolley. Necessary modification may be made in respective SRs and a copy of the same be forwarded to Board for information by 11<sup>th</sup> August 2014.

**(Om Prakash)**  
**ED/Safety**

**Sub: Unusual occurrence of collapsing of two spans of ROB on wagon No. SER 18027 BCNL (9<sup>th</sup> from TE) of Train No. UP BMKI/DC in Muzaffarpur station yard of Sonepur Division of ECR on 27.11.2013.**

**Ref: Railway Board letter No. 2004/M(L)/466/7101/5 dated 11.7.2014.**

CRS/South Eastern Circle, vide Para 7.3 of the preliminary report of the subject accident has recommended as under;

*“Railways should impose temporary speed restriction of 10 KMPH under the ROB along with provision of stationary patrolman when the ROB is opened for road traffic after repairs. All crew and Guards should be advised to pass the location very cautiously”.*

All the Zonal Railways are advised to take necessary action as recommended by CRS/SE Circle through Caution Order.

**(Alok Kumar Mishra)  
Director / Mechanical Engineering (Tr)**

**Sub: Deployment of Gate Counsellors / Gate Mitras on UMLCs.**

**Ref: Railway Board letter No. 2014/Safety (A&R)/Level Crossing (Pt.) dated 22.5.2014.**

The issue of providing Gate Counsellors / Gate Mitras on important UMLCs was discussed in GM's Conference held on 3<sup>rd</sup> & 4<sup>th</sup> April 2013, vide Para 10.4. The minutes of above conference were circulated vide Railway

Board's letter dated 08.5.2013 under reference. The said Para 10.4 reads as under;-

***“CRB emphasized the need of spreading awareness in the rural area to reduce the number of accidents at UMLCs. GM/CR informed that Gate Counsellors have been engaged by CR in some Divisions to counsel people at the UMLCs. CRB and Advisor/Safety desired that the Central Railway experiment should be emulated by other Railways also”.***

In compliance of the above, WCR has identified vulnerable UMLCs in each Division and deployed Gate Counsellors / Gate Mitras at those locations. The Gate Counsellors / Gate Mitras at present have been deployed on 34 vulnerable UMLCs from 07.00 to 19.00 hours. The arrangement has been found extremely useful in ensuring safety on vulnerable UMLCs on WCR.

Zonal Railways may like to assess the performance and usefulness of deployment of Gate Counsellors / Gate Mitras at UMLCs by Central Railway and WCR and devise similar schemes to reduce LC accidents at UMLCs till the time they are eliminated by grade separation (ROB/RUB) or by merger / diversion / closure / manning. In this regard, reference is also invited to directions of Hon'ble MR on 31.8.2009, communicated vide Railway Board's letter dated 02.9.2009 (Vide Para 5.2) which states as under;

***“Manning of level crossing has to be given priority. If staff is not available it may be examined as to whether manning can be done under PPP”.***

**(Sanjiv Garg)  
Advisor/Safety**



**Sub: Deployment of Ex-Servicemen at UMLCs on IR.**  
**Ref: Railway Board letter No. 2014/Safety (A&R)/Level Crossing (Pt.) dated 04.8.2014.**

This is in continuation of this office letter of even no. dated 22.5.2014 wherein all Zonal Railways were advised to deploy Gate Counsellors / Gate Mitras on UMLCs in the same manner as has been done by Central Railway and West Central Railway. However, in view of the continued adverse trend of consequential accidents at UMLCs and concern expressed in all quarters for elimination of such accidents, it has been decided to deploy only **Ex-Servicemen** as Gate Counsellors / Gate Mitras on pilot basis at vulnerable UMLCs on Northern and North Western Railway in pursuance of Cabinet Secretary's letter dated 24.7.2014 as referred above.

Accordingly, both Zonal Railways are requested to utilise the services of **Ex-Servicemen** who may be drawn from the State **Ex-Servicemen by the State Governments and/or Government of India**. It is expected that both the Zonal Railways will be able to implement this pilot scheme within one month of receipt of this letter. Kindly frame your action plan accordingly. The experience of this pilot scheme will then be utilized for further expanding and/or modifying the scheme, based on the lessons learnt.

This scheme is being monitored by PMO. A timeframe for implementation may be advised.

**(Sanjiv Garg)**  
**Advisor/Safety**

**Sub: Elimination of UMLCs on IR.**

**Ref: Railway Board letter No. 2014/Safety (A&R)/Level Crossing (Pt.) dated 11.8.2014.**

1.0 In view of the large number of consequential accidents on UMLCs and the resultant casualties which have been giving adverse publicity to the Railways in the media as well as Parliament, there is an urgent need to tackle this problem at the earliest. Presently, the following four options are available for elimination of UMLCs.

I. **Closure:** Closing UMLCs having NIL / negligible TVUs.

II. **Merger:** Merger of UMLCs to nearby manned or UMLCs or subway or RUB or ROB by construction of diversion road.

III. **Provision of sub-ways / RUBs**

IV. **Manning:** The UMLCs which cannot be eliminated by above means, are to be progressively manned based on the rail-road traffic volume, visibility conditions, etc.,

2.0 It is imperative to take immediate steps for complete elimination of all UMLCs in a short span of time say, in one or two years. Hence, every Zonal Railway is required to examine the traffic pattern on each UMLC and decide early on one of the above mentioned options for closure of the same. The Zonal Railways need to realize the urgency for closure of the UMLCs since the traditional pace of closure of UMLCs (6502 have been closed in the last 6 years with 8300 still remaining on the BG system), is not adequate and fresh time lines need to be drawn for each of the above four options.

3.0 Meanwhile, every Division should identify those UMLCs where regular movement of school buses

takes place and the same should be immediately taken up for manning / closure on priority.

4.0 Also, an analysis of accidents on UMLCs which have taken place in the last three years, should be done in the next fortnight and they should be identified for closure by one of the above means.

5.0 The requirement of extra posts of Gateman will arise. The efforts made in creation of Gateman posts in last 5 years may be brought out while sending proposals for posts creation to Board. Needless to emphasise that action at Zonal level for identifying surplus posts be taken before the proposals are sent to Board. A complete action plan is to be drawn up by every Zonal Railway in this regard and sent to Board by 31.8.2014.

This letter is issued with the approval of Railway Board (CRB).

**(Sanjiv Garg)**  
**Advisor / Safety**

**Sub: Accidents on level crossings on IR.**

**Sub: Railway Board letter No. 2014/Safety (A&R)/14/9 dated 19.8.2014**

1.0 In view of the continued adverse trend of accidents on manned and unmanned level crossings on Indian Railways, it has been decided by Board to hold a safety meeting with General Managers of all Zonal Railways on 21.8.2014 at 15.00 hours in the Committee Room of Rail Bhawan, New Delhi. GMs are requested to come prepared with all information regarding level crossings and suggestions for prevention of accidents on the same.

2.0 In the meanwhile, the following data is to be sent by email to Director/Safety-II [directorsafety2@gmail.com](mailto:directorsafety2@gmail.com);

- (i) Present status of all non-interlocked traffic gates and the target date by which they will be interlocked (position of each such gate on every division to be provided);
- (ii) Present status of all UMLCs in regard to the following options:
  - I. Closure
  - II. Merger
  - III. Provision of subways / RUBs
  - IV. Manning

Zonal Railways are required to provide specific time lines for each UMLC with respect to either of the above options identified for implementation for each gate.

- (iii) In respect of those UMLCs where partial or complete physical infrastructure (lifting barrier, gate lodge, gate phone, etc.,) have been provided, target dates by which manning of such gates will be done by the Railways to be provided.
- (iv) Details of induction of manpower in the following heads:
  - a. Fresh manpower inducted in Engineering Department of each Division since April 2012 (year-wise).
  - b. Current vacancies in the category of Gateman in Engineering Department on each Division;
  - c. Number of additional Gateman inducted in Engineering Department since April 2012 on each Division;
  - d. Number of fresh Group “D” staff inducted in Operating Department on each Division; and
  - e. Current status of vacancy position of Gateman in Operating Department on each Division.

3.0 Vide Railway Board’s letter No. 2014/Safety (A&R)/Level Crossing (Pt.) dated 22.5.2014 and

subsequent letters dated 4.8.2014 & 11.8.2014, all Zonal Railways were advised to deploy Gate Mitra / Gate Counsellors on UMLCs. The progress made so far to be communicated to Board for discussion during the meeting.

4.0 Vide Railway Board's letter No. 2014/Safety (A&R)/LC Boards dated 22.5.2014 & 4.8.2014, all Zonal Railways were advised to install a second whistle board (repeater) for level crossings at a distance of 250m in advance of level crossings. Progress made so far each Division of every Zonal Railway to be communicated to Board for discussion during the meeting on 21.8.2014.

5.0 The above information is to be made available to Director / Safety-II through email by 18.00 hours of 19.8.2014.

**(Sanjiv Garg)**  
**Advisor / Safety**

**Sub: Provision of retro-reflective arrows on the signals to indicate the direction pointing to the line to which it refers.**

**Ref: Railway Board letter No. 2014/Safety (A&R)/19/Misc/17 dated 14.8.2014.**

Advisor / Signal during his inspection of Delhi and Bhopal Divisions has observed that retro-reflective arrow indication tapes have been provided below signals in multiple lines section for both Shunt and main signals. This helps LP for better identification of signals.

However, at present there is no standardization of design of arrow indications, as a result, different Railways are following different designs in terms of size, use of retro-reflective tape or simple paint, etc.,

With a view to issue uniform instructions on the subject and also to standardize the design of arrow indicators, the present practice being followed on your Railway be advised along with your suggestions / feedback on the proposal.

**(Om Prakash)**  
**ED/Safety**

**Sub: Pending accident / D&AR inquiry cases – delay in start and completion of inquiries and finalisation of D&AR in accident cases.**

**Ref: Railway Board letter No. 2014/Safety (A&R/2/10 dated 14/19-8-2014.**

It has been brought to the notice of the Railway Board vide your Railway letter (CSO/SER) dated 5.8.2014 as referred above that there has been delay in finalization of disciplinary proceedings against staff held responsible by the Accident Inquiry Committee in the case pertaining to ID 6816.1.1 wherein it has been stated that ‘**delay was due to reluctance of Engineering / Construction Organisation**’.

There is a fairly well established procedure for fixing up responsibility in accident cases whereby the Accident Inquiry Committee by following the due process establishes the cause of the accident and fixes responsibility on staff (if any). The accident enquiry report is duly accepted by the competent authority. Thereafter, there should be no hesitation on the part of the disciplinary authority to initiate prescribed disciplinary action against staff held responsible for the accident. Hence, it is not understood as to why disciplinary authority in the present case was ‘reluctant’ to initiate disciplinary action. You are requested to counsel the concerned disciplinary authority in this regard as delay in finalization of accident inquiry cases is not acceptable at any level.

**(Sanjiv Garg)**  
**Advisor / Safety**

**Sub: Functioning of VCD on locomotive.**

**Ref: Railway Board letter No. 2014/Safety (DM)/7/1 dated 25.8.2014.**

VCD (Vigilance Control Device) is provided on the locomotive to monitor the alertness of the LP through multi-resetting system which gets reset by specified normal operational activities of the crew, in addition to the acknowledgement of the push button provided for crew. In absence of normal driving functioning or acknowledgement at specified intervals the device will activate emergency brake application after due audio / visual warning.

There were incidences of SPAD / collision reported to Board by Zonal Railways due to lack of alertness of crew and VCD was found to be in isolated condition. These cases could have been avoided, if VCD were in working condition.

In view of the above, Zonal Railways are advised to ensure that;

1. No locomotive should be turned out from the shed with VCD in defective / isolated condition.
2. On run, if VCD becomes defective, LP should isolate the VCD only after getting an authorization to do so from the PCOR / TLC.
3. If the VCD gets defective / isolated on run, the locomotive should be declared as failed at loco changing point or destination.
4. Loco Sheds should thoroughly investigate the reasons for VCD malfunctioning or becoming defective on run and initiate corrective action.

To monitor the activation of VCD on run, the following procedure should be followed over the Zonal Railways;



1. In all locomotives VCD counter should be provided.
2. At the time of taking over charge and handing over charge of the locomotive, the crew should record the VCD counter numbers in the loco repair book.
3. On arrival at the Shed, the crew involved in the VCD activation on run should be identified and the concerned controlling officer for corrective action should be advised accordingly by the Loco Shed.

Compliance of the above instructions should be closely monitored at both Divisional and Zonal Headquarters Officers level.

**This letter is issued with the approval of Railway Board (MT, MM & ML).**

**(Sanjiv Garg)  
Advisor / Safety**

**Sub: Minutes of the meeting on safety held by Member Traffic.**

**Ref: Railway Board letter No. 2014/Safety (A&R)/14/4 dated 31.7.2014.**

Board (MT) in its safety review meeting held on 07.7.2014 as decided as under;

**“CSOs should be directed to analyse each accident in detail and send their analysis along with a copy of the accident report to Board”.**

CSOs may please seen for compliance, analysis of consequential train accidents may please be furnished to Board's office in respect of consequential accidents which took place during the current year i.e., from 1<sup>st</sup> April 214 onwards. Railways reply may please be furnished on FAX No. 011-23382638 as well as on SMDMS.

**(Ashish Kumar)  
Director / Safety-II**


## Section “B”

### Some important rules – Private Number (BWM)

#### **Private Number (PN:)**

- a. Two PN sheets shall be supplied and they shall be numbered and signed by the TI. The PN sheet shall be kept under the personal custody of the SM.
- b. PN shall be given for each train when line clear is granted. Both the SMs shall record the PN given and received for the train in the respective TSRs. When a number is allotted to a train, it shall be scored out with a line drawn horizontally through it. If a PN is allotted to a train the running of which is subsequently cancelled, the same PN shall not be re-allotted to any succeeding train.
- c. If the next number to be used is the same as the one last issued, the sender shall cancel the number and issue the next number. The SM at the receiving end shall be held responsible for seeing that no two consecutive PNs are received from the same station giving line clear.
- d. Each sheet when exhausted, shall be sent in a sealed cover to the TI of the section who shall replace with the fresh one.
- e. Only one sheet shall be in use at a time. Care shall be taken to see that adjacent stations are supplied with different series. Not more than two PN sheets shall be available with staff on duty and the PN sheets shall be serially numbered.

- f. TI or any other inspecting official shall see that PNs are scored out correctly and that the train number and date are entered against each.
- g. When the PN sheet is lost or mislaid, the SM shall utilize, if available, the PN sheet supplied for future use. The SM shall also immediately write to the TI for fresh one.
- h. Used PN sheets shall be preserved for 6 months after the half year in which they are completed and after that they shall be treated as old records and disposed off.

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**Section "C"**  
**Latest Amendments**

**Sub:- Amendment Slip No.12 to G&SR – 2010**

\* \* \* \*

The following modification to GRs & SRs has been given for implementation.

This Amendment supersede advance correction slip No.12 (item No.1 & 2) issued vide this office letter of even No. dated 01.03.2013 and . 23.04.2013

**Item No.1: GR 3.83. is modified as follows:**

GR 3.83. Assistance of the engine crew regarding signals.—

- (1) The Loco Pilot **and** Assistant Loco Pilot, as the case may be, shall identify each signal affecting the movement of the train as soon as it becomes visible. They shall call out the aspects of the signals to each other.
- (2) The Assistant Loco Pilot shall, when not otherwise engaged, assist the Loco Pilot in exchanging signals as required.
- (3) The provisions of sub-rules (1) and (2) shall, in no way, absolve the Loco Pilot of his responsibility in respect of observance of and compliance with the signals.

**Item No.2: SR 4.65.1.4 is modified as follows:**

SR 4.65.1.4 Competency Certificate for persons authorised to drive tamping machine:

All self propelled track machines shall be treated as a train for all purposes.

- (i) No person shall be permitted to drive any type of track machine unless he has undergone stipulated training and passed the examination at ZRTI/MLY in General and Subsidiary Rules. A Technical Competency Certificate shall be issued by Dy.CE/Track Machines or any other Competent Engineering Officer nominated by PCE.
- (ii) The certificate shall be valid for 3 years unless revalidated after undergoing a refresher course at ZRTI.
- (iii) He shall possess a certificate of medical fitness issued by a Railway Medical Officer as prescribed for train Loco pilots.

**Item No.3: SR 4.50.1 in S.No. 9 Add the Following as (h) after (g) :**

**(h) approaching level crossing from repeater whistle board wherever provided at a distance of 250 m short of Level Crossing.**

**Item No.4: SR 4.50.3 is modified as follows:**

SR 4.50.3 Whistle Boards are provided at a distance of 600 metres on the approaches to all unmanned level crossings and on the approaches to such manned level crossing gates outside station limits where a clear view of the line from the level crossing gate is not available. It should be reduced to 350 metres in case of unmanned level crossings on single line section where visibility is clear. Loco Pilots of trains, on noticing whistle boards shall sound their engine whistle intermittently long from the time they approach a whistle board till they pass the relevant level crossing / LC Gate. **At unmanned level crossings wherever repeater whistle boards have been provided at a distance of 250 mtrs short of level crossings, Loco Pilot shall continuously give engine whistle from the repeater whistle board.**

**Item No.5: Para No 9.5.1(ii) of Appendix-VIII is modified as follows:**

9.5.1. Conditions for attaching of dead locomotive-

**ii) Escorting of dead locomotive attached to freight and passenger carrying trains is not necessary if the brakes are fully operational and the dead locomotive is attached next to the train engine. The dead locomotive is to be escorted by competent person not lower than Assistant Loco Pilot when attached in the rear of the brake van or has defect in under gear equipment.**

**Item No.6: Para No 9.5.2 of Appendix-VIII is modified as follows :**

9.5.2. Attaching/hauling of dead locomotives by passenger trains:

**v) Dead locomotive can be attached to Mail / Express train including super fast trains but excluding Rajdhani and Shatabdi / Duranto trains.**

This is issued with the approval of the Competent Authority.

Necessary printed page replacement correction to the relevant pages will be issued later.

All concerned may please be notified.

for Chief Operations Manager

## **Sub:- Amendment Slip No.13 to G&SR – 2010**

\* \* \*

The following modification to SRs has been given for implementation.

**Item No.1: SR 15.18.1.3 is modified as follows:**

**15.18.1.3** Cycle trollies or trollies which are propelled by pedaling instead of pushing, and **Light Motor trollies/Moped trollies/scooter trollies are driven by a motor. They may be pushed when necessary, but not pulled.** Cycle trollies and **Light Motor trollies/ Moped trollies/scooter trollies** are so designed as to be capable of being removed from the track by two men. Seats should also be provided in Cycle trollies and **Light Motor trollies/Moped trollies/scooter trollies** for at least one person other than the person or persons pedaling or driving to sit facing towards the rear continuously to give adequate warning of approaching trains.

**Item No.2: SR 15.18.1.5 is modified as follows;**

**1.5 Light Motor trollies/ Moped trollies/scooter trollies shall be treated as Motor trollies in all respects for the purpose of these rules except where otherwise provided for.**

**Cycle trollies shall be treated as push trollies for all purposes.**

**Item No.3: Delete 15.23.3.1 and 2 and add the following as 15.26.3:**

**SR 15.26.3. Working under block protection:**

During day, when the visibility is not clear and during night a push trolley shall work only under block protection.

**Item No.4: Delete 15.26.4.1 and 2 and add the following as 15.24.4:**

**15.26.4. Speed of trollies:**

The speed of a trolley or cycle trolley shall not exceed 15 KMPH.

**Item No.5: SR 15.26.8 & 15.26.9 are modified as follows:**

**15.26.8. Spring points/Catch siding:**



The official in-charge of the **Light Motor trollies/ Moped trollies/ scooter trollies** shall stop short of the spring/ catch siding points, lift it off the track, if necessary and place it on the correct line, before proceeding further.

9. The Official in-charge of the **Light Motor trollies/Moped trollies/scooter trollies**, while approaching level crossings, shall look out for the road traffic and ensure safe passage for his cycle / moped trolley.


This is issued with the approval of the Competent Authority.

Necessary printed page replacement correction to the relevant pages will be issued later.

All concerned may please be notified.

for Chief Operations Manager

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<b>ASPECTS TO BE CHECKED ON ART/MRV</b>		
<b>1</b>	<b>Complete ART formation is to be stabled in one hook and the double entry facility to be made available for all ARTs to facilitate quick turn out.</b>	
<b>2</b>	<b>The full-fledged Disaster Management exercise to be organized periodically to have the practical experience to ART nominated staff.</b>	
<b>3</b>	<b>Hydraulic re-railing equipment, running of power pack under load and no load condition and test the jacks for its efficient working.</b>	
<b>4</b>	<b>Condition of wire ropes and rope test certificate.</b>	
<b>5</b>	<b>Check LPG lamps whether they are properly burning, spare mantles available or not.</b>	
<b>6</b>	<b>Check working of hydraulic and electrical operated cold-cutting equipment, availability of spares and maintenance of tools, ask for demonstration and see whether staff is conversant with its usage.</b>	
<b>7</b>	<b>Fire extinguishers general condition and next refilling date.</b>	

<b>8</b>	<b>Check whether staff know as to how to use the fire extinguisher.</b>	
<b>9</b>	<b>Detonators availability and its due date.</b>	
<b>10</b>	<b>Check whether wooden/iron wedges are available in all the coaches.</b>	
<b>11</b>	<b>Check all the measuring instruments and gauges are kept as per the requirement. Check whether the calibration dates are due.</b>	
<b>12</b>	<b>Check whether standard items list display board is provided with location plan by the Mechanical, S&amp;T, Engineering, Electrical and Medical Departments.</b>	
<b>13</b>	<b>Check the compliance of last inspections.</b>	
<b>14</b>	<b>Check AMC is available for critical items like HRE, HRD, and inflatable lights etc.</b>	
<b>15</b>	<b>Check whether joint inspections are carried out as per schedule.</b>	
<b>16</b>	<b>Check whether mock drills are conducted or not and number of staff present during mock drill</b>	
<b>17</b>	<b>Availability of spare kits for all types of jacks.</b>	

<b>18</b>	<b>Functioning of inflatable air-bags.</b>	
<b>19</b>	<b>Whether AMC is available for HRE &amp; HRD?</b>	
<b>20</b>	<b>Any other observations</b>	

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**Section “E”**  
**Accident cases**

1. **Brief of the accident:** On 21<sup>st</sup> July 2014, at 08.07 hours, when Train No. 12650 NZM – YPR Karnataka Sampark Kranthi Express was on run between KCG – FM stations of HYB Division, train parted in two portions between S-8 and S-7 (5<sup>th</sup> from TE) at KM 12/10.

**Cause:** The headstock of the Coach No. SWR WGSCN 95244 – PEV end worked out due to lack of fusion and lack of penetration in the weld of centre plate to inner headstock. During the headstock replacement in POH in 2008 at MYS Workshop in SW Railway, repairs were not carried out as per welding practice which resulted in welding joint strength reduced and failure has taken place in service which resulted in train parting.

**Matters brought to light:** NIL

**Staff held responsible:** CWM/MYS Workshop staff of SW Railway.

**Suggestions and recommendations:**

- a. RDSO needs to specify the guidelines and procedure for inspection of welding joint for headstock apart from corrosion repairs during IOH and POH schedules in the Shops.
- b. After carrying out the corrosion repairs to underframe headstock during POH, guidelines from RDSO is needed for conducting load test in Workshop.

2. **Brief of the accident:** SNF Station - On 10<sup>th</sup> August 2014, at 13.00 hours, 10 BOBYNL + 1 BV rolled back from sorting line No.2 to Steel Siding – 1 and hit the dead end and infringed the SNF – MLY bye-pass line and resulted into derailment of BV + 2 wagons. The wagons escaped from the stabled location and travelled for about 1 KM before derailling at the dead end. On the previous day, i.e., on 9<sup>th</sup> August, 24+1 BOBYNL (loaded with ballast) was received on GL-2 of SNF station and the train was further backed into sorting line No. 2. Out of 24 wagons, 14 loaded wagons were despatched to HYB at 02.00 hours of 10.8.2014 leaving the 10+1 wagons in stabled condition.

**Cause:** Due to improper stabling and securing precautions.

**Staff held responsible:**

- a. Sri. G. Tirupalli Das, Dy.SS / SNF
- b. Sri. B. Chandrasekhar, Pointsman / SNF
- c. Sri. R. Ajay Kumar, Pointsman / SNF
- d. Sri. T. Hanumanth, Assistant Pointsman / SNF

3. **Brief of the accident:** On 20<sup>th</sup> August 2014, at 03.55 hours, KPCC Goods was despatched into RTPS Siding from Yadlapur station of GTL Division by taking 'off' Shunt Signal. After the clearance of the train beyond the Shunt Signal, the Dy.SS normalised the trap point, i.e., kept in 'open' position. LP of the train experienced inability to haul the load into the siding and hence, decided to back the train to pick up momentum. But, the train crew failed to ensure that the trap point is 'closed' before backing the train and as a result of that BV + 2 wagons derailed.

**Cause:** Crew of the train backed the train without obtaining the prior permission of Dy.SS / YDLP and without ensuring the trap Point is closed.

**Staff held responsible:** LP, ALP & Guard of the train are held responsible.

4. **Brief of the accident:** On 22<sup>nd</sup> August 2014, Train No. 17405 (ADB – TPTY) Krishna Express arrived at MUE station at 00.25 hours. Loco reversal is essential to work the train towards SC direction. Accordingly, the Guard applied handbrake in the Guard Compartment of the incoming rear SLR and got down to get into the SLR at the other end of the formation (will now become working SLR). The Pointsman applied handbrake in the incoming front SLR before detaching the loco for reversal. Guard of the train changed his SLR and released the handbrake in the now working SLR (earlier front SLR) **but failed to release the handbrake of rear SLR which he worked the train from ADB to MUE.** Crew started the train after a detention of 40 minutes for loco reversal at MUE. SM/SVN which is immediately next to MUE noticed sparks emanating from the front SLR when the train was running through the station and alerted the crew on walkie-talkie who have stopped the train between SVN – UMRI and released the brake blocks and continued their journey. The loco crew also claimed that they have checked the next to engine SLR at DAB and found no unusual. When the train was received at NZB station, the Mechanical Staff who were on rolling 'in' / 'out' duties noticed heavy sound in the vehicle and examined the coach at station which had developed flatness of 65mm and 3mm depth on the wheel of the front SLR. The coach was detached at NZB.

**Cause:** Non-ensuring of releasing of hand brakes before leaving MUE by the Guard of the train.

**Staff held responsible:** Guard of the train Sri. Taher Hussain, PAU of NED Division who worked the train right from ADB to NZB for failing to ensure personally whether the handbrake of both SLRs are released when the train stopped at MUE for 40 minutes.

5. **Brief of the accident:** On 10<sup>th</sup> August 2014, DN 12797 Venkatadri Express (KCG – CTO) was received on non-platform line at Rajampet station of GTL Division. The train was having schedule stop at Rajampet. SM/Hastavaram taken line clear for Venkatadri Express from SM/RJP and accordingly the train entry was made in the TSR, **but SM/RJP mistook it as Goods train and hence made arrangement to receive it on Mainline which is non-platform line and given through signals after consulting SCOR.** LP of Venkatadri Express stopped the train on through signals and enquired SM/RJP who replied that he thought that it is Goods. After the departure of the train, SM/RJP gave arrival & departure timings to SCOR but did not bother to inform the ‘all-concerned’ whereas the Guard of the train gave ‘all-concerned’ message.

**Cause:** Miscommunication between two SMs and SCOR.

**Staff held responsible:** Sri. T. Balachandrudu, SM/HAQ and Sri. C. Subramani, Dy.CHC/GTL are held responsible.

6. **Brief of the accident: (SPAD)** On 22<sup>nd</sup> August 2014, Train No. 12850 Down SC – SHM Express was signalled for reception onto DN Mainline at Kovvur station by the Station Master at 14.01 hours by taking ‘off’ DN Home Signal to ‘caution’ aspect since the block section ahead is still occupied by Simhadri Express. LP of the train is supposed to come and stop near the DN Mainline Starter Signal for clearance of Simhadri Express. **But the LP of the train passed Starter Signal at ‘on’ and stopped after passing a length of engine + 4 coaches.**

**Cause:** Late reaction and late application of brakes.

**Other matters brought to light:** Home Signal was passed at 14.06 hours at a speed of 83 KMPH and DN Mainline Starter Signal at 14.07 hours at a speed of 54 KMPH as per the analysis made from the datalogger report.

**Staff held responsible:** Sri, S. K. Osman, LP /BZA & Sri. K. V. Narayana, ALP / BZA.

7. **Brief of the accident: (SPAD)** On 25<sup>th</sup> August 2014, SM/SKP issued PLCT + T. 369 (3b) to pass DN LSS and DN IB Signals (between SKP-NPL) at ‘on’ position due to failure to the LP of DN 17319 UBL – SC

Express. After obtaining the documents, the LP started his train at 10.38 hours and passed the DN LSS + DN IBS at 'on' **but, the LP also ignored the Gate Stop Signal of LC Gate No.22/E at 'on' and passed the LC Gate in 'open' condition.** Gateman of LC Gate No.22/E complained about this to SM/NPL who in turn intimated SM/LPI to stop the train and enquire. The train was stopped at LPI and fresh crew has relieved them to work the train to SC.

**Cause:** Failure of LP to obey the 'stop' aspect of LC Gate Signal and ignoring the presence of LC Gate. He mistook that the given documents permit him to pass all signals between SKP-NPL at 'on'.

**Other matters brought to light:** Block instrument replacement work is programmed and permitted by SCOR because of which PLCT was issued. SM/SKP obtained line clear at 10.20 hours for this train and informed Gateman of LC Gate No. 22 at 10.25 hours much ahead of the arrival of train (train arrived at 10.37 and left at 10.38). Gateman closed the gate and took 'off' Gate Stop Signal for 17319. Gateman took oral permission from SM for a nature call and after returning, he came to know that the train has not yet passed and hence, asked permission of SM to put back the Gate Signal and 'open' the gate for clearing the road traffic. **But, the Gateman after clearing the road traffic failed to close the gate and take 'off' Gate Signal again for the train.**

**Staff held responsible:** Sri. Xavier Cruze, LP/SC, Sri. Sanjay Kumar, ALP/SC and Sri. V. Ramesh, Gateman of LC Gate No. 22/E.

8. **Brief of the accident:** On 29<sup>th</sup> August 2014, at 11.30 hours, a dead loco No. 11449 which was on Road No.4 of TPTY station of GTL Division was asked to be cranked and then bring the empty rake of 17430 Rayalaseema rake from pitline towards RU end onto platform. Accordingly, the LP/Shunter took charge of the dead loco and cranked the loco which started rolling passed Starter Signal No.44 at 'on' and derailed in the Trap Point No. 118.

**Cause:** The dead loco when stabled, the truck isolation cut out cock was in 'closed' position as such the pressure in the gauge was 'zero' which was not noticed by the Shunter after cranking the dead loco. He also took the notch without ensuring the brake power of the loco leading to derailment.

**Staff held responsible:** Shunter/TPTY.

9. **Brief of the accident:** On 1<sup>st</sup> September 2014, Train No JCL/BCNHL left MLY Yard at 11:40 hours towards MJF direction of HYB Division



and at 11:43 hours 14<sup>th</sup> from TE front trolley 04 wheels derailed towards MJF end. Main line free. ART/SC was ordered and wagon re-railed at 15:10 Hrs and track fit given at 18:30 Hrs.

**Cause:** Due to Excessive curvature Degree.

10. **Brief of the accident:** On 4<sup>th</sup> September 2014, at RDM Station GDK Siding derailment took place at 13.00 hours while giving placement in GDK siding with Loco no 23370+05 BOXN Empties trail through point No 7 and LP immediately backed resulting in derailment of loco and 04 wagons by all wheels. MFD /BPA ordered at 04:55 hours which left 06:00 hours and arrived spot at 07:15 hours. MFD/KZJ ordered at 06:00Hrs which left 06:40 hours, arrived spot at 09:10 hours. Loco re-railed at 08:45 hours and 05 wagons re-railed at 12:35 hours and track 'fit' given at 15:50 Hrs.


**Cause:** Backing the loco subsequent to trail through of local points by the LP caused derailment.

11. **Brief of the accident:** On 2<sup>nd</sup> September 2014, at TPTY station of GTL Division at 06.00 hours empty rake of T. No 17405 (TPTY-ADB) Express was given movement from pitline to Road 7 which was obstructed by some coaches. The Shunter and Shunting Staff were communicating each other on walkie-talkie. But, due to non-functioning of walkie-talkie, the Shunter bumped against the stabled coaches which caused buffer interlocking of coaches in the formation.

**Cause:** During shunting operations, relying only on walkie-talkie by the staff resulted in the incident of buffer interlocking.

12. **Brief of the accident:** On 9<sup>th</sup> September 2014 at 00.20 hours while Train No BCNHLE was admitted on DN Common loop of BN station of SC Division 6<sup>th</sup> wagon (from engine) door hit DN Main line Starter & the 7th wagon No. SCR-33091227889 derailed. ART/ SC was ordered at 00.31 hours, left base at 01.05hrs & arrived at the site at 02.15hrs. Main line was made free & certified 'fit' at 01:15 hrs. Wagon was re-railed at 03:00 hours.

\*\*\*\*



1. Catch siding is intended to protect ..... section and Slip siding is intended to protect ..... section.
2. What action to be taken when a signal is newly erected or when signal is resited?
3. Whenever a train trails through a wrongly set points, the LP shall -----
4. Shunting operations can be controlled by -----
5. Accidents are classified into ----- categories and they are -----
6. PN Sheets shall be preserved in the station after its completion for a period of -----
7. Signalling plan is prepared based on -----.
8. Minimum Horizontal distance from center of track to any structure as per the revised SOD
9. Quad cable is used for -----
10. In RE area the distance between two earth pits shall not be less than -----

### **KEY**

1. **Station section, Block section.**
2. **Signal Sighting Committee shall inspect, caution Order to be given for a period of 10 days, notify the same in the crew lobby through an SOB**
3. **Immediately stop the train, consult the Guard and SM, proceed onwards if considered safe and never back the train.**

- 4. Fixed signals, Hand signals & Verbal instructions**
- 5. Five (5), they are Train accidents, Yard accidents, Indicative accidents, Equipment Failure and Unusual incidences.**
- 6. Six months from the half year ending in which it is completed**
- 7. Type of signaling, class of station and standard of interlocking.**
- 8. 2360 mm**
- 9. Axle Counter**
- 10. 3 metres.**

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**Section “G”**  
**Safety drives launched**

No.Safety.387/SD/Vol.V.

Date: July 25, 2014

GM expressed serious concern over the recent Unmanned LC accident involving a Passenger Train and School Bus that had occurred on Hyderabad division on 24.07.2014, in which 18 dead and 20 injured. Despite repeated drives and inspections, accidents at unmanned LCs continue. Though Railways is not directly responsible for the accident, yet we are responsible for monitoring and ensuring the provision of infrastructure etc., at UMLCs. Hence, the divisions are advised to conduct a fortnight long drive with immediate effect on the following aspects:-

1. Thorough inspection of safety measures including basic infrastructure at UMLCs such as road surface, Road surface and stop boards, whistle boards speed breakers and visibility for the road users etc,
2. Checking the whistling habits of drivers while approaching the Level Crossings.
3. Publicity campaign through various media including News Papers, Television, Radio and slides in cinema halls to educate road users to observe all precautions while moving across UMLCs.
4. Organising public awareness campaigns to educate /counsel villagers and road users and make them aware of the provisions of motor vehicles act and railway act.
5. Putting up posters and banners to strengthen public awareness on safety at UMLCs.
6. Interaction with the village panchayats to involve their volunteers in publicity campaigns.
7. Distributing Pamphlets, hand bills etc., in village panchayats, Markets, Petrol Pumps and other public places through Scouts and Guides and other teams.

8. Directed SMS on mobile phones to road users staying near UMLCs in rural areas.
9. Organising Nukkad Nataks at strategic locations.
10. Regular announcements at stations through P.A. System regarding precautions to be taken at UMLCs.
11. Organising safety measures at various places in the divisions including Road Transport Offices.
12. Joint Ambush checks involving RPF, GRP and Civil Authorities at the level crossing and apprehending errant road users under Sections of M V Act.
13. Whether R W/L Boards are provided on the approaches of the LCs on either side on single line section. If provided, whether SOB is given and individual counselling done for LPs/ALPs.
14. Road Safety Counsellors: Whether wide publicity given to Loco running staff about the location of UMLCs where 'Road Safety Counsellor's are provided. Whether Crew knows their role in their absence. Whether any identification board is provided to know by the LPs/ALPs about the approach of UMLCs 'Road Safety Counsellors'.
15. All UMLCs ready with infrastructure should be manned as per GM's instructions following the accident cited above.

Imperative that DRMs should personally monitor safety drive at UMLCs.

After completion of the drive an action taken report containing checks conducted, deficiencies noticed and corrective measures taken shall be advised to this office certain.

Chief Safety Officer

Date: August 21, 2014.

No.Safety.387/SD/Vol.III.

On 10.08.2014 at Sanatnagar Station on SC division, stabled loads rolled and hit the dead end and derailed. The accident was due to improper securing of stabled stock. In view of this incident, divisions are advised to conduct intensive checks for a fort night of stations

where coaching rakes/goods trains are stabled. It should be ensured that all stations are covered within a fortnight. The drive shall commence with immediate effect. Concerned Officers and Senior Supervisors may be involved in the above drive. The details of the checks may be advised in the enclosed format on or before 8.9.2014.

Chief Safety Officer

No.Safety.387/SD/Vol.III.

Date: August 28, 2014

On 25.08.2014 a rear end collision between a light engine and a Passenger train occurred on NF Railway resulting in injuries to 13 Passengers. GM directed to advise all DRMs on shunting safely. As directed by GM a drive for a fortnight may be conducted with immediate effect. The drive shall focus on the following:

- Whether rules prescribed in G&SR 5.13 i.e., showing of hand signals in addition to fixed signals is being followed strictly.
- Whether LP is vigilant and cautious.
- Whether the speed during shunting does not exceed 15 KMPH.
- Whether shunting staff observe precautions during shunting.
- If shunting engine is allowed for attaching/detaching of coaches, ensure stoppage of engine at 20 meters before attaching the formation.
- Pointsmen should invariably accompany the light engine when movement is given onto obstructed line. LP/Shunter should invariably be informed about the movement.
- Light Engines should not be left unmanned.
- Usage of mobile phones by LPs/ALPs while on duty.

It should be ensured that all major yards are covered during the drive. On completion of the drive a consolidated reply may be advised with irregularities noticed and the corrective action taken on each of the above aspect by 16.09.2014 certain.

Chief Safety Officer

No.T.387/TRAFFIC/SPL.DRIVE.

Date: 12-05-2014

**Sub:** Operating safety drive to ensure adherence of GR.5.13 to 18 and Appendix-XII by SMs/YMs/ASMs/Shunting Jamedar / Shunting Master while performing shunting operations at stations.

It has been decided to launch a 10 days Operating safety drive on the above subject commencing from 14-05-2014 to 23.05.201, the drive shall be conducted by all the Officers & Supervisors of Operating Department. The drive is to be conducted to check the following aspects:-

1. Proper setting & locking of points with cotter & bolt/clamp during non-interlocked movement.
2. Check whether adequate No. of air hose/hose pipes of wagons are Coupled while performing shunting.
3. Whether Shunting staff are accompanying the train during shunting operations or not in major yards.
4. Check whether any short shunting is performed (stopping without clearing opposite shunt signal and backing).
5. Whether T.806 is issued detailing the shunting to be performed.

During the drive, DOM/Gs are advised to inspect major station/yard in the division where regular shunting is being performed. After completion of the drive, details should be sent to the undersigned in the following pro-forma by 28.05.2014.

**CTM / G&PP**

No.T.387/TRAFFIC/SPL.DRIVE.

Date:17.05.2014.

**SUB:** Operating safety drive for checking availability of brake van equipment and Guards personnel equipment and functioning of pressure gauge in BV / SLRs of Goods / Passenger trains.

As ordered by COM, it has been decided to launch a 15 days operating special drive for checking availability of BV Equipment and Guards personnel equipment and functioning of pressure gauge

in BV / SLRs of Goods / Passenger trains from 17.05.2014 to 31.05.2014:-

During the Drive, the following aspects are to be checked.

1. As per S.R 4.19 availability and functioning of FP/BP gauge in SLRs of passenger carrying trains, whether calibration has been done or not.
2. Availability and functioning of pressure gauge and adopter/coupler with goods trains, whether the same is fixed in the Brake van or not.
3. Conducting of Air-Pressure continuity test.
4. Operating Officers and Section TIs personally conduct air continuity test in their jurisdiction and ensure proper fixing of gauges.

A Special drive involving Sr.DOMs, DOM/Gs other Operating Officers and TIs of the Division shall be conducted to ensure compliance of COM instructions.

After completion of the drive, details should be sent to the undersigned in the following pro-forma by 31.05.2014.

**CTM /G&PP**

No.T.387/TRAFFIC/SPL.DRIVE.

Date: 12-08-2014.

**SUB:** Operating Safety Drive - Precautions to be observed during stabling and securing of Vehicles/formation on running lines GR/SR.5.19 and within station limits SR.4.57.

As ordered by GM, it has been decided to launch a 10 days Operating special drive from 13.08.2014 to 22.08.2014 to observe the following:-

**Securing the formation within station limits (GR/SR.4.57.1)**

1. The SM/Guard is responsible to ensure that the hand brakes of the vehicles are applied before the engine or brake-van is detached from the train.



2. At station, if the gradient is not steeper than 1 in 600, the hand brake of the brake- van or in the absence of the brake – van, hand brakes of 6 vehicles shall be applied.
3. If the gradient is steeper than 1 in 600 but not steeper than 1 in 260, hand brakes of brake – van and 6 vehicles or 12 vehicles shall be applied.
4. If the gradient is steeper than 1 in 260, the hand brakes of the brake-van and 12 vehicles or 18 vehicles shall be applied.

**Stabling on running lines (G.R./S.R.5.19)**

1. Vehicles detached from a train shall not be allowed on a running line for a longer period than absolutely necessary.
2. They shall be coupled together and all the necessary hand brakes of vehicles and brake van to be applied.
3. Vehicles not provided with hand brakes shall be secured by chains.
4. At night, the side and tail lamp of coaching vehicles at both ends shall be switched on. If not, fix hand signal lamp showing red at both ends. In case of goods vehicle berthed on main line tail lamps, if available, duly lit, shall be fixed at both ends during night time.
5. Red ink entry shall be made in TSR.
6. The SM shall advise and exchange private numbers with cabin ASMs when running line is occupied and cleared.
7. The occupation of running lines shall be recorded in the station diary at the time of handing over and taking over charge.
8. Whenever possible, track machines should be stabled on non-running lines or on lines which are isolated from other running lines. When the track machine is stabled on a running line due to unavoidable circumstances, the mechanical hand brake shall be applied and the machine shall be securely chained to the rails.

**In case of roller bearing vehicles stabled on running lines/sidings GR/SR.5.23**

1. The formation should be wedged, chained and padlocked.

2. Crossovers which give access to running lines shall be kept clear of vehicles.
3. At least six wagons from each end shall have their brakes applied tightly in addition to the brake of the brake-van.
4. The points must be set against the blocked line, clamped and padlocked. The padlock keys must be kept under the personal custody of the SM.
5. The brakes shall be applied by the station staff under the personal supervision of SM / Guard as per the SWR. Wherever possible, such wagons shall be stabled on lines which are isolated from other running lines

**CTM / G&PP**

No.T.387/TRAFFIC/SPL.DRIVE

**Date: 03-09-2014**

**Sub:** Operating Safety Drive – Testing/Checking the effectiveness of the Detonators and comply G.R.3.64 and S.R there under.

It is decided to conduct operating safety drive to check the effectiveness of detonators as per GR.3.64 and SR. there under for a period of 10 days from 05.09.2014 to 14.09.2014.

It is advised to check the following items:

1. Whether the required numbers of Detonators are available at station as per SWR and with Guard and Loco Pilot.
2. Whether life of detonators are available or not.
3. Whether the manufacturing dates marked on the tin and on the detonators inside the tin are same or not.
4. If the life of Detonator is extended, whether the certification for that lot is available or not.

A drive involving Sr.DOMs, DOM/Gs, other operating officers and TIs of the division shall be conducted to ensure the compliance of the above instructions (.)

On completion of drive, a detailed report shall be submitted in the format given below to the undersigned on or before 19.09.2014.

T.387/TRAFFIC/SPL.DRIVE

**Date: 03-09-2014**

**Sub: Operating Safety Drive - Precautions to be observed**  
**GR.3.64. Knowledge and possession of detonators**

\* \* \*

As ordered by COM, it has been decided to launch a 10 days Operating special drive from 05.09.2014 to 15.09.2014 to observe the following:-

**S. R. 3.64.1 Stock of detonators**

Check whether case containing the actual full stock and ensuring that the stock of detonators is never allowed to fall below the minimum.

**Use of detonators.**

1. For use, a detonator shall be placed on the centre of the head of the rail with the label or brand of the detonator upwards, and shall be securely fastened to the rail by bending the clasps attached with the detonators, round the upper flange of the rail.

2. Station Masters, CCCs and PWIs are responsible for ensuring that the detonators in possession of the railway servants under them are tested as prescribed under the rules and that the staff know how and when to use them.

3. Each Station Master, CCC and PWI will maintain a register of receipts, use and testing of detonators in respect of railway staff to whom the detonators were issued by him.

**S.R.64.5. Testing of Detonators.**

Check whether normal life of detonators is 7 or 5 years and certificates is available or not.

At stations, Loco Sheds, etc., where stocks of detonating signals are kept for issue to Guards, Loco Pilots, Fog signalmen or other railway servants, Station Masters, the CCC or other railway persons in charge of such stock shall test at least one detonator from each tin case issued to the staff.

**CTM / G&PP**

**Section “H”  
Accident Statistics**

**Division-wise number of accidents in different categories**

	BZA		GNT		GTL		HYB		NED		SC		Total	
	2013-14	2014-15	2013-14	2014-15	2013-14	2014-15	2013-14	2014-15	2013-14	2014-15	2013-14	2014-15	2013-14	2014-15
<b>Collisions</b>	∞	∞	∞	∞	∞	∞	∞	∞	∞	∞	∞	∞	∞	∞
<b>Derail Mid-sect.</b>	1											1	1	1
<b>Derl.At station</b>		1			1			2					1	3
<b>Manned LC</b>														
<b>UMLC</b>	1		1	1			1	2			1		4	3
<b>Fire</b>														
<b>Miscellaneous</b>		1						1	1		1	1	2	3
<b>Averted Collision</b>					1								1	
<b>SPAD</b>		1						1	1		1	1	2	3
<b>Yard Accidents</b>	1	1	2	1		5		1	2		3	5	8	13
<b>Others</b>										1			1	
<b>Grand Total</b>	3	4	3	2	2	5	1	6	5		5	7	19	24