

**SOUTH CENTRAL RAILWAY**  
**HEADQUARTERS SAFETY ORGANISATION**  
**BI-MONTHLY SAFETY BULLETIN – March & April 2015**

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**DETAILS OF UNUSUALS AND ACCIDENTS THAT TOOK PLACE**  
**DURING MARCH & APRIL 2015**

1. **Brief of the incident:** On 13.3.2015, at 2327 hours, LP of Train No. UP 12735 SC – YPR Garibrath Express passed UP Mainline Starter Signal No. S-35 of MQR station in SC Division at ‘ON’ and cleared into next station CT.

The train was regulated on Mainline of MQR for precedence of one Goods and one Express train (Bombay Express) since the Garibrath Express was running ahead of schedule. When loop line signals for run through of UP RTPS Goods was cleared by Dy.SS/MQR, LP & ALP of Garibrath Express mistook the signals and started their train from Mainline duly trailing through the points and entered block section towards CT station.

**Cause:** Disregard of signals by LP & ALP of Garibrath Express.

**Matters brought to light:**

1. It is noticed that the LP of UP 12735 SC – YPR Garibrath Express stopped the train immediately after clearing the rear fouling **instead of drawing the train upto the Starter Signal / Stop Boards as per SR 4.49.1.**
2. SM/MQR claimed that he was busy in issuing tickets from the other room **but the UTS statement print out taken out showed that no tickets were issued between 22.52 hours of 12.3.2015 to 00.05 hours of 13.3.2015.**
3. **The call data of ASM/MQR show that he was busy in talking to 4 persons after the incident of SPAD and trail through of points.**
4. SM/MQR **failed to react swiftly** after hearing to the LSS buzzer in putting back the UP IBS.
5. SM/CT should not have directly received the Garibrath Express by taking ‘off’ Home Signal into the station when he knew that the train for which he had granted line clear, i.e., UP RTPS Goods is not coming; instead other train, i.e., Garibrath Express is coming.
6. **SM/CT also committed the grave mistake of manipulating the train entry in TSR of CT by scoring ‘off’ two PNs** (one for Axle Counter section and another for IB Section) on his own **when he had not given line clear at all for this train.**
7. SM/CT also failed to intimate the LP, ALP & Guard of UP 12735 that they are being relieved with fresh crew.
8. **Signal Sighting Committee Reports** – Though the Signal Sighting Committee in their previous reports **brought out the visibility problem of UP Loop line** Starter signal due to the presence of station name board, the **Division did not take any action for the last so many months.**
9. From the entry made in the Joint Inspection of Points & Crossings Register on 30.01.2015, Point No.17B was having excessive opening of 122mm on RH side against the permitted 115±3mm and the same was not rectified.
10. After trail through of Point No.17B by Train No. 12735 Garibrath Express, it was observed that there were no damages on the tongue rail except creation of a gap. It was however surprising to note that detection of Point No. 17B was intact after the passage of the train despite gap between switch rail and stock rail. **The issue of not breaking of motor detection contact allowing signals (UP Home & UP Loop Starter ) to go back to ‘off’ position despite switch gaping after the SPAD**

**incidence requires further investigation. This is not considered a ‘failsafe condition’.**

11. S&T Disconnection Notice (T. 351) given for attending the bursted Point is a **joint work with Engineering Department and no remark to that effect was made on the face of the Disconnection Notice which is in violation of SR 3.51.6. Secondly, before issuing Reconnection Notice, “Track fit” certification was not obtained which is in violation of SR 3.51.7.4.**
12. SCOR Sri. K. L. Chandrakanth who was working on Board No.1 (SKP-WADI) is a Mail/Express Guard working in Control Office for the last fortnight. **He is not a trained person to work as Controller. Permitting non-trained person to work as Controller is not in conformity with Railway Board letter No. 99/Safety-I/25/1 dated 10.3.2000. It is also noted that 10 such untrained persons are utilized to work as Controller. Division need to streamline the procedure of early selection and utilizing trained Controllers only.**
13. SCOR Sri. K. L. Chandrakanth and CHC/Punctuality Sri. G. Nageswara Rao’s reaction subsequent to getting the information of SPAD appears to be very slow. Control Voicelogger output reveal that they have not instructed and guided SM/CT about the necessity of conducting BA test immediately on arrival at CT
14. Divisional Officials failed to conduct brake power test for Train No. 12735 Garibrath Express before permitting it to start at CT station subsequent to the incident of SPAD at MQR which is in violation of Para 902.1 (vi) of Accident Manual.

**Suggestions and recommendations:**

1. Divisions are instructed to issue SOBs to all Crew Booking points to follow the SR 4.49.1 and give wide publicity and intensive counseling on the subject to prevent cases of SPAD.
2. Divisions shall also issue SOB re-iterating the contents given in GR 3.83 (3) which stipulate that LP is solely responsible to observe and comply the aspect of signals.
3. Division to study and delink the Commercial duties from SMs wherever feasible.
4. Division shall take immediate and appropriate action on the deficiencies noticed by the Signal Sighting Committee. DRMs to closely monitor and rectify the shortfalls noticed in a timeframe. These should be discussed in weekly safety meetings in the Divisions.
5. There is a need to look into the crew links (involving GTL Division).
6. **Engine Turn Table:** The provision of engine turn tables at 3 locations (i.e., at MLY, KZJ & GTL stations) though sanctioned way back, there is **no progress on these works.** **This provision is felt essential to minimize the cases of diesel loco working with long hood.**
7. Action may be taken to maintain 8 hours shift duties of ASMs as per roster and avoid over hours working.
8. Special monitoring of newly recruited and posted ASMs to be ensured by TIs. Committee also felt that the training module of ASMs may be reviewed to include more inputs of field training particularly, hands on training for handling unusual situations.
9. Crew to be sensitized about the need to have constant look out on signal aspect till they pass it.
10. LIs to monitor their nominated LPs working in foreign Divisions / Railways.
11. **Timetabling Section of Division & Headquarters:** For this particular train, the departure time of the train at SC is 19.50 and departure time from CT is 00.10 hours, i.e., **260 minutes for covering a distance of 169 KMs for Superfast Express.**

**Staff held responsible:**

**Primary:**

- a. Shri. Shaik Sher Khan, Mail/Express LP/GTL for passing UP Mainline Starter Signal No. S-39 at “ON” (**Rules violated GR 3.83, 3.81, SR 4.49.1**).
- b. Shri. ChandanKumar, ALP/GTL for passing UP Mainline Starter Signal No. S-39 at “ON” (**Rules violated GR 3.83, 3.81, SR 4.49.1**)

**Secondary: - NIL -**

**Blameworthy:**

- a. **ASM/MQR (Sri. Jitendra Kumar Choubey)**: For not reacting swiftly in understanding the situation and not putting back IBS. Also, for not responding to the calls made by the LP/ALP & Guard, Gateman of LC Gate No.4/T.
  - b. **ASM/CT ( Sri. Sanjeev Kumar)**: For manipulating the train entry made in TSR of CT of Train No. 12735 Garibrath Express. Secondly, for not intimating the GLP of Train No.12735 immediately that they are being relieved.
  - c. **Guard of Garibrath Express (Sri. Robinson Thomas)**: For not asking the LP to draw the train upto the foot of the Starter being in-charge of the train and knowing the rule provision.
  - d. **CLI/GTL (Sri. Sk. Mannan Shareef)**: For not making the LPs to follow the laid down instructions of SR 4.49.1.
  - e. **Signal Sighting Committee**: Though the Committee noticed the visibility problem at MQR due to the presence of station name board, they did not comment on the previous inspections in which the same problem was repeated. They should have written the compliance of previous inspection / non-compliance before beginning the report of the fresh inspection.
  - f. **SC Division Safety Department**: For not monitoring the defects noticed / irregularities noticed by the Signal Sighting Committee.
- 2. Brief of the accident**: On 29.3.2015, at 03.07 hours, LP of BJW / BTPN Goods passed UP Home Signal at ‘ON’ of SKZR station of SC Division and entered into station loop line.
- Cause**: Disregard of signals by LP & ALP who slept on duty.
- Matters brought to light**:
- a. Supervisory console to be provided with separate password for clearing absent period and bio-data edit. It should be with the Railway Supervisor as it involves safety. On 26<sup>th</sup> March 2015, the ALP was given booking after off’ PR, but he became absent on 28<sup>th</sup> March 2015. ALP approached CCC/KZJ and given absent report. It appears that he has tried to get absent cleared with non-run to run option with the help of outsourcing staff since password is open to all outsourcing staff.
  - b. In this case, speed chart of the train was not required to finalise the conclusion. However, the Compact Flash Memory Card of the speedometer (Stesalite make) was removed from Loco No. 31456 (ELS/TAT) to extract data, but data could not be extracted. The data from internal memory also could not be extracted due to defective SPM. In the absence of speed data, the actual speed of the train while passing the signal could not be established. In other case also, Stesalite speedometer make became defective and could not be retrieved.
- Suggestions & recommendations**:
- a. All LPs should not hesitate to bring ALPs in alertness on duty during run to the notice of Power / Traction / SCOR and vice-versa.
  - b. Monitoring of LP/ALP by LIs should be more during night times compared to day time.
  - c. No. of seminars to be conducted at regular intervals at all crew lobby locations.

d. Guard was not able to explain the procedure of continuity test. Guards should be counseled by SMs / TIs frequently.

**Staff held responsible:** LP & ALP of the train as 'primary', Guard of the train as 'secondary' and CLI/KZJ under 'blameworthy'.

3. **Brief of the incident** (Averted Collision): On 24<sup>th</sup> April 2015, at about 1630 hours, DN RC 139 Goods was received by taking 'off' Home Signal onto a line which is occupied by DN BTPN Goods at SNF station of SC Division. SNF station has 4 Goods R&D lines, of which L1, L2 & L3 are provided with non-interlocked points with transmission of key by the In-charge of Goompty to CASM towards WADI end. However, these lines are totally interlocked towards SC End. The berthing track is provided by track circuit with indications in Dy.SS/PF Office. On the day of the incident, L1 was occupied by DN BTPN Goods, L2 was occupied by coupled engines and L4 was occupied by another Goods train. The only line free was L3. LP of DN RC 139 who was admitted on to Goods R&D lines by taking 'off' Home Signal stopped just before KL Point No.114 since the Point was set for L1 which is occupied by a Goods train. Immediately after stopping the train, the Pointsman working in the Goompty came running and altered the points and then allowed the train.

**Cause:** Wrong setting of points by the In-charge Goompty and not ensured by Dy.SS/PF & SM in Yard duties.

**Staff held responsible:** Division was advised to conduct enquiry.

4. **Brief of the incident** (bumping): On 30<sup>th</sup> April 2015 early morning hours, Shunter with loco No. 13377/WDG3A/MLY while attaching to Empty rake of 57561 KCG – MMR Passenger at KCG station of HYB Division gave a bump as a result of which the buffer interlocking took place. Subsequent to the buffer interlocking of front SLR with loco, the train was started without front SLR by the station Authorities without proper message / authority.

**Cause:** Rough and careless shunting.

**Staff held responsible:** Enquiry ordered by the Division.

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#### **1.0 Irregularities noticed in the working of staff of Operating Department:**

- a. On 24<sup>th</sup> March 2015, it was seen at RJY station of BZA Division that Caution Orders are collected by LP & ALP from the Dy.SS/PF Office **whereas the Guards are not collecting from the Dy.SS;** instead they are collecting it from outsourcing staff of Crew Lobby **without any acknowledgement which is in violation of Appendix I of G&SR provisions.**

- b. During the inspection of DN 12721 Dakshin Express rear SLR No.00729/SC on 22/23.4.2015, Sri E. Chiranjeevi Rao, M/Express Guard/SC who was working the train from HYB to SC was **not having valid Automatic Competency Certificate. Stretcher** one of the vital BV Equipment as per SR 4.19 was **not loaded** at HYB station which is the originating station for this train apart from primary maintenance of the rake.
- c. During the surprise night inspection of ASAF station of SC Division on 23.4.2014 that ASM on duty from 17.00 hours of 22.4.2015 to 07.00 hours of 23.4.2015 (14 hours). Attendance Register was checked and seen that the ASMs are working on their own roster instead of the Official roster. Instead of following the official roster, they are performing 07.00 to 17.00 hours and 17.00 to 07.00 hours **on number of days which is unsafe.**
- d. SMs of ASAF do not possess the working knowledge of block forward & block back during shunt movements. It was noticed that they are writing 'block' back instead of 'block forward' when the rake is shunted towards KZJ in the right direction. They are also issuing the T.806 Shunting Order to the LP much in advance of the actual shunt movement (more than 3 hours in advance) keeping the PN column 'blank' and authorising the LP to pass DN LSS at 'ON' which is incorrect.
- e. The activity of exchanging 'All-right signals' for mainline trains from 'off' side is totally ignored from 00.00 hours to 06.00 hours at ASAF station of SC Division on 23.4.2015, though 2 Pointsmen were on duty. Both the Pointsmen were deputed to go into the Siding instead of one Pointsmen.
- f. During the inspection of MAGH station of SC Division on 23.4.2015, Loco interception was being carried out for UP JCWS Goods on UP Mainline and the formation was not secured with hand brakes (6 on either side), no skids (2 on either side) were placed, Guard failed to apply hand brake in the BV. BV was checked and found that Sri. Soul, Goods Guard/KZJ was **not having pressure gauge, not having walkie-talkie, no CUG, no tail lamp, administration supplied HS lamp not working and only 4 detonators available in a plastic cover.**

## **2.0 Irregularities noticed in the working of Engineering Department:**

- a. On 24<sup>th</sup> March 2015, at RJY station of BZA Division, one contractor material lorry No. AP 5x 3425 was found moving on PF No.3 at 08.05 hours and lorry driver **does not possess driving license. No Railway Supervisor** was supervising the work to ensure safety of trains and passengers on platforms. **Authorised contractor Supervisor was also not available with vehicle** or on PF No.3.
- b. During surprise night inspection of LC No:237/E interlocked between VJA-SJL stations of GNT Division on 8<sup>th</sup> April 2015, it was noticed that TAWS (Train Approach Warning System) and Dead approach locking facility is provided. **But, fresh GWR subsequent to the interlocking and provision of above equipment is not incorporated.**

### **3.0 Irregularities noticed in the working of S&T Department:**

- a. **Discrepancy in the panel interlocking noticed at PBN station on 27<sup>th</sup> March 2015 - There is an Engineering LC Gate No. 120 protected by independent Gate Signal No.4 in the DN direction. This Gate Signal is also Distant Signal of PBN for DN direction. When the Gateman of LC Gate No. 120/E closes the gate and takes 'off' Gate Signal No.4, the entire route on mainline is getting locked automatically on the panel without the knowledge of SM. As a result of this, if reception signal is taken 'off' in UP direction, the same is flowing back to normal. Secondly, even if the Point No.28 is in 'R' position, still the mainline route is getting locked. The TOC available in SWR of PBN station was checked and found that the closure of LC Gate No. 120/E is not proved in both reception and departure signals. At times, the necessity of ESM's presence is essential to attend and rectify the route locked situation in all the three directions. This is a serious Operating constraint and safety hazard which needs to be rectified immediately.**
- b. **Cable meggering of PAU station in NED Division is overdue from 9<sup>th</sup> March 2014.**

### **4.0 Irregularities noticed in the working of Mechanical Department:**

- a. **On 27<sup>th</sup> March 2015, during the inspection of Pantry Car by Train No. 12715 NED – ASR Sachkhand Express, register of handing over and taking over by three Department Supervisors i.e., Mechanical, Electrical & PC Manager (in each trip) was not available as per the JPO No. 04/2011.**
- b. **Front SLR No.SC 98716 by Train No. 12715 NED – ASR Express, luggage doors are not locked as per SR 4.34.**
- c. **It was noticed at PAU station of NED Division on 27<sup>th</sup> March 2015 that Sr. ALPs are posted to work as Shunters. They have not undergone any training which is mandatory as per Railway Board letter No. E (MPP)/2012/3/19 dated 02.4.2013 which stipulate that "curriculum of ALPs (both diesel and electric) for promotion to LP/Shunter shall undergo Loco RNG-4 or 2 (diesel / electric).**

### **5.0 Irregularities noticed in the working of Electrical Department:**

- a. **On 27<sup>th</sup> March 2015, during the inspection of Pantry Car by Train No. 12715 NED – ASR Sachkhand Express, register of handing over and taking over by three Department Supervisors i.e., Mechanical, Electrical & PC Manager (in each trip) is not available as per the JPO No. 04/2011.**
- b. **Emergency light was found not working in rear SLR No. 00729/SC of DN 12721 Dakshin Express on 22/23.4.2015.**
- c. **During inspection of Pantry Car No 97816/SC of T. No.12721 Express on 22/23.4.2015, Joint Inspection Register in which Supervisors of Electrical, Mechanical & Pantry Car Manager shall check and certify after every trip was not signed by Electrical Supervisor.**

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**LIST OF “MAN OF THE MONTH” AWARDEES FOR THE MONTH OF  
JANUARY, FEBRUARY & MARCH 2015**

	<b>SC DIVISION</b>		<b>BZA DIVISION</b>	<b>21</b>	Sri. P. Chitti Das Technician-I/C&W/GY
<b>1</b>	Sri. R. Praveen Pointsman / NPL	<b>1</b>	Sri. D. John Sr. Technician/Coaching Depot	<b>22</b>	Sri. Jitendra Kumar Guard/GY
<b>2</b>	Sri. Laxman Rao Dy.SS/BG	<b>2</b>	Sri. E.Appa Rao ESM/YLM	<b>23</b>	Sri. D. K. Prasad Dy.SS/TKPY
<b>3</b>	Sri. Vidyasagar LP/SNF	<b>3</b>	Sri. G. Chinna Rao Goods Guard/RJY	<b>24</b>	Sri. Kundan Kumar Pointsman/TKPY
<b>4</b>	Sri. CH. Suryanarayana Dy.SS/RECH	<b>4</b>	Sri. T. Tripathi SM/GLU	<b>25</b>	Sri. Manesh Yadav LP/GY
<b>5</b>	Sri. E. Narsing Rao Technician-III/C&W/SC	<b>5</b>	Sri. SK.Mahaboob Peera Technician-I/SSE/OHE/TUNI	<b>26</b>	Sri. S. B. Saheb Goods Guard/GY
	<b>NED DIVISION</b>	<b>6</b>	Sri. P. Balasubrahmanyam Gateman/E of LC No. 274	<b>27</b>	Sri. K. V. S. Ramakrishna LP/RU
<b>1</b>	Sri. Sudama Kumar ALP/PAU		<b>GTL DIVISION</b>	<b>28</b>	Sri. B. N. Mohanti Guard/GY
<b>2</b>	Sri. Kumar Rishav APM/MTDI	<b>1</b>	Sri. Hanmantha Rao Mail/Express Guard/GTL	<b>29</b>	Sri. R. L. Meena Guard/GY
<b>3</b>	Sri. Krishna Nagorao Guard/PAU	<b>2</b>	Sri. Ermia SS/KEF working as TI/DHNE	<b>30</b>	Sri. Sk. Kallimulla LP/Passenger/GTL
<b>4</b>	Sri. Amit Srivastav LP/Goods/ADB	<b>3</b>	Sri. Somasunder LP/RU	<b>31</b>	Sri. G. Venkat Rao Technician, Grade I/C&W/GY
<b>5</b>	Sri. Madhusudan Meena ALP/ADB	<b>4</b>	Sri. Arvind Kumar ALP/RU	<b>32</b>	Sri. Ajay Kumar ASM/RCG
<b>6</b>	Sri. Suresh Bandu Trackman/DLB	<b>5</b>	Sri. P. S. Babu LP/GTL	<b>33</b>	Sri. Mukthar Ahmed LP/Mail/TPTY
<b>7</b>	Sri. Uttam Shankar Trackman/NED	<b>6</b>	Sri. Gajendra Kumar LP/GY	<b>34</b>	Sri. Deepak Kumar ASM/GTL (W) at BLL
<b>8</b>	Sri. Namdev Gagre Passenger LP/PAU	<b>7</b>	Sri. P. R. Meena ALP/GY	<b>35</b>	Sri. Sachin Tendulkar Dy.SS/JKO
<b>9</b>	Sri. L. Ashok Kumar ALP/PAU	<b>8</b>	Sri. G. Murali Krishna LP/NRE	<b>36</b>	Sri. Sasikant Kumar Dy.SS/HGI
<b>10</b>	Sri. Sk. Ahamad. Sk. M CLI/PAU	<b>9</b>	Sri. Kishore JE/C&W/GY	<b>37</b>	Sri. Dasthagiri Reddy Night Patrolman under JE/P.Way/NRE
<b>11</b>	Sri. Dhyanes Kambale LP/Passenger/PAU	<b>10</b>	Sri. D. V. Ramu ASM/MLK at DHNE	<b>38</b>	Sri. T.V.S.N.G. Kumar LP/NRE
<b>12</b>	Sri. Ashok Kumar. Y ALP/PAU	<b>11</b>	Sri. C. Hanumanthu Technician III/GY	<b>39</b>	Sri. Shah Nawaz Dy.SS/MLK
<b>13</b>	Sri. Rajesh. V. CLI/NED	<b>12</b>	Sri. Nirmal Kumar Dy.SS/RLL	<b>40</b>	Sri. S.E.Rao <b>LP/BTR</b>
	<b>GNT DIVISION</b>	<b>13</b>	Sri. Paswan	<b>41</b>	Sri. Srinivas

			Pointsman/RLL		Pointsman/TGDE
1	Sri. Naveen Reddy APM/SAB	14	Sri. S.Yohan Gateman LC Gate No. 170/T between KEF – PNM	42	Sri. Sreenivasulu Guard/RU
2	Sri. SK. Siddaiah ASM/CEM	15	Sri. Kondanna Sr. Technician/GY	43	Sri. Rajesh Kumar LP/GY
3	Sri. K. V. Kumar LP/NDL	16	Sri. C.H. Balram Gateman of LC Gate No.155/T	44	Sri. Kistaiah Guard/GY
4	Sri. V. Siva Goods Guard/NDL	17	Sri. Ajit Kumar Guard/GTL	45	Sri. S. V. Singh Dy.SS/KSN
5	Sri. T. Ramesh Babu Constable (RPF)/NLDA	18	Sri. Y. Lakshmana Pointsman/GTL	46	Sri. P. Arun Kumar Dy.SS/RGM
	<b>HYB DIVISION</b>	19	Sri. B. V. Ramaiah LP/GTL	47	Sri. N. K. Meena <b>LP/KZJ</b>
1	Sri. Sadanandam Gateman of LC No.240/E	20	Sri. Malleth Keyman/PAK under SSE/P.Way/PAK	48	Sri. S.A. K. Pillai Gateman of LC Gate No. 33/T at RCG

**CHIEF SAFETY OFFICER  
HEADQUARTERS SAFETY  
ORGANISATION**

**Operating Officials:**

**SMs of stations where ART / MRT is stabled – ensure that the points leading to ART / MRT Sidings are tested once in a week and the remark to that effect is made in the Station Diary.**

**Engineering Officials:**

**Ensure that the deficiencies noticed during the quarterly joint inspection of Points & Crossings are attended and not carried to next quarter.**

**Loco Running Staff:**

**When last vehicle is detached from the formation, there is no need to conduct ‘air-continuity’ test.**

**S&T Officials:**

**Ensure that the schedule cable meggering of stations of once in a year is carried out.**