

**SOUTH CENTRAL RAILWAY**

# **VIGIL**

**QUARTERLY SAFETY BULLETIN NO.4**

**DECEMBER - 2015**

**INDEX**

<b>Sl. No</b>	<b>Section</b>	<b>Subject</b>	<b>Page No.</b>
1	<b>A</b>	Knowledge – Extracts of Railway Board letters	<b>1-14</b>
2	<b>B</b>	Important Rules – GR 3.38	<b>15 - 23</b>
3	<b>C</b>	Details of Amendment Slips	<b>24</b>
4	<b>D</b>	Checklist – Operating	<b>25 - 42</b>
5	<b>E</b>	Accident Cases	<b>43 - 51</b>
6	<b>F</b>	Test your knowledge with key	<b>51</b>
8	<b>G</b>	Safety Drives	<b>52 - 60</b>
9	<b>H</b>	Accident Statistics	<b>61 - 62</b>

**My dear Railwaymen**

**I am glad to inform that the third quarter also ended without any consequential train accident which is a good sign. However, the preventable yard accidents continue to worry. All the yard accidents could have been prevented had the field staff shown little vigilance and alertness.**

**Hence, there is a need to rededicate ourselves to concentrate more on train / shunting operations and prevent all preventable accidents and unusual occurrences. This Quarterly Safety Bulletin brings out important Railway Board letters, important rules, checklist, brief of accidents / unusual incidents that took place within the quarter, test your knowledge with key, safety drives launched and statistical position for the quarter. It is requested to all the field staff to go through the contents of this Bulletin and update your knowledge in day-to-day working and contribute for enhancing the safety performance of the Railway.**

**With regards**

**(S. P. SAHU)  
CHIEF SAFETY OFFICER**

**Section “A” KNOWLEDGE**  
**Extracts of Railway Board letters**

**Sub: Fire Safety measures at Railway Stations.**

**Ref: No.2012/Safety (DM)/6/12/2 dated 16.11.2015.**

Ministry of Railways (Railway Board) had nominated fire safety audit teams to identify areas up gradation in fire safety to match in fire safety to match with the international standards. The recommendations of safety audit teams have been accepted by Board (MT, MS, ML & MM).

One of the recommendations of the Audit team was that an appropriate dependent may be nominated to carry out effects of multi-disciplinary in nature to improve first safety at stations. Accordingly, Board has revived fire preparedness at Railway Stations & Associate buildings and Board (MT) desires that the following measures to be taken:

1. SMRs/SMs should be responsible for provision of firefighting equipment at stations and buildings attached to stations with passenger interface.
2. Fire Safety at buildings and establishments other than those indicated in Point above should be the responsibility of the officer in-charge of the building.
3. Zonal Railways should review the availability and requirement of fire extinguishers at Stations/Associate buildings as per the National Building Code of India, Part 4-Fire and Life Safety issued by Bureau of Indian Standards and IS 2190-2010 and make good deficiencies, if any. Details regarding the type and scale of fire extinguishers to be provided based on the occupancy and type of building is given in the Annexure.

4. Operating department should procure and maintain fire extinguishers at stations.
5. National Building Code mandates exit requirements, capacity of exit, arrangement of exits, number of exits, doorways, corridor & passage ways and staircases at buildings. Zonal Railways should review the existing facilities and ensure that these are in conformity with the prescribed norms.

Letters issued by various directorates and RDSO relating in fire safety are uploaded on Safety Information Management System web page. Zonal Railway should audit the fire safety preparedness at all stations on the above lines and submit action taken report to Board positively on or before 31.03.2016.

**(P.Srinivas)**  
**Director (Safety-III)**

Annexure to Lr. No.2012/Safety (DM)/6/12/2. Date: 16.11.2015.

Type of Structure	Type of occupancy	Nature of occupancy	Class of Fire	Recommended Scale of Equipment
Passenger terminal with accommodation more than 300 persons	D-3	MH	Class 'A'	Two 9 litre water expelling extinguishers or ABC 5Kg/6Kg fire extinguisher, for every 200m <sup>2</sup> with minimum of 4 extinguishers per compartment/floor. The extinguisher should be so located as to be available

				within 15 m radius.
Passenger terminal with accommodation less than 300 persons	D-4	LH	Class 'A'	One 9litre water expelling extinguisher or ABC 5kg/6kg fire extinguisher for every 200 m <sup>2</sup> or part thereof with minimum of 2 extinguishers per compartment or floor of the building. The extinguisher should be so located as to be available within 15 meters radius.
Metro Station	D-7	---	---	Para 6.4.8 of National Building Code of India stipulated detailed guidelines.
Offices	B-1	SH	Class-A	One 4.5 kg capacity carbon dioxide or one 2.3 capacity clean agent extinguisher for every 100 meters <sup>2</sup> of floor area or part thereof with minimum of two extinguishers so located as to be available within 10m radius.
Parcel Office and Goods Shed	H	MH	Class-B	Two 9 litre foam extinguisher, mechanical type or 5/6 kg dry powder extinguisher (or one of each type) for every 200 m <sup>2</sup> are with

				minimum of four extinguishers per compartment. Extinguisher should be available within 15m radius.
--	--	--	--	---

**Sub: Derailment of BLC wagons over 1 in 8 ½ turnout.**

**Ref: Railway Board Letter No.2014/Safety (DM) /19/2 of 10.12.14. & 2014/Safety (DM)/9/2 dated 09.11.2015**

Vide letter under reference Board has requested Zonal Railways to submit relevant details of accidents involving BLC wagons over 1 in 8 ½ turnout as per RDSO format. Reply was received only from WR, NWR, SR & SWR.

During the CSO's conference on 04.11.2015 Zonal Railways have already expressed the vulnerability of BLC wagons in negotiating 1 in 8 ½ turnout. RDSO is unable to conduct a meaningful analysis due to lack of information about these accidents. Zonal Railways are requested to submit the details as per the format to the Board at the earliest.

**(P.Srinivas)**  
**Director (Safety-III)**

**Sub: Securing of Vehicles/loads/trains/locomotives at Stations and in block section.**

**Ref: No.2012/Safety (A&R)/19/1 Dated 24.2.12**

There have been few recent incidences of rolling down of loads/vehicles resulting in accidents. The matter has been considered in Board's office. Precautions to be taken for stabling / trains and securing of vehicles/trains/locomotives at stations as well as securing of vehicles/ loads/trains/locomotives at stations as well as securing of trains stranded in block section are consolidated and reiterated below:-

1. Action by Station Master/Traffic staff when vehicles/load/train is to be stabled at station.
  - a. The vehicles/load/train to be chained and pad locked using at least two chains one at either end;
  - b. At least four sprags / wooden wedges be used, two each below the outermost pair of wheels at either end;
  - c. Hand brakes of at least 6 wagons from either end must be fully tightened. In case coaching vehicles are stabled, guard's hand brakes in SLR(s) must be applied. The hand brakes must be operated under the personal supervision of the Guard and in the absence of Guard by SM/ASM on duty;
  - d. The vehicles of stabled load/train should be coupled together in case the stabled load has to be split for any reason, each such split part should be treated as a separate load for the purpose of securing;
  - e. The points must be set, clamped and padlocked against the blocked line and towards dead end or trap point (if available). Scotch blocks must be used, if available;
  - f. Stop collars must be placed on relevant signal and point buttons/slides/levers etc,;



- g. Remarks should be made In TSR and/or SM diary in Red ink to the effect that Line No..... is blocked and all precautions for securing the load have been taken as prescribed above;
- h. After any load/train is stabled, the station master must inform section controller supported by private number that all laid down precautions for stabling and securing the load /train/loco have been taken.
2. Additional precautions to be taken while stabling vehicles/load/train at a station with the gradient of 1 in 400 or steeper may have been prescribed under approved special instructions (by CRS) and mentioned in SWR of respective stations. These should be followed scrupulously. In addition, following precautions must also be observed over and above those prescribed under approved special instructions.
- a. Before vehicles are uncoupled, the hand brakes should be applied, sprags / wooden wedges/skids should also be used to prevent vehicles from rolling down.
- b. As far as possible, the vehicle/load/train should be stabled on a line which is isolated from other lines, particularly running lines.
3. Action by Loco Pilot/assistant Loco Pilot before leaving the loco in case load/train is stabled with locomotive attached or light engine(s) is/are shut down or stabled:-
- (a) Application of both SA-9 and A-9 brakes.
- (b) Application of hand brake and parking brake.
- (c) Secure the loco with wooden wedges provided in the loco.
4. (a). Loco Pilot while on duty should not leave loco unmanned. In case he is required to leave the locomotive unmanned, he should only after receiving written authority from SM/YM and ensuring 3 (a),(b) & (c) above.

(b). Before leaving the Station/Yard, the loco Pilot and guard should jointly record in a register to be maintained with SM that the load & Loco has been secured as prescribed above.

5. Action to be taken by LP/ALP and Guard when the train is stabled in block section due to accident, failure, obstruction or any other reason:-

(a). LP/ALP and Guard should protect the train as per provisions of G&SRs 6.03:

(b). The train should be secured by applying loco brakes (SA-9,A-9 & Hand brakes) and hand brakes of at least six wagons at either end of the train. The hand brakes should be operated by ALP from leading end and by the guard from the rear end. In the case the train is being worked without guard the duties of the guard shall devolve on the ALP. In case of coaching trains, the guard should apply hand brakes of the SLR in addition to the application of Loco brakes by the LP.

6. Station Staff, guard Crew and Section Controller should be aware of gradients at stations/Yards/sidings and block stations.

7. Frequent counseling in this regard should be done by concerned Supervisors.

8. The Railways must ensure availability of adequate number of sprags and chains of approved design at stations and wooden wedges on locos.

This has the approval of Board (MT, MM & ML)

**(J.S.BINDRA)**  
**Director / Safety**

**Sub: Securing of vehicles/load/trains/locomotive at stations and in block sections.**

**Ref: No.2014/Safety (A&R)/3/83/Pt dated 13.11.15.**

There has been a recent incidence of rolling down of a loaded train in Moradabad Division of N. Rly on 04.11.15 resulting in derailment. The matter has been taken very seriously by the Railway Board as it could have led to a serious disaster.

In view of the above accident, it is reiterated that precautions are to be taken as per G&SR 5.23 for stabling loads/ trains and securing of vehicles/loads/trains/locomotives as well as securing trains stranded in block section. Railway Board has already issued a comprehensive letter dated on 24.02.12 to all Zonal railways wherein detailed and consolidated precautions to be taken were spelt out. The copy of the letter No.2012/Safety (A&R)/19/1 is attached for quick reference.

All Zonal Railways should ensure that all precautions are taken as per G&SR 5.23 and related in Railway Board's letter No.2012/Safety (A&R)/19/1.

**(P.S.Mishra)**  
**ED/Safety**

**Sub: Alert Advice No.01/2015.**

**Ref: No.2014/Safety (A&R)/3/83 Dated 06.11.2015.**

Derailment of Train No.18101 at Hiranagar Station, Ferozpur Division, Northern Railway on 06.10.2015,SIMS ID 20151003004.

The enquiry into the above accident has brought out following shortcomings:

1. ESM adopted shortcut and permanently picked up the failed point track circuit from relay to facilitate setting of route and signaled train movement.
2. Since sequential route release on train passing did not work as track was permanently picked up. ASM resorted to emergency route release through EUUYN button.
3. Setting of point in the rear against blocked line after emergency route release was done by ASM without ensuring physical clearance of point track by the train leading to the derailment due to point operation under wheels.
4. The Emergency route release counter had recommended faulty since June 2015.
5. Proper procedure for handing over of Relay Room keys to S&T Staff was not followed.

These are serious lapses, Zonal Railways are advised to get the above aspects checked at all stations. Corrective action should be initiated, if required, to limit the use of emergency operations to a bare minimum. Extensive counseling of field staff to retain from adopting shortcuts may be taken up.

**(P.S.Mishra)**  
**ED/Safety**

**Sub: Interlocking of Manned Level Crossing and change of normal aspect of non-interlocked (Engg. & Traffic) gates from 'closed to road traffic' to 'open to road traffic'**

- Ref:** (i) Adv.(Signal)/Railway Board Letter No.2010/SIG/LX/2 dated 01.10.2010.  
(ii) Adv.(Signal)/Railway Board Letter No.2010/SIG/LX/2 dated 26.09.2011.  
(iii) This office Letter No. 2006/CE-IV/LX-WP dated 02.06.2012.

Vide letter referred at (i) above, the comprehensive policy for interlocking of manned level crossing was issued. Further, vide letter referred at (ii) above, Zonal Railways were advised to get the works sanctioned and make the action plan for interlocking of all Railway crossings which are due for interlocking as per the policy issued vide letter at (i).

Further, vide letter referred at (iii) above, Railway Board has decided that normal position of non-interlocked manned level crossing gates can be changed from 'closed to road traffic' to 'open to road traffic' under the following circumstances:

- (i) If the Manned Level Crossing Gate (non-interlocked), qualifies for interlocking (i.e. having TVUs > 20000), the normal position can be changed to 'Open to Road Traffic' as an interim measure till the manned level crossing is either eliminated or interlocked.
- (ii) If Manned Level Crossing Gate (non-interlocked) is situated on a section where average number of trains during the 24 hours period is less (say up to 14), the normal position can be changed to 'open to road traffic' regardless of TVUs at the gate.

In both the cases, the decision about changing the normal position of manned level crossing gated from 'closed to road traffic' to 'open to road traffic' can be taken by the DRM with the approval of PCE and COM with the conditions given in the letter referred at (ii) above.

Recently, two accidents have taken place on the manned non-interlocked gates which is a serious issue.

In view of this, it is advised that the work of interlocking of all eligible level crossings be got sanctioned immediately and action plan for interlocking of all these LCs should be prepared with the advise to Railway Board. Till the time, these LCs are interlocked, the normal position of these gates can be changed to 'open to road traffic' on case basis after fulfilling the condition laid down in Railway Board's letter referred at(iii) above.

**(LAJ KUMAR)**  
**Additional Member (CE)**

## **Section “B”**

**Some important rules – G&SR 3.38 Points  
effecting the movement of train:**

- (1) The Station Master shall not give permission to take signals 'off' for a train until-**
  - (a) All facing points over which the train will pass are correctly set and locked.**
  - (b) All trailing points over which the train will pass are correctly set and**
  - (c) The line over which the train is to pass is clear and free from obstructions.**
  
- (2) When a running line is blocked by a stabled load, wagon, vehicle or train which is to cross or give precedence to another train or immediately after the arrival of a train at the station the points in rear on double line sections and at either end on single line sections should be immediately set against the blocked line except when shunting or any other movement is required to be done Immediately in that direction on that line.**

S.R.3.38.1 The trailing points shall be correctly set or where the interlocking installation requires it, also locked.

2. During crossing of trains at key locked stations interlocked to standard-I and key locked modified non-interlocked stations, the setting of the outermost trailing points against the line on which the first train is to be received, does not constitute an obstruction for the purpose of this rule.

3.1. At an interlocked station, a train may be allowed to run through a loop line with 1 in 8 ½ turnout, provided the points are correctly set and the signal taken "off" and at a non-interlocked station, in addition to this precaution, the train shall be brought to a halt at the Outer

signal and then the signals taken “off”. The Loco Pilot shall not exceed a speed limit of 10 kmph when running through a loop line at interlocked as well as non-interlocked stations. When a run through train passes over a loop line, the authority to proceed shall be handed over to the Loco Pilot opposite to the station building.

3.2. In no circumstance a train is to be allowed to run through an interlocked or a non-interlocked station over a goods loop with 1 in 8 ½ turnout. If it is necessary to pass a non-stopping train over a goods loop with 1 in 8 ½ turnout it shall, first, be brought to a stand on that line and then signals, if any taken “off” and the authority to proceed handed over to the Loco Pilot. At a non-interlocked station the train shall, in addition, be brought to a halt at the Outer signal and then the signals taken “off” for its admission.

3.3. Warning Boards have been provided at all 1 in 8 ½ turnouts for warning the Loco Pilots to restrict the speed to 10 kmph.

4.1. At non-interlocked stations, bolts and cotters shall be provided for each switch rail at all points on and giving access to running lines. One padlock shall be provided for each such set of points.

4.2. The DEN is responsible for the provisions of bolts, cotters and padlocks and/or clamps and padlocks for the points, when renewals and repairs are being carried out until the points are formally handed over to traffic.

4.3. The DSTE is responsible for the provision of padlocks and/or clamps at stations when disconnection of the interlocking gear is taken up for the purpose of renewals, repairs etc.

5.1. Lever collars are provided for the lever frames at stations. These lever collars shall be placed on the handle of the signal levers to prevent the catch handle being released and to give a visual warning to the operator.

5.2. Lever collars bearing the words —line blocked are intended for fixing on the handles of the levers, working points and signals or fixing on the relevant lever of a line on which a train or vehicle is left



standing or otherwise obstructed. These lever collars shall also be used when a train stops at a station to cross and/or to give precedence to another train or trains. The lever collars shall be removed only when the line has been cleared.

5.3. Lever collars or slide pins are provided for the Station Master's control instruments. They shall be used on the relevant slide control or the Station Master's key control in the same manner and for the same purpose for which the lever collars are used on the handle of the levers in the cabins.

5.4. Detailed instructions regarding the use of lever collars or slide pins shall be incorporated in the Station Working Rules of all stations.

5.5. A board shall be provided in the cabins and at stations indicating the cabin lever numbers and the Station Master's slide control numbers in respect of each running line on which the lever collars and slide collars/pins are required to be placed, whenever the running line/lines is/are occupied. This board shall be provided by the S&T department.

6. If all the lines at a station happen to be blocked, when line clear has been granted to a train, the point should be set for the line occupied by a stabled load or a goods train in that order so that, in case of mishap, the chances of casualties are minimized. In case, all the lines at a station are occupied by passenger trains, points should be set for a loop line, to negotiate which, the speed of the incoming train would be reduced, which in turn would minimize the consequences/ casualties. While doing so, points may be set for a loop line occupied by a train, if any, whose engine is facing the direction of approach of the incoming train rather than for the loop line occupied by a train where a passenger coach, will, in the case of a collision, receive the impact. These precautions shall be taken in addition to the observance of other precautions like use of lever collars etc.

#### 7.1. Motor-Operated Points—

Wherever the points are operated by motor, the normal and reverse position of the motor-operated points are repeated in the cabins. The

‘N’ and ‘R’ indications provided in the cabins correspond to the normal and reverse position of the points. The indicators in the cabin would be lit up only when the relevant lever/switch/button is operated. After operation of every point, the ‘N’ and ‘R’ indications must be checked by the Station Master on duty to see that the points are in working order.

### 7.2. Provision of Emergency Crank Handles—

Where points are operated by point motor, emergency crank handles required for the operation of point machine during failure of points are provided. The emergency crank handle should be secured in a glass fronted wooden box/case and sealed in the Cabin along with the keys of the pad lock of point machine by the S&T staff. The station staff concerned should be trained properly in the use of the emergency crank handles.

### 7.3. Failure of Motor Operated Points—

If the Station Master on duty does not get the correct indications after every operation of motor operated points, the points must be inspected by him to see if there is any obstruction in the points and if any obstruction is found it must be carefully removed and once again the points operated from the cabin. If after verification of the points, the points cannot still be set from the cabin, this should be treated as failure of the points. The Station Master on duty shall thereafter break the seal of the wooden box/case and utilize the relevant padlock key and the emergency crank handle for operating the points manually as follows—

7.3.1. The padlock of the points machine should be unlocked and removed.

7.3.2. The emergency crank handle should be inserted in the point machine and rotated to set and lock the points to the required position in the presence of the Station Master on duty. Care should be taken to continue the rotation of the emergency crank handle till it comes to a stop to ensure that the points are correctly set and locked. However before inserting the emergency crank handle in the point machine, it

must be ensured that the relevant point lever is in the required position.

7.3.3. The Station Master on duty shall personally be responsible to ensure the correct setting of points. He must also ensure that the points are clamped, padlocked and the lever collars are put on the relevant point/levers and must retain the keys of the padlocks in his personal custody before authorizing any movement over the affected points. The reception/dispatch of trains shall be arranged in accordance with the rules.

7.3.4. At stations where crank handles provided to operate the point machines manually or interlocked with the signals, authority to pass the signal governing the movement over the points, which are set by crank handle need not be issued if the signal can be taken 'off' and proper 'N' or 'R' indication, showing that the points have been properly set and locked in the normal or reverse position, is available in the cabin. The points should, however, be clamped and padlocked by the staff deputed to set them by means of crank handle, before the crank handle is restored back to the electrical lock and the relevant signals are taken 'off'.

7.3.5. In case of manual operation of defective motor operated points by crank handles, for passage of traffic, the trains may be received on signals provided—

7.3.5.1. A transportation staff not lower in rank than that of an Assistant Station Master is deputed to operate the defective motor operated points which is to be clamped and padlocked.

7.3.5.2. Private Number is exchanged between the transportation staff at the points and the Assistant Station Master / Switchman taking 'off' the signals to ensure the position of the points and safe custody of the crank handle with the former, and

7.3.5.3. Correct setting of the defective points, has been proved in the electrical circuit after manual operation

7.3.6. The use of emergency crank handle be continued till such time the points are rectified by the S&T staff.

7.3.7. Whenever the emergency crank handle is used, an entry to this effect should be made in the emergency crank handle register specially maintained for this purpose and the station diary, duly advising the concerned Signal Inspector/ESM for rectification.

7.4. Handing over Emergency Crank Handle of motor operated points to S&T staff for maintenance work etc— If the emergency crank handle is required by the S&T staff for maintenance work or for the purpose of testing, disconnection and reconnection notices should be issued in accordance with procedure laid down. Whenever the emergency crank handle is handed over to the S&T staff, an entry should be made in the emergency crank handle register showing the points on which the emergency crank handle is required to be used. The lever collars should, at the same time, be put on the relevant levers. During the time, the emergency crank handle is in use, the reception/despatch of trains should be arranged in accordance with the rules.

7.5. Mechanically operated points with ‘N’ and ‘R’ indication in the Cabin/Station—

At certain stations ‘N’ and ‘R’ indications are also provided for the mechanically operated points. At these stations the Station Master on duty should check up the indications in the cabin/station after the operation of the points to ensure that they are in working order. If the correct indication is not displayed after the operation of points, the points must be inspected by the Station Master on duty to check up if there is any obstruction in the points. Any obstruction found must be removed and the points once again set and locked and the signals taken ‘off’ for reception / despatch of trains. Even after the correct setting and locking of the points, if the ‘N’ and ‘R’ indications fail to respond, this should be treated as a case of signal failure and the trains dealt in accordance with the provisions of rules.

\*\*\*\*\*

**Section “C”**  
**Latest Amendments**

**Advance Correction Slip No. 138 to IRPWM dated 25.8.2015**

The existing Sub Para 1302 (2) (g) of IRPWM shall be replaced by the following;

**Para 1302 (2) (g)** – New bridges including road over and under bridges, foot-over bridges, strengthening, raising, reconstruction, dismantling or extension of existing bridges, addition or replacement of existing girders, including provision of temporary girders. Here, bridges shall include road over and under bridges, foot over bridges and sub-ways affecting running lines.

\*\*\*\*\*

**Section “D”**  
**Checklist - Operating**

<b>S. No.</b>	<b>Items to be checked</b>
<b>1</b>	<b>GR 3.38 (2) – Reversing the points immediately on arrival of the train – whether the staff are in the habit of doing it or not? especially on a double line when a stopping train is received on a common loop where the SM is required to alter the points in rear and in front.</b>
<b>2</b>	<b>EXCHANGE OF ‘ALL-RIGHT’ SIGNALS WITH RUN THROUGH TRAINS – By SM from platform side and by the Pointsman from ‘off’ side. Record maintained by the station staff, if any when any unusual noticed by them.</b>
<b>3</b>	<b>ENSURING COMPLETE ARRIVAL OF TRAIN:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Through BPAC indication on the panel or</b></li> <li>• <b>where BPAC is not available / during its failure, by exchanging PNs with the Guard of the train</b></li> <li>• <b>Record the same in the Train Signal Register.</b></li> <li>• <b>For Goods trains without BV / Guard – separate register to be available at the station.</b></li> </ul>
<b>4</b>	<b>SHUNTING ORDER (T.806):</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Whether the station is exempted from issuing the shunting order by Sr. DOM, check for a copy of the same in the SWR or in the form of a letter.</b></li> <li>• <b>If no such exemptions are given, check whether Shunting Order is prepared in triplicate (one for LP, one for Guard and another for station record).</b></li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Also notice whether it is a signalled movement or not.</li> <li>• If it is not a signalled movement, whether the staff is locking the points?</li> <li>• Whether the SWRs prescribe any special precautions under Para 8, if so whether the same are known to the staff and followed by them or not?</li> <li>• Whether the staff is aware that permitting back movement over a wrongly set point which was trailed through by the LP/Shunter is prohibited?</li> </ul>
5	<p><b>ESSENTIAL SAFETY EQUIPMENT:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Whether available as per SWR</li> <li>• Whether they are in working condition or not</li> <li>• Whether the prescribed equipment is adequate as per station layout or not?</li> </ul>
6	<p><b>LC GATE REGISTER:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Whether entries are separately made for UP / DN trains</li> <li>• Whether the PN is exchanged with Gateman of non-interlocked LC Gate?</li> <li>• Cross check the PNs of previous three trains.</li> </ul>
7	<p><b>MONTHLY SAFETY MEETING REGISTER:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Whether the acknowledgement of staff is obtained in two parts or not?</li> <li>• First part for those staff who is physically present on the day of the meeting and second part for those staff who resume duties after leave / sick / absent /another shift.</li> <li>• Ultimately, the acknowledgement shall be 100%.</li> <li>• Another important item to be checked in this is</li> </ul>

	<p>whether the Guards stationed to work at the station are acknowledging it or not.</p>
8	<p><b>SURPRISE NIGHT INSPECTION BY SM:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Whether the schedule of 4 for supervisory and 2 for non-supervisory is followed or not?</li> <li>• Whether there is proper spacing between inspections or not? Whether the PN of SM and name of the SCOR is recorded or not?</li> <li>• Whether any shortfalls / irregularities, if noticed are highlighted in red ink or not?</li> <li>• Whether all the activity centres of the station such as Dy.SS office, Cabins, LC Gate, Goods Yard, Crew Lobby, etc., are covered on a rotation or not?</li> </ul>
9	<p><b>TRAIN SIGNAL REGISTER:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Whether the entries are clear and legible</li> <li>• ‘Out’ / ‘In’ report is written as per BWM guidelines or not by cross checking the timings with the adjacent stations for at least 3 trains, direction wise</li> <li>• Whether Block Forward / Block Back entries are made in full and in red ink?</li> <li>• Whether the name &amp; designation of the Night Patrolman is written in red ink or not (if night patrolling is in force)</li> <li>• Whether the SM in-charge of the station is scrutinising the TSR daily or not?</li> </ul>
10	<p><b>ROUTE CANCELLATION REGISTER:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Whether reasons are correctly written or not?</li> <li>• If route cancellation is done for a departure signal/s, whether written memo was served to the crew or not?</li> <li>• If route cancellation is done for reception signal,</li> </ul>



	<p>whether any accident was averted, if so details?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Whether the time taken for route cancellation is being recorded or not to analyse the efficacy of timer relay?</li> </ul>
11	<p><b>SWR:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Check for the currency</li> <li>• Whether it is in the new format or not</li> <li>• Check whether the layout is tallying with the rule diagram</li> <li>• Alternate power supply like IPS is incorporated or not</li> <li>• Whether any special precautions are prescribed under Para 7 for blocking / stabling of loads</li> <li>• Whether the station is situated on a steeper gradient (steeper than 1 in 400), if so what special precautions are prescribed and followed by staff, etc.,</li> </ul>
12	<p><b>SWR DECLARATION REGISTER:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Cross check the details with the Attendance Register to see whether staff are acknowledging after 15 consecutive days of absence (before taking charge of duties)?</li> <li>• Whether acknowledgement is separately taken for SMs &amp; Pointsmen duly keeping an index with page number.</li> <li>• The acknowledgement register shall be divided in three portions, one for fresh SWR declaration, one for any amendment received to SWR, another portion for such staff who resume duties after 15 consecutive days of absence / staff of outstation.</li> </ul>
13	<p><b>S&amp;T FAILURE REGISTER:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Whether all Signal and Telecom failures are</li> </ul>

	<p><b>getting recorded or not?</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>In case of block failures, whether failure entry is made at both the stations or not?</b></li> <li>• <b>Cross check the train passing documents such as T/A 1425 to T/D 1425 &amp; T. 369 (3b) and identify specific shortfalls including individual lapses.</b></li> <li>• <b>Whenever trains are received on Calling-‘on’ due to Home Signal failures, whether SMs are entering the Home Signal failure entry in the failure register or not?</b></li> <li>• <b>Cross check the failure entries with failure memos issued to S&amp;T Official.</b></li> <li>• <b>Whether any particular signal or point is repeatedly failing, if so whether S&amp;T Officials are closely monitoring that asset?</b></li> <li>• <b>Calculate the average failure time for the month to comment on the efficiency and swiftness shown by the S&amp;T Official.</b></li> <li>• <b>Cross check the Disconnection Register whether the S&amp;T Official has issued Disconnection Notice before attending such gear as per Group ‘C’ of Appendix XIII of G&amp;SR.</b></li> </ul>
14	<p><b>ACCIDENT REGISTER:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Whether all the accidents and unusuals are entered or not.</b></li> <li>• <b>Whether complete details of the incident including D&amp;AR action initiated against the staff held responsible are entered in the register or not?</b></li> <li>• <b>Identify similar type of accidents / unusual taking place on a particular line / point to suggest remedial measures.</b></li> </ul>
15	<p><b>DISASTER MANAGEMENT DISPLAY</b></p>

	<p><b>BOARD:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Whether the board is available or not.</li> <li>• Whether contact telephone numbers including mobile numbers of Medical (Railway and Non-Railway), Civil, Transport, Voluntary Organisations, etc., are displayed or not.</li> <li>• Whether the SM is making a random check to check the correctness of the telephone number once in a fortnight; and if so, record of the same.</li> <li>• Availability of fire extinguishers and the knowledge of the staff in using the same.</li> </ul>
16	<p><b>STABLED LOAD REGISTER:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Whether the entries are properly made in the register as per the pro-forma.</li> <li>• Whether the exchange of PN with SCOR is followed or not, if so the details are written or not.</li> <li>• Whether the validity of BPC is written or not?</li> <li>• Whether the GLP check memo issued or not – if given, the record keeping of the same is correctly maintained or not.</li> <li>• Physically check the stabled load formation and ensure whether the written details are correctly written and followed or not.</li> <li>• Whether coaching rake stabling details are entered in the register or not.</li> </ul>
17	<p><b>STATION DIARY:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Whether the SM in-charge is filling up the columns pertaining to him before 1000 hours of the day or not.</li> <li>• Whether all the columns are correctly filled or not.</li> </ul>

18	<p><b>CAUTION ORDER MESSAGE REGISTER:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Whether brought forwarding is done as per Appendix I of G&amp;SR.</li> <li>• Whether the Serial Numbers are properly maintained or not.</li> <li>• Cross check the details with the Caution Order copy issued to the Crew.</li> <li>• Identify such SRs which are not feasible to obey, for example 75 kmph + stop if required – to address the problem by writing to Engineering Officials.</li> <li>• Similarly, at certain locations we may find cancellation and imposition of caution orders under one and the same message number which is irregular.</li> <li>• Also identify such SRs which are given for two / three block sections instead of giving them individually to one block section.</li> <li>• Whether adequate space is left in between two SRs for interpolating any new additions given on emergency account.</li> </ul>
19	<p><b>BIO-DATA REGISTER:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Cross check the entries with the actual BCC / PCC, PME certificates possessed by the employees at the time of inspection.</li> <li>• Whether they are adhering to the instructions of IRMM Para 514, i.e., staff after attaining the age of 45 years are supposed to undergo PME as per their date of birth.</li> <li>• Ensure that RC / PME overdue staff are not utilised in direct train operation.</li> </ul>
20	<p><b>WEATHER WARNING REGISTER:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Whether the acknowledgement time and date is correctly written by the Officials who received</li> </ul>

	<p>the message.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Whether the SM is writing the actual weather condition at the time of receipt of the weather warning message?</li> <li>• Whether the beat books are deposited with the SM of the station or not. If available, cross check the entries of TSR &amp; Station Diary with the beat books or vice-versa.</li> </ul>
21	<p><b>RELAY ROOM KEY REGISTER:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Check whether proper reasons are written in the register?</li> <li>• Whether all the columns are correctly filled by the station staff?</li> <li>• Whether the name, designation of the employee who is handing over / taking over the key are legibly written.</li> <li>• Calculate the total number of times the key is taken in a month; and the total time the key is out of the box to comment on the unhealthy practices, if any.</li> <li>• Whether the opening of the Relay Room door or EKT is inter connected with the datalogger, if so whether the same is getting registered or not.</li> </ul>
22	<p><b>DISCONNECTION &amp; RECONNECTION NOTICE (T.351):</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• By scrutinising the foils pasted in the register, identify such works which involve joint works with Engineering Department. Further look for the remark “joint work with engineering” is passed or not as per SR 3.51.6.</li> <li>• Whether the S&amp;T Official is ensuring track ‘fit’ memo / remark from Engineering Official after completing such joint works.</li> <li>• In the course of regular maintenance of block</li> </ul>

	<p><b>instrument, whether the SM is passing a remark on the face of the Disconnection Notice that ‘no train in block section’ as per Para 5 of Appendix XIII of G&amp;SR.</b></p>
<p><b>23</b></p>	<p><b>CRANK HANDLE REGISTER:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Whether the entries are made by the officials whenever the crank handle is removed.</b></li> <li>• <b>Whether the chain is properly connected to the EKT housed in the glass cage of SM Office.</b></li> <li>• <b>Whether the S&amp;T Officials are testing the crank handle working as per the schedule of once in a fortnight by the ESM, once in a month by the JE/Signals and once in three months by the SE/SSE. In the course of testing, whether all the points that are connected to that crank handle are tested on a rotation or not?</b></li> </ul>
<p><b>24</b></p>	<p><b>AXLE COUNTER RESETTING REGISTER:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>BPAC axle counter resetting, direction-wise details are correctly recorded in the register or not.</b></li> <li>• <b>Whenever resetting is done, whether the failure entry is made in the Signal Failure Register or not?</b></li> <li>• <b>Loop line Axle Counter resetting – whether the co-operation box is kept outside SM Office or not? Whether this failure entry is also made in the Signal Failure Register or not?</b></li> <li>• <b>IBS Axle Counter resetting – before resetting, whether the SM is aware what precautions are to be taken. Check for the occasions when the same are reset and cross check with the Signal Failure Register entries and TSR.</b></li> </ul>

25	<p><b>CALLING-‘ON’ ROUTE CANCELLATION REGISTER:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Whether the Veeder Counter is separately provided for direction wise or not. If a common one is provided, write to the Signal Department officials to provide the same separately to correctly analyse as to how many times the cancellations (direction-wise) are made and to take corrective remedial action.</li> <li>• Check whether the reason for using the Calling-‘on’ is correctly written by the station staff or not.</li> <li>• If it is used due to Home Signal failure/s – whether Home Signal failure entry is made in the Signal Failure Register or not?</li> <li>• Whether the S&amp;T Officials schedule is correctly followed or not (by observing the entries in the register).</li> </ul>
26	<p><b>TI INSPECTION REGISTER:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Whether the schedule of one per month is followed or not?</li> <li>• Whether he is bringing out irregularities / shortfalls during his inspection, if so what action taken by the SMR / SM in-charge.</li> <li>• If identical shortfalls / irregularities are noticed by the TI – what action taken by the Divisional Administration.</li> </ul>
27	<p><b>OFFICERS INSPECTION REGISTER:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Action initiated by the SMRr / SM in-charge on the irregularities / shortfalls related to safe operations noticed by the officer/s.</li> <li>• Whether SMR / SM in-charge is putting any effort to get the copy of the inspection report from the division, if not received.</li> </ul>

<p><b>28</b></p>	<p><b>STAFF GRADATION REGISTER:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Whether gradation is done once in 6 months (January and July) as per board guidelines or not?</li> <li>• Details of marks obtained by the staff are written or not?</li> <li>• By observing the details, identify the weak area of the employee/s and counsel the SMR / SM in-charge and TI of the section to concentrate on those subjects / topics.</li> </ul>
<p><b>29</b></p>	<p><b>RUSTY RAIL COLLARS / CAPS:</b></p> <p>Whether the SWR stipulate special instructions regarding the usage of rusty rail collars / caps, especially at those locations such as Coastal Area, Cement Companies, Iron Ore / Coal loading stations; if so whether the staff are following those instructions, i.e., testing the point/s once in 24 hours and keeping a record of the same.</p>
<p><b>30</b></p>	<p><b>AVAILABILITY OF WHEEL CHAIR AND STRETCHER AT A STATION:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Whether the wheel chair is available or not?</li> <li>• If so, whether there is a display board to that effect or not?</li> <li>• Whether the wheel chair is in good condition or not?</li> <li>• Similarly, whether there is stretcher under the control of SM, if so its condition.</li> </ul>
<p><b>31</b></p>	<p><b>PLCT WORKING:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• During PLCT working, whether the failure entry is made at both the stations of block section made or not?</li> <li>• If the failure is continued for more than one</li> </ul>



	<p>hour, whether the S&amp;T Supervisor is attending the station or not, if ‘yes’ relevant record is maintained or not?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• If the failure time is more than 3 hours, the section TI or SMR of the station is supposed to visit the station to oversee the safe working of PLCT , whether they are aware of it, if ‘yes’ whether any record is maintained or not?</li> <li>• If the failure time is more than 24 hours, whether SR of 30 KMPH is imposed or not?</li> <li>• Whether the SCOR is adhering to the laid down instructions of not arranging crossing on single line, not arranging precedence on single / double line sections.</li> </ul>
32	<p><b>GLP (GDR) CHECK:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Whether the GLP Check is effectively done or not?</li> <li>• Whether the GLP is checking the formation as per joint procedure order?</li> <li>• Whether the GLP check memo is prepared in triplicate or not, to be cross checked with the stabled load register.</li> <li>• Whether the staff aware of the new instructions, i.e., when the Goods train is without Guard; LP is responsible for the entire check and SM has to depute one Pointsman to assist the LP. And additional time of 30 minutes, i.e., 30+30 minutes is permitted.</li> </ul>
33	<p><b>AVAILABILITY OF BV EQUIPMENT:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Whether the loading, locking and sealing of full complement of BV Equipment in all the SLRs of the formation are done or not?</li> <li>• Whether the spare ‘OTL’ is provided or not?</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <b>Whether the display sticker is pasted or not?</b></li><li>• <b>Whether there is lighting provision with control switch outside the cabinet in which BV Equipment is loaded?</b></li></ul>
<b>34</b>	<b>ANY OTHER OBSERVATION</b>

\*\*\*\*

**Section “E”**  
**Accident cases**

**1. Brief of the accident / incident:** On 01.11.2015, at 12.05 hours, during the course of shunt movement, loco derailed at NED station of NED Division. Engine with SLR coach was given movement to stabled line via shunting neck and the loco derailed at Point No.34A.

**Cause:** While coming from sick line and for further movement to shunting neck, the Shunter did not identify the signal aspect of Shunt Signal No.14 and passed it at ‘on’ resulting in derailment of the loco.

**Staff held responsible:**

Primary: Sr.LP/PAU as primary.

Secondary: Dy.SS/Outdoor and APM.

Blameworthy: SMR/NED, Dy.SS/NED on panel.

**Matters brought to light:**

- a. Supervisor’s joint observations are sub-standard including the prima-facie which is apparent.
- b. Wrong reporting time of accident i.e., when the accident took place at 12.05 hours, SMR/NED gave the message as 12.20 hours.
- c. Initial report of SMR/NED was that three wheels derailed whereas three pairs of wheels derailed.
- d. Poor co-ordination among the field level Supervisors.
- e. Over confidence and over relying on walkie-talkie by the staff.
- f. Poor planning for R&D of ART which got delayed at Home Signal. Operating and S&T Officials failed to analyse the favourable position of Point No.33 for reception of ART on Calling-On.

**Suggestions & recommendations:**

- a. Qualitative and intensive counseling of staff is necessary.
- b. Safety seminars at frequent intervals needs to be conducted.
- c. Frequent ambush checks on shunting movements are necessary.
- d. Close monitoring by Supervisors on such staff who are prone for violation of rules.

- e. Safety Department has to keep a close watch on the performance of the ground staff.
- f. LPs and Shunters should not ask for shunt movements on walkie-talkie to Dy.SS except in emergencies when their train is waiting at station. They should concentrate more on signals.
- g. Field supervisors shall identify short cut practices and take necessary action for prevention.
- h. Drive to be launched on the working of loco crew to ensure their vigilance in obeying the signal aspects.

2. **Brief of the accident / incident:** On 20.10.2015, at about 22.50 hours, when Train No. 12622 New Delhi – Chennai Tamilnadu Express was on run between Kesamudram and Tadlapusapalli stations of SC Division, passengers of GS coach pulled ACP on noticing smoke from the roof ceiling. After stoppage of the train, all passengers have got down from the coach; no passenger is injured. Crew have used fire extinguishers initially to put off the smoke/fire. The affected coach could not be detached and isolated from the formation in the section. However, after reaching MABD station, the coach was detached.

**Cause:** The scientific reason for originating of smoke and thereafter smoke turning into fire has to be co-related with the findings of Forensic Report which is still awaited.

**Staff held responsible:** No Railway Staff is held responsible.

**Matters brought to light:**

- a. Late ordering of SPMRV from Control Office.
- b. Late start of SPMRV from KZJ.
- c. Movement of electrical loco while performing shunting at MABD into unwired line due to non-availability of warning / 'Stop' board.
- d. The affected coach is not provided with BLDC fans.
- e. Roof ventilators in the coach not provided with SS wire mesh as per RDSO guidelines.
- f. The ELUs should be ensured functional after the coach is turned out from Shops before putting them in service. The functioning shall be periodically checked.

- g. TRD staff should ensure putting caution / warning boards to all unwired lines at stations / yards.

**Suggestions & recommendations:**

- a. Coach roof ceiling in the GS and SLR is presently done with limpet sheet. This sheet is easily tamperable. Hence, alternate material need to be explored to avoid passengers damaging the limpet sheet.
- b. Luggage racks design in GS and SLR coaches to be modified and location to be raised such that it is suitable only to keep the passenger luggage. The design shall ensure that it should not be possible for any passenger to sit on the rack so that the roof ceiling is inaccessible to the passengers to tamper.

- 3. Brief of the accident / incident:** On 16/17.11.2015, at about 23.05 hours, while a diverted express train No. 06336 was on run between Nandalur and Mantpampalle stations of GTL Division, three coaches got stuck up due to flash floods which entered inside the cutting and over flown the track.

**Cause:** While the train was on run observed water flowing on the track and stopped the train due to three coaches struck up in the flash flood which entered inside the cutting and over flown on the track.

**Staff held responsible:** NIL

**Matters brought to light:**

A trench dug by the Forest Department to protect vehicle entrance into the forest may be identified earlier and precautionary measure to be taken to protect the railway area by P. Way Authorities.

**Suggestions and Recommendations:**

- a. The retaining wall constructed in the cutting to be extended upto the end of the cutting i.e., normal ground levels.
- b. The cuttings are provided with Watchman. In addition to this, proper lighting arrangements to be provided.
- c. A shelter for the Watchman in the cutting area also to be provided.

4. **Brief of the accident / incident:** On 13.10.2015, at about 03.42 hours, when Train No. BT/GTL was on run between TDD – BPY stations of BZA Division, one wagon derailed on plain track due to laminated spring of rear trolley of the wagon worked out and fallen.

**Cause:** Due to old flaw existing in the shackle pin, has broken on run and led to dropping of laminated spring connected to it. This caused imbalance of load on the rear trolley and caused its derailment of wagon. The subject wagon including the rake was due for intermediate TXR check since 03.10.2015 and hence has been running as invalid. The rake was supposed to be examined at MPU for further safety fitness as intermediate examination is due, but the same was moved with GLP check by the CHC/BZA upto BZA with TC No. 12/18. This has created unsafe situation for the derailment to happen.

**Staff responsible:** CHC/BZA under ‘primary’ and JE/C&W, Guard/RJY, LP/RJY and ALP/RJY under ‘secondary’

**Matters brought to light:** Whenever, any Gateman, Trackman, Station staff and trains passing on adjacent lines if any, shows danger signal the running should be stopped immediately.

**Suggestions & Recommendations:**

Bypassing TXR checking points with invalid BPCs to be avoided.

5. **Brief of the accident / incident:** On 01.12.2015, loco derailed at MAGH station of SC Division which was stabled.

**Cause:** Non-securing of loco as per SR 5.23.

**Staff held responsible:**

LP/KZJ under ‘primary’, Pointsman under ‘secondary’ and ALP/KZJ under ‘blameworthy’.

**Matters brought to light:**

- a. There is a falling gradient from electric loco stop board towards BPQ end in GL No.1A which is not mentioned in the SWR.
- b. Accident register was not signed by SS after making entry of derailment.
- c. TSR entries are not legible.

**Suggestions & Recommendations:**

- a. Whenever a loco with defective hand brake is to be secured in 'dead' condition, it should be chained and padlocked on both ends.
- b. Physical gradient should be mentioned in SWR for proper guidance of staff dealing with train operations.
- c. Whenever a light engine is stabled it should be responsibility of LP in following the complete procedure and signing the stabled load register. SM on duty should not accept the loco keys unless the LP signs in stabled load register.

**6. Brief of the accident / incident:** On 14.11.2015, at NPL station of SC Division, loco derailed on KL Point due to the movement made by the LP without ensuring setting of points which led to derailment.

**Cause:** Negligence on the part of the LP & Co-LP who failed to ensure that the points are favourable before making the movement.

**Staff held responsible:** LP & Co-LP and Guard.

**Matters brought to light:** The crew had worked more than 16 hours without relief and the Committee has not taken notice of this and Guard is also made responsible since he was in the loco when the LP made the movement.

**7. Brief of the accident / incident:** On 29.10.2015, NTPC Goods train left MCI Siding and the LP of the train passed Shunt Signal No. 35 at 'ON' position and derailed in the trap point no.30.

**Cause:** Disregarding the signal aspect by the crew.

**Staff held responsible:**

LP & ALP under 'primary' and Dy.SS/MCI under 'blameworthy'.

**Suggestions and recommendations:**

- Train crew and station staff should be counseled on the provisions of SWR for R&D of trains into siding and vice-versa.
- Supervisors should study and sent the report regarding the improvements in signaling, suitable power to haul the load, remarks regarding gradient and possible solutions.

\*\*\*\*

**Section "F"**  
**DO YOU KNOW?**

1. 'etc'                    **End of Thinking Capacity**
2. Pen                    **Power Enriched in Nib.**
3. Smile                 **Sweet Memories In Lips Expression.**
4. SIM                   **Subscriber Identity Module**
5. Tea                   **Taste and Energy Admitted.**
6. Bye                   **Be with You Every time.**
7. Aim                   **Ambition In Mind.**
8. News Paper         **North East West South Past and Present  
Events Report.**
9. CHESS               **Chariot, Horse, Elephant, Soldiers**
10. COLD               **Chronic Obstructive Lung Disease.**
11. Joke                 **Joy of Kids Entertainment.**
12. Date                 **Date and Time evolution.**



**Section "G"**  
**Safety drives launched**

**Sub: Safety Drive on attention to Safety aspects at Unmanned Level Crossings.**

**Ref: No. Safety .387/Vol. IV Dated 09.12.2015.**

Safety Drive is to be conducted immediately to attend all safety features and infrastructure at Unmanned Level Crossings with special emphasis on the following aspects.

1. Required clear visibility for the road users of the approaching trains by removing the infringements / tress bushes etc.
2. Availability of required infrastructure (W/L & R/WL boards with retro-reflective letters at specified distance alongside on either side, Road warning boards, speed breakers, proper road surface at LC and approaches etc.).
3. Ambush checks to be carried out to verify the whistling habits of LPs, working of Road Safety Counselors deployed at UMLCs, precautions taken by road users while crossing the track at UMLCs, counseling/warning/advising road authorities for registering cases against defaulters under MV Act.
4. Additional precautions/safety measures are to taken for foggy weather conditions prevailing in the area.

The compliance report furnishing the details of action taken is to be furnished by not later than 31.12.2015

**(S.P.SAHU)**  
**CHIEF SAFETY OFFICER**

**Sub: Operating Safety Drive on Train Operation during FOG and comply G.R. 4.16 & 3.59 and S.Rs there under.**

**Ref: ED/Safety, Railway Board Lr.No.98/Safety (A&R)/19/16 dt:01.10.15 circulated vide letter No. T.387 / Traffic / Special drive Dated 15.10.2015**

It is decided to conduct an operating safety drive for 15 days from 17.10.15 to 31.10.15 to observe precautions during foggy weather mentioned in GR.4.16 & 3.59 and SRs there under.

Railway Board vide their letters of even number dated 23.08.10 and corrigendum thereto dated 25.08.10 and 14.12.10 have issued precautions to be followed before onset of foggy weather and advised to ensure training, education and counseling of staff & crew. They are as follows.

1. Adequate availability of detonators at all Station for use during the fog.
2. Lime marking across the track at the signal warning board.
3. Painting of the signal warning board, W/L boards, fog signal posts; road signs/lifting barriers etc.
4. Adequate availability of additional staff for replacement of detonators.
5. No shunting to be carried out on non-isolated lines after granting Line Clear to an approaching train.
6. As per GR.5.18 during fog, no train is to be advanced beyond the Starter (or Intermediate Starter) signal up to the Advanced Starter when the track between them is not track circuited.
7. During fog, the Loco Pilot shall run the train at a speed not exceeding 60 KMPH in Absolute Block System and 30 KMPH in Automatic Block Territory.
8. Loco Pilot shall whistle frequently to warn any Gatemen and road users
9. The prescribed VTO / VTP shall be used to determine the onset of fog. VTO/VTP shall be defined in SWR.

10. When a Loco Pilot passes an Automatic stop signal at 'ON', he shall stop 1 minute by day and 2 minutes by night and shall proceed at a speed not exceeding 10 KMPH on straight and when visibility is clear and 8 KMPH on curve and when visibility is poor.
11. A Loco Pilot, having passed in Automatic stop signal at 'ON' shall not act on the indication of signal ahead until he has actually reached the signal.
12. When the train has come to an out of course halt in Automatic Territory, the Guard shall show stop hand signal towards the rear and warn the crew of following train intermittently about the position of his train on Walkie-Talkie set / VHF.
13. After passing an Automatic stop signal at 'ON', the Loco Pilot of the following train shall maintain a distance of 150 meters or two clear OHE masts (on electrified section) and 75 meters or one clear OHE mast in case of EMU.
14. The Loco Pilots, Asst. Loco Pilots and Guards working in Automatic Block Territory shall be imparted one day's orientation course.
15. As per GR.4.16 (1) (b) during night, as well as in thick foggy or tempestuous weather impairing visibility during day, a red tail lamp of approved design displaying a flashing red light to indicate last vehicle check device should be provided and lit on the last vehicle.
16. As per GR.9.02 (3), during dense fog, when the line ahead cannot be seen clearly, the Loco Pilot shall proceed at a very slow speed (near walking speed), which shall under no circumstances exceed 8 kilometers an hour.

A drive involving Sr. DOMs, DOM/Gs, other operating officers and TIs of the division shall be conduct checks and ensure the above instructions shall be circulated to all stations. Crew and Guard booking points and running rooms etc., and staff to be counseled and educate on precautions to be taken during fog.

On completion of drive, a detailed report shall be submitted in the format given below to the undersigned on or before **05.11.2015** to apprise Railway Board.

---

Name of the officer / Supervisor	Details of checks conducted		No. of Staff Counselling	Irregularities noticed	Remarks
	Date	Station / Location			

**(K.Padmaja)**  
**Chief Traffic Manager**

**Sub: Operating Special Safety Seminar & Safety meeting Drive on GR.3.38. Points affecting movement of train” and SR’s there under.**

**Ref: COM’s Safety cum Man Power Planning Meeting- held in COM’s chamber on 16.11.2015 circulated vide letter No.T.165/OB/09 Dated 17.11.2015.**

\* \* \*

During Safety cum Man Power Planning Meeting- held in COM’s chamber on dated 16.11.2015, in view of Point Trail Through at Tuggali station of Guntakal division 14.11.2015, COM expressed concerned over the increasing trend of unusual/accidents and operational procedural lapses at stations/yards. COM advised to conduct “Special Safety Seminar at major stations/yards & Safety meetings at all others stations on GR.3.38. Points affecting movement of train” and SR’s there under for strict adherence.

In view of above, it has been decided to launch a 10 days **Operating Special Safety Seminar & Safety meetings** drive commencing from 20.11.15 to 30.11.15, involving Sr. DOMs, DOM/Gs, other operating officers, Supervisory Ss and TI’s of the respective divisions shall be conducted and ensure the compliance of the drive details submitted in the following pro-forma (.)

Station / Yard	Officers/TI’s / Supervisor	Special safety Seminars and meetings conducted	Staff Counsellled	Remarks

On completion of the drive, a detailed report shall be submitted to the undersigned on or before 07.12.15 for kind appraisal of COM.

**(K.PADMAJA)**  
**CTM /G&PP**

**Sub: OPERATING SAFETY DRIVE ON WORKING OF NON-INTERLOCKING OF MLC IN TERMS OF Annexure III to V OF APPENDIX-II to G&SR AND SWR OF CONCERNED STATION.**

**Ref: No.T.387/TRAFFICSAFETYDRIVE Dated 08.12.2015**

IN VIEW OF COLLISION OF DIESEL MULTIPLE UNIT T.NO.74934 DOWN FIROZPUR CONTONMENT - JALLANDHAR CITY JN. WITH TRACTOR TROLLEY NO.PB 08 CP 3616 AT MANNED LEVEL CROSSING NO.C-6 AT KM 6/9-8, COMMISSIONER OF RAILWAY SAFETY/CENTRAL CIRCLE MADE THE FOLLOWING REMARKS/RECOMMENDATIONS:-

- TO MONITER WORKING OF STATION MASTERS TO ENSURE CLOSURE OF NON-INTERLOCKED GATES UNDER THEIR CONTROL BEFORE GRANTING LINE CLEAR FOR TRAINS.
- BY CARRYING OUT SURPRISE INSPECTIONS AT LEVEL CROSSINGS TO MONITER ALERTNESS OF GATEMAN AND PROPER OPENING/CLOSING OF GATES.
- TO MONITER THAT LOCO PILOTS ARE NOT OVER SPEEDING IN FOGGY WEATHER WHEN THE VISIBILITY IS RESTRICTED.

IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE IT HAS BEEN DECIDED TO LAUNCH A 15 DAYS SPECIAL DRIVE COMMENCING FROM **11.12.15 TO 25.12.15** WITH REGARD TO WORKING OF GATEMAN AND STATION MASTERS AND PROTECTION OF NON-INTERLOCKED MLC IN TERMS OF Annexure III to V OF APPENDIX-II to G&SR AND SWR OF CONCERNED STATION.(.)

A SAFETY DRIVE, INVOLVING SR.DOMs, DOM/Gs, OTHER OPERATING OFFICERS & TIs OF DIVISIONS AND

ALL OFFICERS ENSURE THE COMPLIANCE OF THE ABOVE INSTRUCTIONS (.)


ACTION TAKEN IN EACH CASE AND THE REMARKS, IF ANY, TO BE SUBMITTED IN THE FOLLOWING PROFORMA (.)

Date	LC No.	Irregularities noticed	Action Taken	Remarks

ON COMPLETION OF DRIVE, A DETAILED REPORT SHALL BE SUBMITTED TO CTM/G&PP ON OR BEFORE **31.12.2015** BY DOM/Gs.

**(K.PADMAJA)**  
**CTM/G&PP**

\*\*\*\*

A rectangular box with a double-line border and a drop shadow, containing the section title. The text is centered within the box.

## **Section “H” Accident Statistics**

During the last quarter of 2015, 6 accidents took place and the details of them are;

- 13.10.2015 at Badampudi station of BZA Division one BT train derailed falling under the category of ‘Other train accidents’ (D5)
- On 20.10.2015 between Kesamudram and Tadlapusapalli stations of SC Division, in 12622 Tamilnadu Express there was smoke which was stopped and put ‘off’ by the crew and the accident falls under the category of ‘B-5’.
- On 29.10.2015 at Manchiryal station of SC division, one Goods train loco derailed in the yard while coming from siding and the category falls under ‘D-6’.
- On 01.11.2015 at Nanded station of NED Division, engine derailed in the yard in the course of shunting and the accident falls under the category of ‘D-6’.
- On 17.11.2015 between Nandalur – Mantapampalle stations of GTL Division one non-daily express train 06336 met with an unusual incident of coaches got struck up in the mud due to flash floods and the category of the accident falls under ‘R3’.
- On 01.12.2015 at Manikgarh station of SC Division one light engine derailed in the yard and the category of accident falls under ‘D6’.

There were no collisions, no UMLC accidents, no other consequential accidents, no SPAD.

\*\*\*\*\*