

## SOUTH CENTRAL RAILWAY

Safety.387/Fly Leaf/4/2016

### Fly Leaf No. 04/2016

## Attention.....

### OPERATING & LOCO RUNNING STAFF OFFICIALS

Of late there are incidences of passenger carrying trains received & entered onto Goods R&D lines resulting in “breach of block rules”. In a span of 5 months, there were **three** incidences in BZA Division. Lapses on the part of SMs & LP are the reasons for such occurrences. All such incidences are preventable had little vigilance and alertness is exhibited. The details of the three incidences are given below;

1. On 9<sup>th</sup> November 2015, BOX’N’ Empty Goods was waiting on loop line of Thadi station of BZA Division and at 10.35 hours, SM/DVD granted line clear for the Goods train as per the initial planning. However, SCOR instructed SM/THY to keep the Goods train at THY itself and given precedence to Train No. 18520 LTT – VSKP Express. SM/THY gave through signals for Train No. 18520 Express via mainline.at 10.40 hours. The train ran through the station THY and arrived at the Home Signal of DVD at 10.50 hours. SM/DVD thinking that it is a Goods train, signalled for reception of the train on to Goods line No.6. LP of Express started his train and entered on to Goods loop which was not having further despatch facility to VSKP. Hence, the train was forced to be backed and received on Road No.2. As a result of this, the train lost its punctuality. **The cause of this failure was due to failure of Dy.SS/THY who failed to cancel line clear for the Goods train (as per initial plan) and take fresh line clear for Express train as per the modified plan.** Dy.SS/THY was primarily held responsible for violation of Block Working Manual guidelines and the LP of the train was held responsible under ‘secondary’ responsibility.
2. On 25<sup>th</sup> January 2016, Train No. 17229 (TVC – HYB) Sabari Express was wrongly admitted and given through via Goods R&D line No. 10 at BTTR station of BZA Division. The incident resulted due to the wrong communication given by Dy.SS/South Cabin/BTTR to Dy.SS/PF and Dy.SS/North Cabin as BCN empty Goods. The train is not having schedule stop at BTTR. LP of the train also failed to alert the Dy.SS & Guard. No written message was given by the train crew at BTTR. **Dy.SS/South Cabin/BTTR was held responsible under ‘Primary’ and LP of the train under ‘Secondary’, & Dy.Punctuality under ‘blameworthy’.**
3. On 10<sup>th</sup> April 2016, at about 18.59 hours, Train No. 57257 TPTY – COA Passenger left Godavari station of BZA Division and at RJY, the train was signalled for reception on to Goods R&D line and the LP of the train also entered on to the Goods loop. The train was further backed and

admitted on to platform line. As per the TSR of Godavari station, there is no overwriting and no confusion, it is entered as Train No. 57257 and even the LC Gate controlled by SM/GVN was written as Passenger train. The CASM/RJY only made a mistake by writing Goods train instead of Passenger train. Also, he made alterations in the TSR. The Enquiry Committee held the CASM/South/RJY under 'Primary', LP & ALP of the Passenger train under 'Secondary' and section TI/RJY + DI/RJY under 'Blameworthy'.

All the above three incidences were totally preventable had little vigilance and alertness was exhibited by the SMs and Loco Running Staff. In the first incidence, SM/THY failed to cancel line clear for Goods train which was initially taken before despatching an Express train. In the second instance, CASM/BTTR wrongly communicated with other CASM and Platform Dy.SS as Goods train. In the third incidence, CASM/S/RJY wrongly written and wrongly communicated with other CASM/North/RJY and Dy.SS/PF as Goods train instead of Passenger train.

Loco Running Staff (LP/ALPs) could have prevented all the three incidences on noticing a wrong route on the Home Signals and could have been a part of 'appreciation'.

**CHIEF SAFETY OFFICER**  
**SAFETY ORGANISATION    SOUTH CENTRAL RAILWAY**