

**SOUTH CENTRAL RAILWAY**  
**HEADQUARTERS SAFETY ORGANISATION**  
**BI-MONTHLY SAFETY BULLETIN – March & April 2016**

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**DETAILS OF UNUSUALS AND ACCIDENTS THAT TOOK PLACE**  
**DURING MARCH & APRIL 2016**

1. **Brief of the incident (SPAD):** On 10<sup>th</sup> March 2016, at 16.07 hours, LP of SEM UP Goods hauled by Electric traction multi with a trailing of 54 loaded BCFC+1 passed UP Home Signal of PGDP at 'ON' position of SC Division and stopped after engine/s +2 wagons length beyond the Home Signal.

**Cause:** Delayed application of brakes by the LP.

**Staff held responsible:** LP & ALP under 'Primary'.

**Matters brought to light:**

- a. The leading loco speedometer was not recording the events.
- b. On perusal of LC Gate Register at PGDP station, it was noticed that no train nomination entries are made in the register by the Dy.SS.

**Suggestions and recommendations:**

- a. As the effective braking distance for the rakes fitted with Automatic Pressure Mechanism (APM) and Load Sensing Device (LSD) is relatively more with respect to conventional Load/Empty device fitted rakes, all LIs shall monitor and counsel their nominated LPs to apply brakes well in advance to control these trains.
- b. The speedometer chart of electric locomotives is not providing all the parameters related to braking system i.e., BP drop, BL pressure etc., as available in diesel locomotives. The parameters of speed chart shall be standardized to get better analysis and correctness.
- c. Duties of ALPs as advised by Railway Board shall be once again circulated to all ALPs through lobbies / SOBs.

2. **Brief of the incident (SPAD):** On 13<sup>th</sup> March 2016, at 07.29 hours, LP of Train No. 57477 (TPTY – GTL) Passenger passed UP Mainline Starter Signal and stopped after 350m at Taticherla station of GTL Division.

**Cause:** LP failed to ensure that control and power apparatus and brakes of the train is in working order.

**Staff held responsible:**

**Primary:**

- a. Technician/Diesel Shed/GY who has closed the BP additional cut-out cock of leading side of dead loco without the notice of the train crew resulting in isolation of BP pressure towards formation.
- b. LP/GTL who worked the train from DMM towards GTL for violation of GR 4.46 & 4.43.
- c. Sr. Goods Guard/GTL who worked the train from DMM towards GTL for violation of SR 4.45.

**Secondary:**

- a. LP/DMM who worked the train from TPTY to DMM failed to identify the correct defect and for giving misleading information to PCOR and GY Shed Staff. He noticed heavy blow of air through feed valve and the train should have worked on single pipe from TPTY or should have given message for detaching the dead loco in the formation (dead loco after working loco).
- b. Sr.ALP/GTL who worked the train from DMM towards GTL for failing to alert the Guard.
- c. CLI/DHNE who was available at DMM for his failure to take proper decision in both aspects i.e., allowing the train to work on single pipe or to detach the dead loco at DMM when problem could not be rectified; instead he advised the LP to proceed in the same condition in anticipation that Mechanic will attend the trouble en-route.

**Blameworthy:**

- a. Sr. ALP/DMM who worked the train from TPTY to DMM for failing to record the defective feed valve in the loco log book.
- b. CLI/GTL, nominated LI to the LP/GTL for not imparting proper and effective counseling / training regarding the identification of loco critical components and also troubleshooting.
- c. CLI/GY, nominated LI of LP/DMM for not imparting proper and effective counseling regarding the identification of loco critical components and also troubleshooting.

**Matters brought to light:**

- a. Having found leakage in feed pipe of dead loco at Tummanagunta station, the formation was permitted in the same condition instead of working the train on single pipe system.
- b. It is seen that the location of BP and FP additional cutout cocks are not uniform in all locos leading to confusion.
- c. Correct identification of failed component is not done by the LP.
- d. The VG given at TPTY was not indicating about the attachment of dead loco instead it is indicated as multi-loco along with working loco. Further the VG was not authenticated.

**Suggestions and recommendations:**

- a. There should be clear demarcation of BP and FP additional cutout cocks.
- b. Whenever any additional cutout cock is closed, there should be sensing mechanism (audio-visual).
- c. In case of attention en-route by Shed Staff or any examination of formation, the LP shall conduct brake continuity test and feel test to ascertain functioning of brake system.
- d. Staff involved in air brake system should be given specific training on troubleshooting of the air brake system.
- e. Shed Mechanics whenever they are attending such defects of locos, they should attend it in the presence of LP.
- f. Event recorder similar to the loco may be provided in SLR.

3. **Brief of the incident (SPAD):** On 29<sup>th</sup> March 2016, LP of DN 67264 MEMU passed DN Home Signal of GT station of SC Division at 10.50 hours. The train stopped after passing 71m. The train had 5 official scheduled halts since its journey from HYB till the incident of SPAD.  
**Cause:** Due to misjudgement of the LP and delayed application of brakes.  
**Staff held responsible:** LP of the train under 'Primary' and CLI/SC nominated LI of the LP for failing to counsel the LP under 'blameworthy'.  
**Suggestions & Recommendations:** Analysing calls to and from CUG SIM of loco crew from sign 'on' to sign 'off' with reference to the JPO issued by Railway Board vide letter No. 2010/Tele/2(1)/1 Pt. dated 21.12.2012 to be implemented as recommended through CMS.
4. **Brief of the incident (Breach of Block Rules):** On 10<sup>th</sup> April 2016, at 18.59 hours, Train No. 57257 TPTY – COA Passenger started its journey from Godavari to Rajahmundry station of BZA Division. At RJY, the CASM communicated the description to other end Cabin and Dy.SS/PF as Goods train and accordingly, the Home Signal was cleared to Goods R&D line. LP of the Passenger also passed the Home Signal and entered the Goods yard and subsequently realised and alerted the CASM, the train was further backed beyond Home Signal and correctly received on PF line.  
**Cause:** Negligent working of South Cabin ASM/RJY. He also failed to make entry in the TSR.  
**Staff held responsible:**  
**Primary:** CASM/South/RJY  
**Secondary:** LP/RJY and Sr. ALP/RJY who failed to stop the train at Home Signal when wrong signal is given to his train.  
**Blameworthy:** TI/RJY for not counseling the SMs and also for not conducting monthly inspections regularly. DI/RJY is also held under 'blameworthy' for the reason that he failed to counsel the LP.
5. **Brief of the incident (Unusual Incident):** On 7<sup>th</sup> March 2016, at 10.45 hours, UP 12647 Kongu Express (CBE-NZM) arrived onto UP Mainline (PF-1) of KCG station of HYB Division. The train was hauled by diesel loco upto KCG and the load of the train is 23 coaches. Diesel traction was detached. Before the electric traction loco could be attached to the formation, the formation rolled back by 3 coaches length towards FM direction containing passengers on mainline (which is not isolated) in Automatic Block Territory double line.  
**Cause:** Improper securing precautions coupled with releasing the formation by the Mechanical Staff before attachment of the loco.  
**Staff held responsible:** Sr. Technician/C&W under 'Primary', Technician/C&W under 'Secondary' and two Pointsman under 'Blameworthy'.  
**Matters brought to light:**  
a. C&W staff are in the habit of releasing the formation by  $\frac{3}{4}$  of formation before loco is attached.

- b. SE/C&W was not available on PF for making an endorsement on the BPC after loco interception.
- c. Operating Staff are not following the securing precautions as laid down in SR 5.23.
- d. Hand brakes of front and rear SLRs of the formation was found not functioning.

**Suggestions & Recommendations:**

- a. During power interception, Dy.SS/PF and SE/C&W must be available to supervise the shunting and stabling precautions.
- b. Wooden wedges are to be replaced by iron skids for securing the formations.
- c. Incoming and outgoing Guards shall ensure that formation is properly secured and shunting is supervised.

6. **Brief of the incident (Yard derailment):** On 14<sup>th</sup> April 2016, at 13.35 hours, WDG4 (multi) derailed at CMS crossing of Point No. 16 near Trip Shed of RDM station in SC Division. The movement was given for the light engines to come from Trip Shed to Road - 3.

**Cause:** Improper maintenance of newly commissioned track.

**Staff held responsible:** SSE/P.Way/Construction for improper maintenance of newly commissioned track and for not ensuring proper lay out.

**Matters brought to light:** Same class of loco derailed at the same location on 31<sup>st</sup> January 2016.

**Suggestions & Recommendations:**

- a. There shall be no ambiguity regarding the responsibility for maintenance of newly commissioned track among Construction and Openline Departments.
- b. As per Para 2.7 (II) of CRS authorization letter No. R.12028/01/16-SCC, all newly laid points and crossings have to be checked for proper assembly, layout, squaring, housing and opening of the switches is ensured by the Construction Organisation before the commissioning of the section.

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**1.0 Irregularities noticed in the working of Operating Department:**

- a. On 12<sup>th</sup> March at 01.04 hours, while Train No. 15905 (CAPE-DBRG) was on run between MBD – GWM stations of BZA Division, Gateman of LC Gate No.319/A noticed unusual sound and alerted SM/GWM. The train was stopped at TOU and found leading trolley left side bolster spring missing. Before the train could be stopped at TOU, it travelled in unsafe condition for about 13 KMs involving two stations. Station staff of two stations failed to stop and examine the train in spite of alerts given by three LC Gatemen.
- b. On 18<sup>th</sup> April 2016, at 17.47 hours, LP of Train No. SAMT Goods was on run between HAQ – RJP stations of GTL Division, noticed LC Gate No.108/E in ‘open’ condition and applied emergency and stopped the train. Cause of the incident was due to the failure of SM/HAQ who failed to exchange PN with the Gateman before granting / obtaining line clear for a train.

- c. On 22<sup>nd</sup> April 2016, at 10.50 hours, LP of Train No. 17205 Express was on run between GT – BN stations of SC Division, noticed LC Gate No.19/E in ‘open’ condition and applied emergency and stopped the train. Cause of the incident was due to the failure of Dy.SS/BN who failed to inform the Gateman under exchange of PNs before obtaining / granting line clear for a train.
- d. Again immediately on the next day i.e., on 23<sup>rd</sup> April 2016, at 06.30 hours, LP of Train No. 12759 Express was on run between GT – BN stations of SC Division, noticed LC Gate No.19/E in ‘open’ condition and applied emergency and stopped the train. Cause of the incident was due to the failure of Dy.SS/BN who failed to inform the Gateman under exchange of PNs before obtaining / granting line clear for a train.
- e. On 28<sup>th</sup> April 2016, at 11.18 hours, LP of Train No. DN JSWT Goods was on run between OBVP – PMT stations of GTL Division, noticed LC Gate No.94/E in ‘open’ condition and applied emergency and stopped the train. Cause of the incident was due to the failure of Dy.SS/BN who failed to inform the Gateman under exchange of PNs before obtaining / granting line clear for a train.
- f. During CSO’s surprise night inspection of PGDP station of SC Division, it was noticed that Sri. Sekhar Babu, Dy.SS/PGDP **though working at this station for the last 3 months not issued with Electrical Isolator Competency Certificate which is essential as per SR 17.03.5.3.4.**
- g. At PGDP station of SC Division, it was noticed by CSO during his surprise night inspection that many shortfalls were noticed in the station safety equipment, out of two tail lamps **only one working**, Out of three HS lamps **two working**. As many as 7 detonator tins of various dates of manufacturing is found. **Out of the seven tins, 5 tins were found having the stock of Detonators way back of year 2000.**
- h. During rear-window inspection from SC – GNT section by Train No. 17230 Sabari Express it was noticed at NLPD station of GNT Division that one coal loaded rake MOO ‘N’ Goods was found stabled on Road No.5 without loco i.e., stabled. It was noticed that **iron skids and safety chains are not used** for securing. On further enquiry with SM/NLPD it is ascertained that the rake has come in the morning at 07.10 hours and further detained for want of diesel traction loco for movement towards GTL direction and the electric traction loco was detached. **But, it was reported by SM/NLPD that the stabling entry is not made till 17.30 hours in the evening and stabling precautions by placing iron skids and safety chains was not done by the Dy.SS in the morning shift and further not ensured by day shift Dy.SS.** Subsequently, the station was inspected by Dy.CSO/Electrical on 29.3.2016 to oversee the procedures being adopted for stabling of rakes and noticed that entries were **not made from October 2015 to 23.3.2016.** SMR / NLPD and section TI/GNT have totally failed to notice the major lapse and did not make any effort to rectify the failure. He also observed that Train No. AVA’N’ which arrived at 13.30 hours on Road No.1 was stabled **but stabling entry is not made** and another Train No. NDL Goods arrived at 14.00 hours on Road No.5 was found stabled and **stabling entry is not made.** This was noticed by Dy.CSO/Electrical at 21.00 hours.
- a. At TEL station of BZA Division, Dy.CSO/Electrical noticed during his inspection that Guard of T. No. 67263 MEMU (BZA-TEL) is not trained in MEMU working and does

not possess competency certificate to work EMU/MEMU trains. Similarly, Guard/BZA working T. No. 67256 MEMU also was found not trained in EMU/MEMU and does not possess competency certificate to work these trains.

## **2.0 Irregularities noticed in the working of Engineering Department:**

- a. On 13<sup>th</sup> March 2016, at 11.15 hours, LP of Train No. 12194 (JPR-YPR) Express while passing between IKI – MOA stations of HYB Division, noticed LC Gate NO. 115/E in ‘open’ condition and stopped the train. The incident resulted because the Gateman failed to ‘close’ the LC Gate before exchanging PN with the SM.
- b. On 27<sup>th</sup> March 2016, at 01.15 hours, LP of Train No. 12769 (TPTY-SC) Express was on run between GWD – PDO stations of HYB Division, noticed LC Gate No.100/E in ‘open’ condition and applied emergency and stopped the train. Cause of the incident was due to the failure of Gateman who failed to ‘close’ the LC Gate before exchanging PN with the SM.
- c. On 27<sup>th</sup> March 2016, at 03.30 hours, LP of Train No. 17603 (KCG - YPR) Express was on run between BVO – DHNE stations of HYB Division, noticed LC Gate No.164/E in ‘open’ condition and applied emergency and stopped the train. Cause of the incident was due to the failure of Gateman who failed to ‘close’ the LC Gate before exchanging PN with the SM.
- d. On 1<sup>st</sup> April 2016, at 04.00 hours, LP of Train No. DN BCN Empty Goods was on run between MOB-MED stations of HYB Division, noticed LC Gate No.241/E in ‘open’ condition and applied emergency and stopped the train. Cause of the incident was due to the failure of Gateman who failed to ‘close’ the LC Gate before exchanging PN with the SM.
- e. On 10<sup>th</sup> April 2016, at 11.55 hours, LP of Train No. 11041 (CSTM – MAS) Express was on run between KOU – SF stations of GTL Division, noticed LC Gate No.82/E in ‘open’ condition and applied emergency and stopped the train. Cause of the incident was due to the failure of Gateman who failed to ‘close’ the LC Gate before exchanging PN with the SM.
- f. On 15<sup>th</sup> April 2016, at 06.07 hours, LP of Train No. BJW/BTPN Goods was on run between KHNP – HBU stations of SC Division, noticed LC Gate No.56/E in ‘open’ condition and applied emergency and stopped the train. Cause of the incident was due to the failure of Gateman who failed to ‘close’ the LC Gate before exchanging PN with the SM.
- g. On 18<sup>th</sup> April 2016, at 12.05 hours, Engineering Staff were cutting the tree beside the track near DN Home Signal of PKNS station of NED Division and the tree fallen on the Home Signal uprooting the Signal. It took almost 5 days to restore the Home Signal and affected the punctuality of trains.
- h. On 19<sup>th</sup> April 2016, at 03.48 hours, LP of Train No. 57542 Passenger was on run between TR – NSL stations of NED Division, noticed LC Gate No.13/E in ‘open’ condition and applied emergency and stopped the train. Cause of the incident was due to the failure of Gateman who failed to ‘close’ the LC Gate before exchanging PN with the SM.
- i. On 26<sup>th</sup> April 2016, at 06.02 hours, LP of Train No. 17210 Express was on run between CGI – MNPT stations of GTL Division, noticed LC Gate No.88/E in ‘open’

condition and applied emergency and stopped the train. Cause of the incident was due to the failure of Gateman who failed to 'close' the LC Gate before exchanging PN with the SM.

- j. During CSO's surprise night inspection of GTL Division in the early hours of 4<sup>th</sup> March 2016, it was noticed at Engineering Non-interlocked LC Gate No.154: KM 324/3-4. TVUS:5436,RVUS:135 between MLK – DHNE stations that both side hooters not working, both side road user red lamps not working, during inspection gate was in 'open' condition but Gateman failed to keep danger lamps on either side of LC Gate. After insisting, the Gateman kept the danger lights, but the visibility of red lamp is obstructed by half focus. Opening blocked due to the cage provided. The cage should be designed in such a fashion that red light is completely visible for the approaching train/s. Panyam end, solar light not glowing. Gate census due on 01/2016, as per board last census done on 01/2013. Both side safety chains are of inadequate length as a result it could not be hooked by the Gateman during the demonstration planned. Gate is due for O&E, Last gate O&E done on 31.10.2010. Gateman Sri A. Anki Reddy, before giving P.N. to Dy.SS for train no. MSPV/N, he failed to 'close' the gate.
- k. During rear-window inspection by CSO in Train No.17230 Sabari Express on 13.3.2016 from SC – GNT section, it was noticed that at LC No. 68 at KM 111/9-112/0 between TPPI – MRGA and LC No. 55 at KM 91/8-9 between NLDA – TPPI stations, though the LC Gates are permanently 'closed' the Gatemen are not withdrawn.

### **3.0 Irregularities noticed in the working of S&T Department:**

- a. During the surprise night inspection of BMH station of GTL Division by CSO on 4<sup>th</sup> March 2016, it was noticed that IPS monitor was reported as not working for the last couple of months but the failure memo and failure entry is not made in the S&T Failure Register which is essential.
- b. It was also noticed at BMH station of GTL Division during surprise night inspection by CSO on 4<sup>th</sup> March 2016 from the record of Relay Room Key Register that last entry was made on 22.01.2016 at 10.00 hours. It appears that the schedule of inspections by ESM once in a fortnight, JE/Signals once in a month and SSE/Signals once in a quarter is not followed since there is no entry for the entire year after 22<sup>nd</sup> January 2016.

### **4.0 Irregularities noticed in the working of Mechanical Department:**

- a. On 12<sup>th</sup> March at 01.04 hours, while Train No. 15905 (CAPE-DBRG) was on run between MBD – GWM stations of BZA Division, Gateman of LC Gate No.319/A noticed unusual sound and alerted SM/GWM. The train was stopped at TOU and found leading trolley left side bolster spring missing.

### **5.0 Irregularities noticed in the working of Electrical Department:**

- b. During Dy.CSO/Electrical inspection of NLPD station of GNT Division on 29<sup>th</sup> March 2016 that Shunter/GNT was found performing shunting in WAG-7/JHS/24049 from rear cab.
- c. It was also noticed at NLPD yard, that lighting is very poor making it difficult for GLP check & shunting.

- d. On 26<sup>th</sup> April 2016, during Dy.CSO/Electrical inspection of TEL station in BZA Division noticed that LP/BZA working 67263 MEMU (BZA-TEL) is overdue for MEMU RC from 29.8.2015.

**CHIEF SAFETY OFFICER  
HEADQUARTERS SAFETY  
ORGANISATION**





**MAN OF THE MONTH AWARDEES FOR THE MONTHS OF JANUARY, FEBRUARY & MARCH 2016**

<b>SC DIVISION</b>	<b>NED DIVISION</b>	<b>BZA DIVISION</b>	<b>BZA DIVISION</b>	<b>GNT DIVISION</b>	<b>HYB DIVISION</b>
Sri. P. Ravi Kumar Gateman of LC No.61/E	Sri. V. Srinivasu LP/Passenger/PAU	Sri. Ch. Yesudas ESM/A/SLO	Sri. Rupesh Kumar ALP/BTTR	Sri. R. Chandrasekhar APM/SRMR	Sri. S. K. Meena LP/KCG
Sri. Purushottam Kumar Roy ESM/YP	Sri. Babu Kumar Singh ALP/PAU	Sri. K. Kishore Kumar Guard/RJY	Sri. S. Appa Rao Night Patrolman	Sri. Sk. Riaz Basha LP/NDL	Sri. Butchendera Gateman under SSE/P.Way/MBNR
Sri. Ramulu Patrolman of Unit No.5	Sri. Rajkumar Seshraj Mate of Gang No.1 under SSE/P.Way/MUE	Sri. N. Satyanarayana NPM/RJY	Sri. Srinivas Rao Night Patrolman under SSE/P.Way/NDD	Sri. Hinno Behra ASM/MUK	Sri. Chand Miya Keyman under SSE/P.Way
Sri. Bhagwan Sahay Meena Guard	Sri. K. Anand Babu CLI/NED	Sri. E. N. Rao NPM under SSE/P.Way/KVR	Sri. P. Srinivasa Rao Gateman/E/NDO	Sri. P. Satish Kumar Pointsman/PGRL	Sri. Srinivas LP/KCG
Sri. O. Krupakar LP/KZJ	Sri. Ramnivas Singh Pointsman/AWB	Sri. R. Venkateswar Rao NM/YLM under SSE/P.Way/SLO	Sri. Rayapati Sudheer Gateman/E/KRV	Sri. Sk. Abdul Jabbar Dy.SS/DKD	Sri. V.K. Viswanath LP/KCG
Sri. K. Venkateswarlu ESM-I/DKJ	Sri. Sunil Mahajan Pointsman/AWB	Sri. A, V. V. Ramesh NPM/SLO	Sri. M. Rajendra Prasad Night Patrolman under SSE/P.Way/RJY		<b>GTL DIVISION</b>
Sri. V. Anka Raju LP/KZJ	S. H. Meshram SM/SVW working at BSQ	Sri. Y. Durgaprasad Goods Guard/RJY	Sri. P. B. Shankar Night Patrolman under SSE/P.Way/TDD		Sri. Md. Azaruddin ALP/NNRE
Sri. P. Varalababu (working relief duty) APM/YP		Sri. V. Krishna Gateman/Traffic DWP	Sri. T. Ratna Kumar Gateman of LC 319/E under SSE/P.Way/NZD		Sri. K. Surendra Babu LP/NRE

Sri. R. P. Singh Guard/SNF		Sri. K. Prasad ESM/MBD	Sri. H. L. V. Bala Raju Technician- II/SSE/OHE/KVZ		Sri. P. R. Reddy LP/RU
		Sri. G. Umamaheshwara Rao Gateman/Traffic/NLR	Sri. D. Devanarayana Rao Night Patrolman		Sri. Srinivasu Mortha ALP/RU
		Sri. Sajen John LP/RJY	Sri. N. K. Ranjan Kumar ESM/A		
		Sri. S. Varahalu Babu ALP/RJY	Sri. K. S. Reddy Gateman/Traffic/PAP		
		Sri. Bipin Kumar ESM/SKM	Sri. V. Venkatesan LP/BTTR		
		Sri. G. Ramesh JE/S&T/NDD	Sri. T. P. Naidu NPM		
		Sri. R. Madha Sr.Technician/S&T	Sri. S. Yanadaiah Gateman/Engineering LC 137/E		
		Sri. Y. Murali Krishna APM/BVL	Sri. Buraudin ESM		
		Sri. R. J. P. Narayana SS/RVD	Sri. M. Rambabu Pointsman/CLX		
			Sri. P. Narayana Rao MC ESM		

**ATTENTION .....**

**In-chargers of Crew Lobbies**

**DO CONDUCT THE BREATHALYSER TEST ON EVERY LP, ALP & GUARD DURING SIGN 'ON' / 'OFF' TIMES BY KEEPING THE BA EQUIPMENT IN 'ACTIVE' MODE AND NOT IN 'PASSIVE' MODE.**

**ATTENTION .....**

**Operating Staff**

**Be vigilant and observe for any unusual on a running train and make all out efforts to stop the train. If failed to stop, inform the Gateman of LC Gates in between stations, SM of next station and SCOR duly keeping a record of the same in TSR & Station Diary.**

**ATTENTION .....**

**S&T Officials**

**Do not forget to obtain 'failure memo' from the SM before attending to the S&T gear at fault.**

**ATTENTION .....**

**P. Way Officials**

**Do not use and do not allow other Departments staff to use steel tapes, steel staff, all gauges, levels etc., in Electrified & track circuited area.**