

**SOUTH CENTRAL RAILWAY**

# **VIGIL**

**QUARTERLY SAFETY BULLETIN NO.1**

**MARCH - 2016**

**INDEX**

<b>Sl. No</b>	<b>Section</b>	<b>Subject</b>	<b>Page No.</b>
1	<b>A</b>	Extracts of RB letters	<b>1 – 26</b>
2	<b>B</b>	Important rules	<b>26 – 30</b>
3	<b>C</b>	Latest amendments	<b>30 – 32</b>
4	<b>D</b>	Checklist – LC Gates	<b>32 – 37</b>
5	<b>E</b>	Accident cases	<b>38 – 47</b>
6	<b>F</b>	Test your knowledge	<b>47 – 50</b>
8	<b>G</b>	Safety drives	<b>50 – 55</b>
9	<b>H</b>	Accident statistics	<b>55</b>

**My dear Railwaymen**

**At the outset, let me take the privilege of congratulating all the field staff for contributing your might in achieving the safety shield to our Railway for the year 2015-16. Receiving the safety shield after 13 long years is certainly making all of us to feel happy and at the same time, it is a challenging task for all of us to sustain the shield for the coming 2016-17 year. I hope that all of us together can again achieve the shield for the coming year by following all the laid down precautions in safe running of trains apart from showing concern for punctuality of passenger carrying trains.**

**However, it is necessary for us to introspect ourselves in looking and analyzing at the accidents and unusual incidents that have taken place on our Railway during 2015-16 and take strong preventive measures from recurring. In the concluded financial year, 44 accidents / unusual incidences have taken place when compared to 50 accidents / unusual incidents during 2014-15. There is no much reduction in number of incidences. Out of the 44 accidents / unusual incidents, 20 are yard accidents, 16 other accidents, 5 indicative, 2 consequential and one equipment failure. The number of accidents division-wise are 16 in SC Division, 5 in HYB Division, 7 in BZA Division, 10 in GTL Division and 6 in NED Division. GNT Division recorded 'nil' accidents.**

**This quarterly bulletin "VIGIL" containing important Railway Board letters, few important rules, checklist, test your knowledge with key, brief of accidents / unusual incidences that have taken place in the quarter, safety drives launched and statistical safety performance of the zone. All these information is useful for updating the knowledge of the field staff and apply the same in day-to-day working for safe operation of trains.**

**Wishing all the best for the 2016-17 financial year.**

**(S. P. SAHU)  
CHIEF SAFETY OFFICER**

**Section “A” KNOWLEDGE**  
**Extracts of Railway Board letters**

**Sub: Reporting of cases under Section 113 to CRS.**

**Ref: Railway Board letter No. 2015 / Safety (A&R)/11/2 dated 05/6.1.2016.**

It has come to the knowledge of Railway Board that certain cases of accidents / incidents falling under Section 113 of Railway Act which have been reported to the CRS but are not reported in SIMS (Accident / Incident ID has not been created in the data base). This creates a mismatch of Section 113 cases known to RB and CCRS Office.

In order to avoid such confusion all Zonal Railways should ensure;

1. Any accident / incident if reported under Section 113 of Railway Act to CRS should also be reported in SMS and to RB Safety Directorate.
2. In the new accident reporting form of SIMS, there is a provision of selecting the option of reporting of a particular accident / incident under Section 113, which should be strictly complied with by selecting appropriate option in the accident reporting form.

Please ensure that under no condition any mismatch should occur in cases reported to CRS under Section 113 and to the cases reported to the Railway Board in SIMS and falling under Section 113 of Railway Act.

**(P. S. Mishra)**  
**Advisor / Safety**  
**Railway Board**

**Sub: Award of Railway Minister Safety Shield for the year 2015-16.**

**Ref: RB letter No. 2016/Safety-I/3/Safety Shield dated 05.01.2016.**

The safety shield for the year 2015-16 is to be awarded as per the criteria enclosed herewith.

Zonal Railways are requested to furnish the information as per the pro-forma I, II & III. The data is to be furnished for the period April 2015 to March 2016 in respect of all the items indicated in these pro-forma.

Bin Pro-forma I, under item IV (a), assessment is to be made with regard to the improvement in overdue of RC, PME, Safety Camps, inter-railway and intra-railway inspections and trains run without BVs.

Regarding item No. V (b), which pertains to LC elimination, Railways are requested to indicate the achievements made with regard to items mentioned in the pro-forma.

With reference to item No. IV (c) on publicity, railways are required to furnish the material of the publicity carried out and safety literature circulated during 2015-16.

For item IV (d) regarding follow up of safety drives, the compliance of various drives issued by RB is to be given.

Pro-forma-II is regarding finalization of D&AR cases.

Proforma III is regarding human element in accidents.

Requisite data / information and publicity material printed / issued during 2015-16 may be furnished to Board's Office and should be loaded on SMDMS by 15<sup>th</sup> March 2016 positively.

Apart from the information provided by Railways as per above mentioned pro-forma, details regarding accidents, reporting, inquiry, D&AR etc., will also be taken / verified from SIMS database. Zonal Railways are therefore advised to keep the SIMS database updated in this regard so as not to lose marks on account of blank / not updated fields.

This may please be treated as most immediate.

**(Prafulla Chandra)**  
**Director / Safety-1**

**Sub: Role of Railways in the event of aircraft in distress.**

**Ref: RB letter No. 2003/Safety (DM)/6/3 dated 08.01.2016.**

Ministry of Civil Aviation has constituted National Aeronautical Search and Rescue Co-ordination Committee and published the National Aeronautical Search and Rescue (NASAR) Manual.

The NASAR Manual provides detailed guidelines / procedure to be followed in search of the missing aircraft, its crew and passengers and to provide aid and organize the rescue of survivors of aircraft accidents. The manual envisages better co-operation at all levels, co-ordinated approach and defining the functions of various agencies involved in search and rescue operations.

In view of above, Ministry of Civil Aviation has sought co-operation and has defined role of Railways as indicated vide Para 6.13.2 of the Manual which states;

**”Railway Officials – can play an important role in assisting the Search and Rescue Organisation by ensuring speedy transmission of information relating to aircraft in distress to the Rescue Co-ordination Centre through the Railway Control Room for taking appropriate action. Railway controls, when requested by the Rescue Co-ordination Centre of alerting post to assist in locating a missing aircraft shall direct all stations and staff in the area to be on the lookout.**

**In the event that aircraft in distress falls on or near railway lines or infringes railway tracks, railway control shall speedily transmit information relating to aircraft to Rescue Co-ordination Centre for appropriate action. Railway controls, when requested by the Rescue Co-ordination Centre or alerting post to assist in locating a missing aircraft shall direct all stations and station staff at stations in the vicinity of the area to be alert and on the lookout”.**

Region-wise contact details of different aerodromes are indicated in the annexure. It is requested that the role of Indian Railways may be advised to all the stake holders.

**(P. Srinivas)  
Director/Safety – III**

**Sub: Minutes of CSO’s conference held on 4<sup>th</sup> November 2015 in Railway Board.**

**Ref: RB letter No. 2015/Safety-I/25/1 dated 05.02.2016.**

**1.0 MTs interaction with CSOs:** It was reiterated that follow up of safety rules in train operations is with the CSOs. The job of Safety Officer now is to monitor working of all departments and audit wing of railways through super checks and inspection for ensuring safe train operations.

**1.1 Gist of presentation by Railways:** Six Zonal Railways made presentation on various issues like SPAD, derailments, ULCs, rail fractures etc.,

**2.0 Central Railway:** CR has done analysis of SPAD cases (Mumbai Division). Average duty hours was peak of 230 hours a few years to 130 hours as against 104 hours and Motorman not utilizing HQ rest for actual rest.

**3.0 East Central Railway:** Emergency cross-over at DILWA station of DHN Division was badly located which led to derailment of 18625 DN Patna – Hatia Express as SM failed to ensure proper clamping of this point. The crossover was not visible on the SM panel.

**4.0 Northern Railway:** There was a derailment case of Kalka – Shimla express in KLK – TKSAL section. Case is under CRS inspection. However, preliminary report says that LP was habitual of high speed, and also in locomotive speed indication was not functional.

**5.0 North Western Railway:** UMLC form about 67% of all consequential accidents on NWR as compared to IR average of 43.6%. At the current rate of 106.5 LC elimination per year it would take 10 years to eliminate all LCs. 15 derailments of BLC rakes were noticed in the last 5 years over 1 in 8 ½ turnout in NWR.

**6.0 Southern Railway:** Cases of rail breakage from areas due to excessive corrosion in flange area are due to toilet droppings and water retention. This problem can be reduced to great extent by longitudinal shifting of liners and periodic greasing.



- 7.0 **South Eastern Railway:** SET has taken various steps to control failure of roller bearing of the wagon like checking of felt seal has been intensified, rejection of axle box due to oversize axle box bore, zyglow test etc.,
- 8.0 **East Coast Railway:** Actions are being taken for SPAD controlling, level crossing maintenance and rail fracture maintenance.
- 9.0 **Eastern Railway:** ER brought out three problems faced with BLC wagons. They are sharp curves, 8 curves and 2 consecutive 8 ½ turnout.
- 10.0 **Kolkata Metro:** Kolkata Metro operational modalities are different from open line system in many aspects. Therefore, zonal railway training school for metro system is required.
- 11.0 **North Central Railway:** 51% territory of double line section of NCR is having automatic signaling. Various steps like good visibility of signal and sign boards, operation of modified semi-automatic signalling systems, effective communication, cancellation of trains in advance, modification of crew links to avoid long hours, counseling of the train operation staff. Additional support to LPs to identify signal location etc., have been done to avoid such cases.
- 12.0 **North Eastern Railway:** 140 T Crane is required to be placed at Kasaanj and MLN.
- 13.0 **Northeast Frontier:** RB is requested to make suitable instructions in co-ordination with Forest and Environmental Department for cutting and dressing of tress situated within 30m of both sides of the track.
- 14.0 **South Central Railway:** Signals located on right hand to be given distinct colour for easy identification. At present a small red colour arrow below the signal is provided which is not visible from a distance.
- 15.0 **South East Central Railway:** There is no clear instruction / guideline regarding running of tower wagon and track machine in a corridor block simultaneously.

- 16.0 **South Western Railway:** There are 16 tunnels in Braganzha Ghat in UBL Division for 26.2 KMs, the longest being 289m. There are 56 tunnels in SKLR – SHR ghat section of Mysore Division at a stretch of 56.26 KM, the longest being 569.8m. Both the sections are in the Western Ghats with almost no approach road. Hence, necessity of rail mounted tunnel rescue equipment is of utmost importance in the relief / restoration activities in the section.
- 17.0 **West Central Railway:** RRI case of fire was discussed.
- 18.0 **Western Railway:** Duty list of ‘Gate Mitras’ / ‘Counsellors’ needs to be finalized at the earliest.
- 19.0 **Konkan Railway:** KRCL is having two SPMRVs stationed at Ragnagiri and Verna. Present sanctioned MPS is 75 KMPH. There is necessity to increase the speed of SPMRVs so as to reach accident spot at the earliest.

**Concluding remarks MT:**

1. Passing of train at gate in DFC territory is going to be big problem.
2. LP/ALP have no confidence to apply emergency brakes due to fear of derailment. They need to be counseled.
3. There should be no let up in situation where lobbies are not functional and Guard and LPs are working on their own.
4. Funds for elimination of UMLCs should be clearly earmarked in the beginning of the financial year so that works can be planned in advance.
5. Diamond crossing and scissors wherever available on wooden, be replaced with those of PSC.
6. 85 stations in SER are still having mechanical signaling with old and worn out level frames. Some of the lever frames are 60 years old and need immediate replacement.
7. Duty list of ‘Gate mitras’ / ‘counsellors’ needs to be finalized at the earliest.

8. Although there has been marked reduction in consequential accidents, but the number of accidents attributable to the railway staff continues to be high. Similarly, SPAD cases and accidents at UMLC also remain at a high level.

**Presentation by Safety Directorate of Railway Board:**

1. Consequential train accidents on IR in the current year is 66 against 94 in the year 2014-15. Out of this, 35 are derailment cases and 23 are accidents at UMLCs i.e., they contribute 53% and 35% respectively respectively to total consequential train accidents in the year 2015-16.
2. Out of total consequential train accidents of 66, 28 are attributed to failure of Railway Staff and 28 are due to other than Railway Staff.
3. Engineering Department continues to lead the table with 14 cases.
4. NWR, SECR, SR and WR have shown increase in number of accidents.
5. ED/Safety-I discussed various issues pertaining in SIMS. Various fields appearing in SIMS are not being updated by the Zonal Railways. As a result of this, the data is represented in a skewed manner. Railways were advised to ensure that not only the preliminary accident data is filled up in the SIMS but also all fields pertaining to accident enquiry, D&AR inquiry and final penalty imposition by the DA are filled properly in the database. The CSOs were appraised of various misreports being generated by the system, as also, the areas wherein data are found missing in the SIMS fields.

**Interaction of CRB and Board members with CSOs:**

1. Safety Department of Railways is working quite satisfactorily, but the need of the time is of target for zero failures or minimum failure.
2. In three line section it is already difficulty for the Gateman to see the status of the train passing through. When this is converted into 5 line block section, in case of DFC lines, then

the Gateman reaction to the different trains passing through the gate will be impossible to communicate status of different trains. Also, for how much time the gate remains closed in 5 line block section will be tough decision.

3. Instructions already exist that Rajdhani / Shatabdhi routes should not have any UMLCs but inspite of that there are various Railways where such situation exists. Urgent action for elimination of UMLCs in these sections need to be taken.
4. Hot axle cases in both coaching and freight trains is an area of concern. Enroute rolling 'in' examination of freight trains was discontinued in 2006 to improve wagon turn around. Boars should review these instructions.
5. A letter has been issued to all the GMs for conducting safety audit of all Divisions through DRMs. The target date was 31.10.2015. a report should be submitted to Board and compliance to all the deficiencies should be ensured.
6. Repeated failure of same type under a given condition is not acceptable at al. CSOs are advised that as soon as a failure occurs, a special preventive check is done in the system to know that similar conditions don't occur again.
7. Central Railway should ensure that Motorman does not work excess hours over stipulated rostered hours of 104.

**Finance Commissioner:**

1. Automation is the need of the hour in train operation. Full features of automation needs to percolate down the corner to achieve its full benefits.
2. Simplification of language for imparting safety instructions needs to be ensured. The instructions in the local language must be issued to the staff.
3. Involvement of staff in the working of the depots/ running rooms etc., is required. If possible during inspection a union person may be taken for inspection.

### **Member Engineering:**

1. Safety is very important as far as train operation is concerned. The system will run automatically if the foundation is good.
2. Lobby in-charges must take positive action on the feedback given by the LP at the time of signing 'off'.
3. Inspection schedule and how to do that inspection is an important aspect, which must be laid down.
4. 'shunting melas' to be organized at the zonal headquarters . GM should attend it and apprise staff about safety.

### **Member Electrical:**

1. **Banihal tunnel** – this tunnel was commissioned about one year back. There are lots of features connected to the working of the tunnel but it is surprising to know that a large number of features are either not functional or have gone in to disuse. Escape tunnel which has been provided is full of dirt and muck and voice logger in the control room is not functional. There is an urgent need to conduct a thorough safety audit of this tunnel by officers of other zonal railway.
2. **DG set in RRI** – Normally running of DG set is checked for 5 minutes and set is put off. However, at the time of crisis when DG set needs to be used then it konks off in 2-3 hours. It is, therefore, most important that DG sets in RRI are run for 8 hours in a quarter to check its performance.
3. Signaling gears are to be checked as per the laid down schedule. It is to be ensured that they are in fine fettle all the year around.
4. In the CMS software it is found that each lobby is having the same password and sometimes the password is managed by the private person who looks after outsourced work of date entry in the lobby. This needs to be checked immediately.

**Sub: Fire in trains – amendment to Section 167 of Railways Act.**

**Ref: Railway Board letter No. 2015/Safety (DM)/7/3 dated 15.02.2016.**

A reference was made to RB to ascertain the need to amend Section 167 of Railways Act to empower Railway Officials to enforce prohibition of smoking in Railway premises.

The matter has earlier been examined in consultation with Legal Adviser (Railways), who has suggested as under;

*“It may be seen that, as authorized by Para 4 of the O.M. dated 08.8.2005 of Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, Ministry of Railways has already issued a notification dated 12.01.2006 authorising certain Railway Officers to take action under the provisions of Tobacco Act of 2003. That being so, it is up to the authorities to invoke the provisions of either the Tobacco Act or the Railways Act as the situation may warrant. Therefore, there is no need to make amendments in the Railways Act as has been proposed”.*

In the view of above, the amendment of Section 167 of Indian Railways Act, 1989 does not seem warranted.

**(P. Srinivas)**  
**Director / Safety-III**

**Sub: Restricting entry into Coaching Depots and prohibiting usage of coaches as rest-shelters by on-board staff.**

**Ref: RB letter No. 2009/M (C)/141/6 Vol. II Part (II).**

In regard to the incidence of fire in 6 coaches of Train No. 22824 BBS Rajdhani Express and SDAH Rajdhani Express on 21.4.2014 at NDLS, the enquiry committee had attributed the responsibility of the incident to the onboard staff of ECoR and ER

who were observed to be using the rakes as rest shelter. It has also been observed that miscreants / unauthorized personnel other than maintenance staff may interfere with safety fitting of coaches leading to safety risks to passengers. Issue of security provision in coaching depot was further deliberated in Board in consultation with Security and Safety Directorates.

This is a serious matter and Ministry of Home Affairs has also expressed concern on the incidence and possible law and order issues and has further advised to cover the yard under CCTV surveillance so that any undesirable activity in that area could be immediately detected. Provision of CCTV in the coaching depot was also recommended by enquiry committee of DLI Division of Northern Railway.

Therefore, in order to maintain safety and security of coaches and ensure that maintenance work including pest and rodent control treatment of coaches is carried out without interference. Railways are advised to:

- a. Declare all major coaching depots as high security zone and prohibit entry of personnel other than authorized maintenance and shunting staff.
- b. Visitors including Railway personnel other than authorized maintenance and shunting staff may be permitted inside coaching depots only, if they carry visitor pass issued by concerned CDO.
- c. Strictly ensure that on-board staff (Pantry Staff, TTEs Coach Attendants, Power Car Staff etc.,) does not utilize coaches as rest shelters.
- d. RPF need to regulate the trespassers accordingly.

Railways are advised to scrupulously follow above instructions and take necessary action.

This has the approval of Board (MM and DG/RPF).

**(Prashant Kumar)**  
**Director ME (Coaching)**

**Sub: JPO for safety and security of stabled rakes.**

**Ref: RB letter No. 2015/Safety (DM)/12/3 dated 18.3.2016.**

With a view to reduce fire accidents / incidents in the stabled rakes, Board has proposed to issue a JPO duly involving Operating, Mechanical, Electrical and Security Directorates. A draft guidelines prepared in this regard are enclosed.

View of Zonal Railways on the draft guidelines may please be advised to Board. If Zonal Railway had issued any instructions or guidelines in this regard the same may also be sent to Board. It is requested that the above details may please be uploaded in SMDMS or e-mailed to [dsafety@rb.railnet.gov.in](mailto:dsafety@rb.railnet.gov.in) and [pamurthi\\_srinivas@yahoo.com](mailto:pamurthi_srinivas@yahoo.com) before 31.3.2016.

**(P. Srinivas)**  
**Director / Safety-III**

**Draft guidelines for JPO of Zonal Railways for safety / security of stabled rakes**

In the backdrop of increasing fire accidents / incidents of empty rake stabled on platforms / yards and huge loss to railway property reported from Zonal Railways, it has become imperative to review the safety / security measures in practice and to plug the loopholes if any with a view to prevent recurrence of such incidents. Enquiries conducted into such accidents have brought out miscreant activity, maintenance related issues, careless disposal of beedi / cigarette butts, cooking inside coaches etc., as reasons / probable reasons for those incidents. They are indicative of inadequate security arrangements, lacunae in securing of rakes



by concerned staff, lack of enforcement of the rules and procedures by various staff etc.,

With a view to prevent / reduce such incidents, the following guidelines are issued to Zonal Railways for drafting JPO involving Operating, Mechanical, Electrical and Security Departments within a fortnight and implement the instructions to prevent fire accidents / incidents in stabled rakes. These guidelines are not exhaustive and therefore should be drafted incorporating other relevant aspects considering the prevailing specific security threats / situations at particular railways / places concerned.

The general guidelines for drafting JPOs at Zonal level for safety / security of stabled railway rakes are as under:-

**(A) At stations:**

1. All switches / breakers including power supply to main pantry and mini-pantry equipment should be turned off by nominated staff of Electrical Department before the coaches are locked.
2. On arrival of any train at a terminal station, window shutters should be dropped and coaches should be locked positively by C&W staff in presence of RPF to prevent entry of unauthorized persons. The rake must be moved from platform to yard and from yard to platform in locked condition. It should be ensured that no passengers / persons remain inside the coaches before locking them, except electrical escorting staff like AC Mechanic and ACCA etc., who are permitted to remain in coaches vide RB letter No. E (LL)83/HER/1-2 dated 27.6.1985 issued by Establishment Directorate with Board Finance Directorate concurrence, which indicates that these staff are allowed to take rest in the AC coaches itself wherever rest facilities have not been

made available to them in the nature of a running / rest room. Nominated Electrical, C&W and RPF personal who have jointly supervised above mentioned activities should confirm under joint signature on a register kept in C&W Office at the station that the activities have been completed else concerned supervisor should record the reasons.

3. If at any station, nominated staff of C&W or Electrical Departments are not available, this activity has to be carried out by nominated staff of Operating Department.
4. If a rake is stabled at platform or coaching yard or is being moved for maintenance or being brought out after maintenance, the activity mentioned against points 1 & 2 has to be ensured by the concerned staff.
5. Rake should be emptied and all escorting staff, linen staff should vacate the coaches and it should be ensured by the C&W staff that the coaches are in locked condition.
6. Rake should not be moved out of the platform till the time activities mentioned above are complete. Wherever it is not feasible to complete the above procedures without jeopardizing other operational requirements, alternate measures should be devised by the concerned Departments to comply the said aspect. This should be personally ensured by SM on duty.

**(B) At yard:**

1. Station and yard area must be provided with all basic security arrangements and covered under CCTV surveillance. RPF should report the requirements to concerned Departments for compliance.
2. Proper lighting arrangements should be ensured by electrical departments and backup generators are made available at yard and stabling areas where maintenance of rakes are done to ensure continuous lighting even in the event of power failure. The SM / YM in co-ordination with

Electrical Department should ensure proper lighting arrangements.

3. All precautions outlined with respect to stabled rakes under (A) as applicable should be followed for stabled rakes in yard also.
4. It shall be ensured that yard area / maintenance area / stabling area is fenced or boundary wall is constructed.
5. It shall be ensured that the water supply to yard and station areas other than the meant for passengers / customers are to so regulated that the same is not being misused by the general public and unauthorized entry for pilfering water from Railways avoided.
6. In the Coaching Depot, all maintenance staff should be issued work permit by the CDO's office. For EMUs / MEMUs stabled in stations / yard, maintenance staff should be issued permit by concerned Sr. DEE. For visitors separate ID Card should be issued. This system can be digitized in the long run, RPF should ensured that only person with valid authority are permitted on rakes under maintenance else they may be treated as trespassers.

**(C) General:**

1. Division should identify stabling plan for each train / rake. These should be jointly signed by Sr. DME, Sr. DEE/G (for EMU/MEMU – Sr. DEE/RSO), Sr. DSC and Sr. DOM or officers of these branches nominated by DRM if these posts are not available / vacant.
2. Generally locked rakes should be stabled at stations / yards where RPF staff is available. However, in exigencies and for operational reasons if the rake has to be stabled at some other station / place, the location should be notified to Electrical (for lighting) and Security Departments by Operating Department. This however should be permitted as a routine.

3. For day-to-day stabling of regular trains at a nominated place, there is no need to issue a memo to RPF. However, in case of any deviation from the standard practice, Divisional Security Control Room has to be advised for arranging security.
4. Above procedure should be followed for spare coaches and rakes that are stabled on platforms and in yards.
5. RPF staff should ensure safety and security of the rake when stabled, especially from thefts of fittings, vandalism, nuisance, unlawful activities etc., If there is no RPF then it will be done by Operating Department.
6. All staff working in maintenance / yard should wear issued uniform and be in possession of ID cards as well as work permits if they are entering the rake / pit.
7. Earmarked resting places for Railway employees and contract labour in yard and station area should be made available.

**(D) Procedure during bomb threats at station platform and yard:**

1. When specific bomb threat is received, RPF in co-ordination with GRP / Local Police should ensure that the rake is thoroughly checked. Sniffer dogs could be used for foolproof checking. Police clearance is necessary for the movement of the rake concerned.
2. In the event of a bomb, IED or suspicious device being detected, bomb squad may be requisitioned by RPF / GRP. Only after necessary action is taken by the Police and clearance given in writing, the rake may be moved.
3. The entire area should be cordoned off and the general public and railway employees should be evacuated in event of (1) & (2) above.

**(E) Accident/ untoward incident:**

1. In such instances, when rakes / rolling stock are stabled at unscheduled / unsecure locations, it shall be the duty of the SM of the nearest station to first ensure the security of the rakes in the manner possible and to intimate the RPF Post with jurisdiction about:
  - a) Precise location of stabled rake.
  - b) Number of coaches / wagons, description, information about goods carried needing special protection / arrangement etc.,
  - c) Duration for which security is required.
2. In the vent of RPF staff escorting trains / rakes which become involved in accident/ untoward incidents, it shall be the duty of the escort staff to ensure that the RPF Post with jurisdiction is informed immediately of the accident which led to unscheduled stoppage / stabling of the train / rake for arranging reinforcement / relief.
3. After intimation to the concerned RPF Post, the train escort staff should remain on duty with the train / rake and wait for further instructions from the Sr.DSC / DSC of the concerned Division where the untoward incident has occurred.
4. While handing over charge to the relieving party, message should be conveyed to the Sr. DSC / DSC of the concerned Division and home Division with details of handing over and taking over before departure.

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## Section “B”

### Some important rules – Threshold value as per Accident Manual

**108 Threshold Value:** For the purpose of reporting of accident, threshold value is a minimum value beyond which the accident will be treated as having serious repercussion on the basis of loss to railway property or interruption to through traffic. It shall constitute two portions.

- a) Threshold value of loss of railway property is fixed at one lakh rupees or;
- b) Threshold value of interruption to through traffic either partial or total is where duration of interruption is equal to or more than the number of hours specified against each column below.

<b>Interruption</b>	<b>BG=A,B,C or D Spl routes (in hrs)</b>	<b>BG=D,E Spl or MG-Q, R routes (in hrs)</b>	<b>BG= E or MG=S routes (in hrs)</b>
Total	3	4	6
Or	or	or	or
Total + Partial	6	8	12

#### 108.1 Classification of Routes:

Classification of routes on South Central Railway is as follows:

SOUTH CENTRAL RAILWAY	
Routes “A” – Speeds upto 160 KM/hour	
Route	Section

<b>A</b>	Vijayawada – Balharshah, including Kazipet by pass. Gudur - Vijayawada
<b>Route “B” – Speeds upto 130 KM / hour</b>	
<b>B</b>	Guntaka – Bellary Gudur – Renigunta - Tirupathi Katpadi – Pakala - Tirupathi Guntakal - Nandyal Vijayawada – Bhimavaram - Nidadavolu Bye pass near Bhimavaram Pagidipalli - Nadikude Guntur - Nadikude Guntur - Krishna Canal Guntur - Tenali Nallapadu – Donakonda - Nandyal Secunderabad – Falaknuma - Dhone Secunderabad – Bolarum - Mudkhed Manmad - Mudkhed Kazipet - Secunderabad Secunderabad - Wadi Hussainsagar - Hyderabad Bye pass near Hussainsagar Vijayawada - Visakhapatnam Wadi - Guntakal Guntakal - Renigunta Gooty - Dharmavaram Bye pass line at Renigunta
<b>Route “D” Speeds upto 110 KMPH and the annual traffic density is less than 20 GMT</b>	
<b>D</b>	Vikarabad - Parlivaijnath Nadikude - Macherla Samalkot - Kakinada Port Parbhani - Parlivaijnath Gooty - Pendekallu Dornakal - Bhadrachalam Road Bhadrachalam Road - Manuguru Karepalli - Singareni Collieries

	Purna - Akola Pakala - Dharmavaram
<b>Route “D” Spl – Speeds upto 110 KMPH and the annual traffic density is 20 GMT or more.</b>	
<b>D Spl</b>	Bye pass between Sanatnagar and Moula Ali
<b>Route “E”– All other Sections and branch lines with speed upto 100 KMPH</b>	
<b>E</b>	Venkatachalam - Nidiguntapalem Peddapalli - Jagityal Manigarh - Gadchandur Motumari - Jaggayapet Town Gudivada - Machilipatnam Bhimavaram - Narasapur Kakinada town – Kotipalli Tenali - Repalle Adilabad - Pimpalkutti Mudkhed - Adilabad Janakampet - Bodhan Malkajgiri - Moula Ali chord line Bye pass at Malkajgiri Bye pass at Secunderabad Bye pass at Dornakal Jn Bye pass at Bhadrachalam Road Bye pass at Manikgarh
<b>Meter Gauge</b>	
Route	Section
<b>R3</b>	Akola – Khandwa

**Note:-** The actual section speed as notified in the working timetable for different types of loco motives and rolling stock should be followed. The route classification of some sections may undergo a change from time to time.

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**Section “C”  
Latest Amendments**

**ACS No. 139 to IRPWM dated 08.02.2016**

**1.0 The new Para 607 (4) shall be added to IRPWM given as under;**

**Para 607 (4) – For maintenance of track at locations where speeds are to be reduced due to work at work sites or in yard lines where speed potential is generally low, following track parameters for guidance of field officials are stipulated;**

<b>Speed Band in KMPS</b>	<b>Peak value of UN (unevenness) in mm at 3.6m chord</b>	<b>Peak value of twist in mm at 3.6 chord</b>	<b>Permissible gauge range</b>
45	22	22	-10 to +27mm
30	24	25	-10 to +27mm
15	33	30	-12 to +27mm

**2.0 The existing Para 248 (2) of IRPWM shall be replaced with the following;**

**Para 248 (2) (a) BG – Track renewals, doubling, new lines and gauge conversions – 60 kg rails with minimum 90 UTS.**

**Note: For gauge conversion works and new line works having projected traffic of less than 5 GMT, 60 kg ((SH) rails, if available with railways, can be used depending upon future projected extension of lines etc.,**

**Loop lines:**

**60kg (SH) or 52kg (SH) should be used. New rails may be used on loop lines of Group A, B & C routes with prior approval of Board.**

**Private and other Sidings:**

<b>(i) Siding taking off from DFC or feeder routes to DFC or 25 T axle load routes</b>	<b>60 kg</b>
<b>(ii) Sidings other than (i) above with permissible speed upto 50 KMPH</b>	<b>52 kg (SH) or 52 kg (IU)</b>
<b>(iii) Sidings other than(i) above with permissible speed more than 50 KMPH</b>	<b>60 kg</b>

**3.0 The existing Para 910 (1) (i) of IRPWM shall be replaced with the following;**

**Para 910 – Equipment at LCs – 1 (i) 1 canister for muster sheet for Engineering Gates only.**

**\*\*\*\***


**Section “D”**  
**Checklist - Level Crossing Gates**

<b>ACTIVITY CENTRE – MANNED LC GATE (OPERATING OR ENGINEERING INTERLOCKED OR NON-INTERLOCKED)</b>		
<b>S. No.</b>	<b>Items to be checked</b>	<b>Observations made</b>
<b>1</b>	<b>AVAILABILITY OF ROAD SIGN BOARDS:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Double strip (200m)</li> <li>• Single strip (50-100m)</li> <li>• Road warning board (within railway boundary)</li> <li>• Speed breaker board (5-10m from Speed breaker) &amp;</li> <li>• Speed breaker (rail post to 20 m distance or within railway boundary) whether provided as per standards?</li> </ul>	
<b>2</b>	Provision of wicket gates (mandatory at manned LC Gates).	
<b>3</b>	Whether vertical clearances of lifting barriers (from bottom of lifting barrier to road surface) is between 0.8 - 1m.	
<b>4</b>	Lateral, Vertical clearances of check rails (lateral - 51 to 57mm; Vertical - >38mm).	

<b>5</b>	<b>Whether length of check rail &amp; road width is as per standards (length of check rail = road width + 2.0m).</b>	
<b>6</b>	<b>Whether the length of the safety chain is suiting the width of the LC, make the Gateman to physically put the chain across the LC Gate and observe the length whether it is correct or not, also make the Gateman to padlock.</b>	
<b>7</b>	<b>Cross check the LC Gate Register entries with station – at least last 3 trains; in case if it is non-interlocked LC Gate, the PNs should be checked &amp; in case of interlocked LC Gate, check for the availability of PN Sheet which needs to be used in case of failure of interlocking.</b>	
<b>8</b>	<b>Check for the availability of competency certificate and medical certificate of Gateman.</b>	
<b>9</b>	<b>Check the record for the last damages caused to lifting barrier – in case of interlocked LC Gate, whether PN was exchanged by Gateman with SM till the lifting barrier is restored / repaired.</b>	
<b>10</b>	<b>Check the general condition of the gate lodge with regard to Civil / fabricated structure and Electrical fittings,</b>	

	alternate power supply, water source, etc.,	
<b>11</b>	Test the efficacy of the interlocking in case of interlocked LC Gate by trying to lift the lifting barrier after transmitting the EKT.	
<b>12</b>	Knowledge of the Gateman during normal working and abnormal working.	
<b>13</b>	Whether the check rail clearances are clean?	
<b>14</b>	Whether the Gateman are functioning as per official roster?  Whether Gateman are available in three shifts (in case of 'Special' class and class 'A' LC Gates only)?	
<b>15</b>	Whether GWR instructions are available in vernacular and English / Hindi languages.	
<b>16</b>	Observations made by Engineering / Traffic Officials in the LC Gate Inspection Register.	
<b>17</b>	Drainage facility is available and has clear passage or not.	
<b>18</b>	Fencing available in both ways, i.e.,	

	<b>road and rail directions.</b>	
<b>19</b>	<p><b>General condition of the road within the track portion and on the approach locations.</b></p> <p><b>Road surface is level upto 15m or beyond in Special Class (class I road).</b></p> <p><b>In case of other class of roads, 8m surface shall be level.</b></p>	
<b>20</b>	<b>Availability of gate equipment as per the SWR and its condition.</b>	
<b>21</b>	<p><b>Whether sliding boom provision is available and in working condition which will be used during damages to lifting barrier.</b></p> <p><b>Whether the sliding boom is also having interlocking proving, if so, whether it is working or not.</b></p>	
<b>22</b>	<p><b>Whether the audio buzzer is properly functioning and audible while closing / opening the lifting barrier.</b></p> <p><b>Is the buzzer is interlinked with the movement of lifting barrier or to be switched on manually.</b></p>	
<b>23</b>	<b>Whether the infrastructure is enhanced according to the class of LC Gate as per Annexure 9 of IRPWM?</b>	
<b>24</b>	<b>Any other observations</b>	

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Section "E"  
Accident cases

**1. Brief of the incident (yard derailment):** On 31<sup>st</sup> January 2016, at 20.40 hours light engine diesel multi derailed near CMS crossing at RDM station of SC Division.

**Cause:** Due to reverse super elevation (Construction) as per joint memo issued.

**Staff held responsible:**

- SSE/P.Way/Construction/KZJ for not attending line before commissioning.
- SSE/Signals/Construction/SC for lack of co-ordination with other Departments.
- SSE/OHE/Construction/KZJ for giving safety certificate without completion of work.
- Under 'blameworthy' – Drawing Branch which prepared approved drawings for 3<sup>rd</sup> line RDM yard not highlighted the actual site asset as per field condition properly and in consonance with Divisional Drawings.

**2. Brief of the incident (UMLC accident):** On 4<sup>th</sup> January 2016, when Train No. 19301 Express was on run between Dharmabad – Basar stations of HYB Division, hit a concrete mixture at UMLC No.181 resulting in damages to loco.

**Cause:** Negligence of road vehicle driver.

**Staff held responsible:** Tractor Driver under 'Primary', Contractor under 'Secondary' for violation of agreement

and Trackman working as Gatemitra under 'Blameworthy'.

3. **Brief of the incident** (yard derailment): On 14<sup>th</sup> February 2016, at 02.20 hours while backing empty rake of 17641 from shunting neck to pitline No.3, 3<sup>rd</sup> coach derailed after passing Point No. 100 at KCG station of HYB Division

**Cause:** Due to rough shunting.

**Staff held responsible:**

**Matters brought to light:**

**Suggestions & Recommendations:**

4. **Brief of the incident** (yard derailment): On 18<sup>th</sup> February 2016, at about 19.10 hours, while attaching the loco (after reversing), BV derailed at MTDI station of NED Division.

**Cause:** Though the speed of the engine was only 1 KMPH while attaching, the speedometer chart analysis reveal that tractive effort has gone up to 50 KN and in the short span of movement, speed cannot pick up accordingly. Hence, it is clear that high tractive effort was contributing to the derailment.

**Staff held responsible:**

Primary – LP, Guard, Pointsman are 'primary'.

**Matters brought to light:**

- Joint observations of Sr. Supervisors was very sketchy.
- No evidence was preserved such as; photographs, readings of track, condition of CBC etc.,
- ART siren given remotely from Control failed.



5. **Brief of the incident (Yard derailment):** On 8<sup>th</sup> January 2016, at about 01.30 hours, at PAU station of NED Division, while pushing empty rake of Train No. 57521 (PAU-PRLI) Passenger from shunting neck to stabling line, formation of 9 coaches went on to adjacent line i.e., AC coach line which is only 66m length as a result rear SLR derailed.

**Cause:** Wrong setting of Point No. 105 by Pointsman and outdoor Dy.SS/PAU.

**Staff held responsible:** Pointsman/PAU and Dy.SS/PAU under 'Primary'.

**Matters brought to light:**

- a. Pointsmen were not in possession of walkie-talkie sets leading to communication gap.
- b. Delay in reporting the accident by 50 minutes.
- c. Lighting arrangements in the yard towards PBN end is not adequate.
- d. Poor co-ordination among shunting staff.
- e. Failure of supervision by Dy.SS.
- f. Provision of standard dead-end for AC sick line is made in the SIP but physically not available.

**Suggestions & Recommendations:**

- a. Intensive counseling of shunting staff is essential.
- b. Frequent ambush checks needs to be conducted.
- c. Close monitoring at Supervisory level on shunting staff.
- d. At major yards, multi-disciplinary audit system needs to be introduced.

- e. Proper recorded handing over and taking over by Pointsmen is essential.
  - f. Dy.SS responsible for supervising shunting shall not change the Pointsmen till the desired planning of shunting is completed.
6. **Brief of the incident (Derailment):** On 19<sup>th</sup> January 2016, at 08.45 hours, between PRLI – GTU stations of SC Division, while Train No. CWHC BCNL Goods was on run, 3 wagons derailed at KM 254/15.
- Cause:** Engineering block was given from 13.35 to 15.35 hours but the block was burst by 2 hours and finally cleared at 17.45 hours. From the video footage of the previous day, it was concluded that huge blasting took place due to which large size boulders have fallen on the track on a curve & cutting. Subsequently, 4 JCBs were deployed to clear the boulders that have fallen on track. And at this location only, the derailment took place next day. The enquiry committee was of the opinion that track structure was disturbed heavily. Measurements noted from point of drop, super elevation varying from 140mm to 188mm and 180 to 150mm where the twist parameters beyond permissible limits are considered main contributory factors for derailment.
- Staff held responsible:**
- Primary:** SSE/P.Way/PRLI for failing to ensure safety of track at work site during widening of cutting work and intentionally tampered the evidences. JE/P.Way/PRLI for failing to follow prescribed procedures for safety of track during and after widening of cutting work.

**Secondary:** NIL

**Blameworthy:** Supervisors who have failed to proper readings, preserve clues and signed in the joint proceedings without cross checking the readings.

**Matters brought to light:**

- a. Caution Order was issued to leading loco LP without obtaining acknowledgement at PRLI.
- b. The Goods train was on run with BV next to working loco which is unsafe practice.
- c. Work site precautions during the cutting work are not adequate.
- d. Locos derailed have been despatched to other Division without the consent of Sr.DSO.

**Suggestions and Recommendations:**

- a. Disaster Management training to be imparted to all Sr. Supervisors stationed at PRLI.
- b. One loco on either end of unusual spot to be kept ready to avoid delay in restoration works, after arrival of SPART.

7. **Brief of the incident (Yard Derailment):** On 24<sup>th</sup> January 2016, at about 19.35 hours, derailment took place at KCG station of HYB Division. Light engine in the course of shunting while going from Road No.3 to pitline, loco derailed on non-interlocked Point No.100.

**Cause:** Improper setting of non-interlocked Point No. 100 by Pointsman and Dy.SS. The Pointsman failed to ensure correct setting of Point No.100 and given exchange of signals from Point No. 102 which resulted in derailment of loco on Point No.100.

**Staff held responsible:** Pointsman/KCG as ‘Primary’ and two other Pointsmen + LP/Shunter under ‘blameworthy’.

**Suggestions & recommendations:**

- a. Shunting staff manpower needs to be enhanced.
  - b. Lighting arrangements to be provided at every Point location to ensure correct setting of point.
  - c. All points should be provided with individual electric motor instead of manual setting and locking.
8. **Brief of the incident (Yard Derailment):** On 24<sup>th</sup> January 2016, at 19.35 hours while backing empty rake of Train No.12702 Express from shunting neck to PF – 4 at HYB station of SC Division, 2 coaches derailed at non-interlocked Point No.24.

**Cause:** Improper setting of non-interlocked Point No.24 by Pointsmen.

**Staff held responsible:**

**Primary:** Pointsmen and Shunting Jamedar under ‘Primary’.

**Secondary:** YM, Shunter and SSE/C&W/ART in-charge.

**Matters brought to light:** After rerailment, while moving the coaches to platform, one coach again derailed on Point No.40. Cause for the second derailment was due to the failure of not ensuring proper attention to the rerailed coach before authorizing the movement of the formation from the site of accident.

9. **Brief of the incident (Breach of block rules):** On 25<sup>th</sup> January 2016, at about 03.55 hours TrainNo. 17229

Sabari Express (TVC – HYB) was wrongly received on Goods R&D line No. 10 at BTTR station of BZA Division and further allowed to continue its journey (run through).

**Cause:** CASM/South/BTTR wrongly communicated with CASM/North and PF as Goods train instead of Sabari Express.

**Staff held responsible:** Dy.SS/South Cabin/BTTR “Primary”, LP of Sabari Express under “Secondary” and Dy.Punctuality under “Blameworthy”.

- 10. Brief of the incident (LC Gate in ‘open’):** On 22<sup>nd</sup> January 2016, when Train No. 22694 (NZM – SBC) Rajdhani Express was on run between Balanagar – Gollapally stations of HYB Division, LP of the train noticed non-interlocked LC Gate No. 39/E in ‘open’ position. On noticing the LC Gate in ‘open’ condition, LP applied emergency brakes and stopped the train and informed the SM/GLY and Guard of the train. Subsequent to the closure of the LC Gate, the train started its journey.

**Cause:** Trackman working as Gateman failed to close the LC Gate after exchanging PN with the SM.

**Staff held responsible:** Gateman.

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**Section “F”**  
**Test Your Knowledge**

- 1. How many shields were bagged by SCR at the Board level for the year 2015 - 2016, what are they?**
- 2. What is the freight loading achieved by SCR for 2015-16?**
- 3. What is Gatimaan Express, at what speed it runs and between what stations it run?**
- 4. How many UMLCs were eliminated in the financial year 2015 – 16?**
- 5. On how many trains OBHS facility is extended on SCR?**
- 6. By which year it is targeted to achieve 100% for fitment of bio-toilets in trains on SCR?**
- 7. How many KMs of new lines / triple lines is completed for 2015 – 16 by SCR?**
- 8. On Energy conservation front, which award was received by SCR?**
- 9. How to ensure whether the coaching rake is secured properly or not before detaching the loco?**
- 10. Joint inspection by section TI and SSE/JE-Pway of all non-interlocked LC Gates shall be done once in ----- of all the non-interlocked LC Gates in their jurisdiction.**

**KEY**

1. **6 shields were bagged by SCR. They are Safety, Commercial, Comprehensive Healthcare. Stores independent shields. Civil Engineering & Environment Management shields jointly.**
2. **107.163 MT**
3. **It is a high speed train covering a distance of 200 KMs in 105 minutes with 160 KMPH between Nizamuddin – Agra stations.**
4. **68 UMLCs were eliminated against the target of 48.**
5. **40 trains and planned to cover another 22 trains shortly.**
6. **2019**
7. **177 KMs (51 KMs between Jagityal – Morthad in SC Division, 92.5 KMs between Yerraguntla – Banaganapalle stations of GTL Division, 10 KMs between Mellacheruvu – Mathampalli in SC Division and 24.3 KMs of triple line between Mandamarri – Manchiryal and Ramagundam – Peddampet stations of SC Division).**
8. **Initiatives such as 300 kWp capacity solar panels, 11900 LPD capacities solar water heaters, 105 day light pipes have been provided apart from converting 38 stations in to 100% LED lit stations. Hence, Ministry of Power has awarded 7 most prestigious National Energy Conservation Awards for the year 2015 to SCR.**
9. **LP shall apply A-9 and try to pull /push the formation and see whether any movement is taking place or not. If there is movement, repeat the exercise once again. This rule shall be followed in addition to application of handbrakes in all the SLRs of the formation, application of two safety chains on either end of the formation and placing of at least 2 iron skids on either side of the formation.**
10. **Once in a year.**

**Section “G”**  
**Safety drives launched**

No.Safety.387/SD/Vol.IV.

Date:05.01.2016.

**Sub: Safety Drive on safety aspects at Unmanned Level Crossings.**

In view of the unusual incident occurred at UMLC No.181 between Darmabad and Basar stations of HYB division on 04.01.2016 involving Train No19301 Indore-Yaswanthapur Express hitting vehicle mounted concrete mixer. General Manager desired to conduct a special safety drive for a fortnight from 07.01.2016 to 21.01.2016 to attend and comply all safety features and infrastructure at Unmanned Level Crossings with special emphasis on the following aspects.

1. Ambush Checks to be carried out to observe the working of Road Safety Counselors (Gate Mitras) deployed at UMLCs. During the drive it should be examined whether the Road Safety Counselors / Gate Mitras are remaining at their nominated UMLCs till such their reliever takes over charge. Also to check whether the given duty roster is followed by them or not?
2. Precautions taken by Road users whole passing the track at UMLCs counseling/advising road authorities for registering defaulters under MV Act.
3. Required clear visibility for the road users of the approaching trains by removing the infringements/obstructions/tress, bushes etc.,
4. Availability of required infrastructure (W/L & R/WL boards with retro-reflective letters of specified distance alongside on



either side. Road warning boards, speed breakers, proper road surface at LC and approaches etc.,)

5. Whether all the LPs & Guards are in the habit of passing a remark about the non availability of Road Safety counselors at UMLCs at the sign 'off' location in a register: if so what action is initiated against the concerned agency?
6. Whether all the LPs are given a list of UMLCs where the Road Safety Counselors are posted to man the UMLCs
7. Whistling habit of LPs to warn the road users.

The compliance report furnishing the details of action taken is to be furnished by not later than 23.01.2016.

**(S.P.Sahu)**  
**Chief Safety Officer**

No.Safety.387/SD/Vol.V.

Date:01.03.2016.

**Sub: Safety drive on Breathalyser check to prevent drunkenness on duty.**

With a view to check and control drunkenness on duty, GM desired to conduct a special safety drive from 02.03.2016 to 20.03.2016 with special emphasis on the following aspects.

All the officers, Traffic Inspectors, Loco Inspectors and other supervisors should conduct surprise ambush checks on the staff especially Loco Pilots, Assistant Loco Pilots, Guards, Station Masters, Pointsmen, Gatemen with breathalyser equipment to ensure that the staff are not in drunken state while on duty. Any case of tested positive has to brought to the notice of DRM/Sr.DOM/Sr.DSO immediately.

Drive details conducted with action taken to be given latest by 23.03.2016.

**(S.P.Sahu)**

**Chief Safety Officer**

No.Safety.387/SD/Vol.V.

Date:08.03.2016.

**Sub: Safety Drive on working condition of Hand Brakes of SLRs and Brake Vans of Goods Stock.**

Recently there was an unusual incident occurred on 07.03.2016 at KCG station. Train No12747 (CBE-NZM) Express with Loco No.40247 arrived KCG at 10.40hrs. Power interception was planned. Outgoing Loco No.22205 arrived KCG at 11.00hrs. Before attaching engine on formation, the train rolled back about 3 coaches outside the fouling mark since formation released by TXR staff. On arrival at KCG, incoming Guard applied hand brakes of SLR and as per out going guard on applying hand brakes, brakes not applied properly.

In view of the above, Divisions are advised to conduct a special drive on working condition of Hand Brakes arrangement

system on goods and SLRs on coaching stock from 08.03.2016 to 15.03.2016.

Drive detail conducted along with action taken to be given by 21.03.2016.

**(S.P.Sahu)**  
**Chief Safety Officer**

No.Safety.387/SD/Vol.V.

Date:16.03.2016.

Railway Board expressed serious concern over the current collision involving Assisting Engine and the disabled train in Bock section which occurred in DHN division of ECR.

Railway Board desired that a Safety Drive should be launched, hence Divisions are advised to conduct a 15 days drive from 17.03.2016 to 31.03.2016 involving concerned department officers/supervisors on the following aspects:-

1. Ensure strict adherence and compliance of Rules for working of the Assisting Engine and the Train Engine.
2. Authority to proceed without Line Clear (present T/A 602) should indicate the Kilometer position of both the train engine and the Brake Van/ Last Vehicle of the disabled train standing in the section along with the train number.
3. Speed of Relief Loco should not be more than 15 KMPH during DAY and when the view ahead is clear & 10 KMPH during NIGHT and the view is not clear.
4. LP and Guard of the disabled train should protect the train as per G&SR 6.03
5. If assistance has been asked for, the train shall not be moved till such assistance arrives, provided in G&SR 6.05 to be followed.

DRMs to personally monitor the safety drive on the division.

After completion of the drive deficiencies noticed and corrective measures shall be advised to this office by 04.4.2016.

**Sd/-  
Chief Safety Officer**

**Section “H”**  
**Accident Statistics 2015-16 comparing with**  
**2014-15**

- **In the concluded financial year, 44 accidents / unusual incidences have taken place when compared to 50 accidents / unusual incidents during 2014-15.**
- **There is no much reduction in number of incidences.**
- **Out of the 44 accidents / unusual incidents, 20 are yard accidents, 16 other accidents, 5 indicative, 2 consequential and one equipment failure.**
- **The number of accidents division-wise are 16 in SC Division, 5 in HYB Division, 7 in BZA Division, 10 in GTL Division and 6 in NED Division. GNT Division recorded ‘nil’ accidents.**