

SOUTH CENTRAL RAILWAY

Safety.387/Fly Leaf/6/2020

Fly Leaf No. 06/2020

Attention..... ALL CONCERNED

Derailment of 14003 Up Malda town –New Delhi Exp in the yard o Harchandpur station of Lucknow – Rae Bareli section Broad Gauge, Single Line, Non-electrified section of Lucknow Division of Northern Railway. – CRS Report

The accident:

- Harchandpur (HCP) station is provided with MACLS with Standard (II) R Interlocking, with centralized operation of points and signals from the panel.
- On approach of Harchandpur (HCP) station, Distant ,Home, Starter and Advance Starter (LSS) all signals were litting Proceed (Green) aspect.
- Train while passing the Facing Point No 42, LP felt heavy jerk and the Loco derailed, Train was travelling at 75 KMPH. LP immediately applied brake and fell down, got injured. LP got up and noticed some coaches of the train also derailed.
- 07 Persons died, 04 persons grievously injured and 32 persons sustained simple injuries.

Discussion:

- ESM during inquiry has said that he left the HCP station after attending the Point. The Mobile call records of ESM revealed that ESM is available in the same station, has spoken with SI and ASM for three times at the time of dealing derailed Express train.
- Relay room and Location Box were not sealed and it is done after the arrival of CRS to HCP Station. Officers who reached the site of accident have failed to ensure this.
- It is concluded that “**Loss of integrity of interlocking was done by Human Interference by ESM in connivance with ASM and SI**”.

Points to Note

- Though LP says that he has applied A9 Brake, as per the data analysis of REMMOLT, it is confirmed that LP has applied SA-9 Brake.
- By applying A9 Brake, the damage could have been avoided/reduced, but it is found to be the bad engineering of LP.
- Due to shortage of Mail/Express Drivers in LKO Div, A graded LP Goods has been empanelled to officiate in higher grade, failure of crew management of LKO Division.

Could this accident have been averted

- The accident could have been averted had the ASM on duty declared Point No 42 as failed and followed the procedure as per G&SR Para No 3.77.
- Abnormal working of S&T equipment is to be dealt as per G&SR Para 3.68. Unfortunately ASM on duty did not follow.
- Due to sustained failure of Pt No 42, SM on duty should have at least either visited or deputed the points man to verify the integrity of point before taking off signals, but nothing has been done.
- Severity to train and passengers could have been minimized had the LP applied A-9 Brake instead of SA-9 Brake.

Matters brought to Light

- No mechanism to monitor relay room opening and closing through Data Logger.
- RB's instructions regarding protection of S&T cables during execution of work have not been followed.
- No entry in opening in closing of relay room in the registers is made.
- No disconnection/reconnection were issued for carrying out RE modification works in Relay room, replacing signalling cables.
- LP(Goods) was operating the exp train 14003, LP (Mail) should only be used for Mail/Express trains.

Responsibility

- Primary - ESM on duty, Signal Inspector, ASM HCP Stn
- Secondary – LP of Express train 14003
- Blame worthy – Sr DSTE/ LKO

- Due to shortage of Mail/Express Drivers in LKO Div, A graded LP Goods has been has been empanelled to officiate in higher grade, failure of crew management of LKO Division.

Recommendations

- Rly should decide on a reasonable time as well as reasonable attempts after which a point not responding to command should declare as failure, necessary changes to data Logger software should be done.
- Provision of Magnetic Lock to Relay room door to keep electronic log of relay room opening/closing, should ensure its working at all stations, should reflect in daily position to DRM.
- Instead of location boxes for points, to be housed in a Relay hut, to be ensured Double locking to these relay huts similar to Relay rooms.
- CCTVs to be provided to all Control Panel and Relay rooms.
- Drivers should be trained to ensure use of SA-9 Brake.
- Vacancies in Safety category to be filled up.
- EI should be provided at all stations irrespective of number of routes
- Data Logger and relay room should be sealed to preserve clue, should generate exception reports – Point operation time, change of point status without a command from panel.
- Data Logger terminal with report printing should be kept with chief controller in control office for immediate access, training should be given to all operating control officials.
- Railway should adopt clamp type axle counter track device to avoid drilling of holes in the rail leading to rail fracture.
- LP seat in Locomotive should be improved to provide a seat belt to prevent driver from falling due to sudden jerk.
- Cab voice recorder should be installed in all Locomotives.
- LC's in station yards should be eliminated as para 901 of IRPWM.EI

CHIEF SAFETY OFFICER

SAFETY ORGANISATION

SOUTH CENTRAL RAILWAY