

**, SOUTH CENTRAL RAILWAY  
HEADQUARTERS SAFETY ORGANISATION  
BI-MONTHLY SAFETY BULLETIN – JULY & AUGUST 2020**

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**DETAILS OF ACCIDENTS AND UNUSUALS THAT TOOK PLACE  
DURING JULY & AUGUST 2020**

- 1. Brief of the accident** (Derailment): On 03.07.20 between MYL-DHNE stations of GTL division, Train no. SA while passing through caution order location between MYL-DHNE 6<sup>th</sup> wagons from Train Engine was derailed at 09.35 hrs.  
**Cause of the Accident:** due to track unevenness.  
**Responsibility:**  
**Primary:** Sri. Vijay Chandra Gusain, SSE/P.Way/DHNE for not maintaining the track as per the standards.  
**Secondary:** Nil  
**Blameworthy:** Sri. AS Rama Kumar SSE/P.Way/DHNE for not ensuring competency of his subordinate supervisor.
- 2. Brief of the accident** (Unusual incident): On 22.07.20 at 11.28 hrs between CTF-VKB stations of SC division, 3 bridge maintenance engineering staff (1 lookout men and 2 working staff) while performing duty on bridge No.123 at KM 113/7-1 between CTF – VKB stations. Diesel coupled light engines (70399+12951) run over the bridge staff and killed. 3 bridge staff died in this incident.  
**Cause of the Accident:** due to failure of imposition of suitable caution order (Men working on bridge whistle continuously).  
**Responsibility:**  
Primary: Sri. Binay Kumar Samal, SSE/Bridges/SC  
Secondary: Sri. N. Pratap reddy, Erector-II
- 3. Brief of the Accident** (Derailment): On 15.08.2020 at about 12.25 hrs. at VHGN station of SC division, while doing shunt movement of Tower Car at VHGN station from DN Loop line to Up main line towards BPA, tower car passed shunt signal No.21 at ON.  
**Cause of the accident:** Tower car driver failed to stop the tower car before shunt signal No.21 which is at ON.  
**Responsibility:**  
**Primary:** Tower Car Driver  
**Blameworthy:** SS/VHGN
- 4. Brief of the accident** (Derailment): On 27.08.2020 at 18.20 hrs at FCI siding/CHZ of SC division, while grouping of BCN loaded wagons from Rd-3(23 wagons) to Rd-6(19 wagons) at FCI/CHZ siding 3 wagons derailed while negotiating over Point No.9 leading to Rd-6 which is of 1 in 8 ½ 52kg steel turnout due to fittings ineffective.  
**Cause of the Accident:** Spread Gauge due to ineffective track fittings and perished long wooden sleepers beyond CMS crossing of Point No.9 and also working out of keys and cotters of CST-9 sleepers on plain track, inner rail on curve portion got completely titled and wheel has run on the web of inner rail.  
**Responsibility:** **Primary:** FCI siding/CHZ authorities for poor maintenance of track.

## Irregularities noticed

During the safety audit inspection of KCG and MJF stations and KCG – FM section of Hyderabad division on 11.11.20 and 12.11.20, the following irregularities are noticed

### 1.0 Irregularities noticed in the working of Operating Department:

- **Accident Register:** On 11.11.2019 at 10.40hrs 'Head on Collision' took place at KMs 7/42 between T.No.s 47178(MMTS) and 17028 Express took place. CRS/SCC completed and report was submitted. Action taken particulars under D&AR on the staff held responsible were not entered in the register. Division is advised to furnish the action taken particulars to SMR/KCG for maintaining the Accident Register at his end.
- **Stable Load Register:** When the locos are stabled on running lines, most of the cases LP (Shunting)/LP are not signing in the register as per Unified G&SR 5.23. CCC/KCG should be advised to instruct all LPs/LP (shunting) to sign in the stabled load register as and when Light/ Multi engines are stabled at KCG station.
- **IN SWR,** in case of Failure of Advanced Starter, authority to be issued is shown as PLCT, but in Automatic block system, it is required to issue T/369(3b) and caution order to observe 10 KMPH. Thus It is to be corrected in SWR accordingly.

### 2.0 Irregularities noticed in the working of Engineering Department:

- No entries made by ADEN/KCG & SSE/P.Way/KCG since long period. *As per Para No.656 of New IRPWM-June'2020 "(1) Each SSE/P.Way(in-charge) shall maintain a Section Register containing all important information including a brief history of the section. (2) The entries made in the section registers shall be brought up-to-date from time-to-time and these shall be scrutinised in the beginning of every year by the Assistant Divisional Engineer"*
- Recently, two SEJs were laid in KCG yard on DN line on 03.09.20 at KM 6/30-32 & on 09.09.20 at KM 07/18-20. These have not been entered in section register.
- Registers, other than 15 listed in "Withdrawal of Registers' as per Para No.1307 of New IRPWM-June'2020 are to be maintained and updated.

### 3.0 Irregularities noticed in the working of S&T Department:

- \* Panel IPU No. 0249E/alt-3 recorded in the SWOD/KCG is not matching with the panel, to be corrected.
- \* To prevent the blanking of auto signals between KCG-FM, an auto goomty has been constructed between YKA-HPG and an Integrated Power Supply has been provided so that power supply can be extended from this IPS to signals on either side of this location. AT transformer has been provided to feed the IPS, however connection has not been given. The work was sanctioned under Log Book and all the works of Civil and Electrical Depts. have been completed except the connectivity between AT to CLS Panel. AT supply may be extended as early as possible to prevent blanking of signal in auto section.

### 4.0 Irregularities noticed in the working of Electrical Department:

- BA Positive Case register was checked and found there were 2 case of staff found positive in both 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> test in 2020 i.e.  
On 01.01.2020 Sri Md. Azeem, Sr.ALP/KCG who was booked to work train no. Dn. CMCT while signing "ON" at 10.10 hrs found positive with 62mg/100ml when tested on Kiosk. After 14 minutes is at 10.24 hrs conducted second test he was found positive with 25mg/100ml with other BA equipment.

***In this case gap between first and second test was 14 minutes which is not correct as against stipulated upper time limit of 5 minutes and violation of CELE Lr.No.E.195.TRS/alcoholic policy/Vol.I dated 19.12.2016.***

On 1.8.2020. Shri. B. Ramakrishna Sr.ALP/KCG was found positive with value of 96mg/100ml in 1<sup>st</sup> test and 22 mg/100 ml in 2<sup>nd</sup> test. He was imposed with penalty of withholding of increment for 30 months.

There were 10 cases of Crew found positive in 1<sup>st</sup> test and negative in 2<sup>nd</sup> test. It is observed that in one of the positive case BA value is as high as 185mg/100 ml in 1<sup>st</sup> test and 0 in 2<sup>nd</sup> test.

In case, a staff is found positive in 1<sup>st</sup> test and negative in 2<sup>nd</sup> test, specific reason for staff found positive in 1<sup>st</sup> test should be found out and how the result has come to 0 in 2<sup>nd</sup> test. The same should be mentioned clearly in the BA positive case register. Concerned ADEE/ADME/P to regularly monitor this aspect.

- Average PDD of the depot is 90 minutes which is on higher side. This should be brought down

#### **5.0 Irregularities noticed in the working of Mechanical Department:**

- The Coach No.SC WGACCN 12106 underwent IOH at KCG depot for which Trolley has been received from LGD shops in which also found "Split pins were missing for Vertical shock absorbers". CWM/LGD It should be ensured that split pins are provided for the rakes in the under gear without any deficiency. Bogie received from LGD shops for IOH @KCG
- The following defects were noticed in the rake by PCSO during examination in the pit.
  - It was observed that, split pins were found missing for vertical shock absorbers for two coaches. It is advised to conduct thorough check in the entire rake for such defects.
  - During inspection, it was observed that nearly 100 Split pins were found missing in the rake.

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**ATTENTION .....**

**STATION MASTERS**

**5.05. Report of neglect of duty.—**

**The Station Master shall report, without delay, to his superior, all neglect of duty on the part of any railway servant who is under his orders.**

**ATTENTION .....**

**LOCO PILOTS / ASISTANT LOCO PILOTS/GUARDS**

S.R.514.6. Shunting of wagons containing explosives shall not be carried out except under the superintendence of an official not lower than Station Master who shall ensure that during shunting operations –

- (a) Wagons containing explosives shall be separated from Elec/Diesel locomotive by a minimum number of one wagon not containing explosives or other dangerous goods or articles of inflammable nature.
- (b) The speed of all movements does not exceed 8 KMPH, and
- (c) No rough, hump, fly or loose shunting takes place.

**ATTENTION .....** S&T staff

Appendix XI, II-6-ii. I- Do's for S&T staff.

- 3. a) Take current and voltage readings of the point machines periodically.
- b) Obstruction test should be carried out on the points regularly. Also disengaging of the clutch during the obstruction test should be verified.
- c) Track locking should be verified on the point machines. The operating time of the point machines should also be checked.

**ATTENTION .....** Engineering

S.R. 15.17.3: Special precautions when water level rises:—

The following precautions shall be observed, in each case trains being stopped dead and allowed to proceed at a speed not exceeding 8 KMPH.

- 3.1. If water rises over the ballast level but is below rail level, the track should be walked over by two men abreast one at either end of the sleepers before each train and only if the track has not been disturbed, should the train be allowed over the track.
- 3.2. When water overtops the rail, the PWI should certify by walking over and probing that the track is safe.
- 3.3. Message shall be sent by the PWI to the AEN and DEN when water rises above ballast level and again when it subsides. This should be followed up with special reports.
- 3.4. Records of all such occurrences should be entered in the PWIs section register