

SOUTH CENTRAL RAILWAY
HEADQUARTERS SAFETY ORGANISATION
BI-MONTHLY SAFETY BULLETIN – JANUARY & FEBRUARY 2020

DETAILS OF ACCIDENTS AND UNUSUALS THAT TOOK PLACE
DURING JANUARY & FEBRUARY 2020

1. **Brief of the accident** (Derailment): On 06.01.2020 at KZJ yard (E cabin) of SC division, Tower Car No. RU 4891 driver while coming from Tower Car shed, did not stop at shunt signal No.16 and travelled 60 meters by trail through the Point No. 118 and rammed into buffer stop and derailed all wheels.

Cause of the accident: Both Tower car driver and JE failed to ensure full opening of inlet cock of brake valve and also failed to apply emergency brake and hand brake in time to control and stop the tower car.

Responsibility:

Primary: Sri. V. Ramesh, Tech.II under SSE/OHE/RDM

Secondary: Sri. K.Vasanth Rao, JE/OHE.KZJ

Blameworthy: NIL

Matters brought to light:

1. Sri. V.Ramesh, Tech-II/RDM is not a regular driver, he does not have driving competency(T4)-. No road learning at KZJ and not attended any training except G&SR training at ZRTI/MLY.
2. Booking of staff to work as tower car drivers without proper training and competency is being done regularly.
3. The involved car is not having the feature of Dead Man Handle provision.
4. The trap at shunt single is closed though the shunt signal is not taken off. This had led to tower car entering main line when tower car driver overshoots shunt signal at 'ON'.

2. **Brief of the Accident** (Derailment): On 25.01.2020 at about 06.45 hrs. at HYB yard of SC division, after berthing of Train No.12723 HYB – NDLS Telangana Express: shunting Loco No. 13395/WDG3A/MLY was placed on pit line No.11 at 06.00 hrs The next movement was given at 06.40 hrs from pit line No.11. At 06.45 hrs Loco front truck leading pair wheels got derailed on the pathway at SC end.

Cause of the accident: At a low speed, the cable has infringed between wheel flange & LH the rail, resulting in mounting of LH wheel flange cause the derailment.

Responsibility:

Primary: Sri. K. Manohar, SSE/Ele/M/HYB – for not noticing the electrical cable & for not removing it.

Secondary: Sri. Alok kumar SSE/P.way/HYB – for not noticing the obstruction near the P.Way & not reporting about the obstruction to the concerned.

Blameworthy: Sri. P.S.Nanda Kumar, Sr.KP/Shunter/HYB & Sri. Anand Kumar, Points man-A/HYB for not noticing the obstruction during the movement.

3. **Brief of the Accident** (Derailment): On 27.01.2020 at about 23.25 hrs. at NUDURUPADU of GNT division, while Train No.AVC/HL up loaded goods train after stop and start from the station during Non Interlocked and doubling work, 3 wagons 15th, 26th and 27th from Train Engine derailed on main line near LSS at Km 28/4-5. Derailed wagons are SECR 33141287214, NCER

33131090206 and WCR 33160987560 ON NEWLY LAID POLAIN TRACK IN LIE OF DISMANTLED Point No.13B. No casualties & through traffic restored at 07.50 hrs on 18.01.20

Cause of the accident: Uneven settlement of newly laid track in lieu of dismantled Point No. 13B at Track at KMs 28/4-5 made through by construction department as a part of doubling work. Uneven settlement has caused excessive cross levels and lead to alignment parameters beyond tolerance on 2 degree curve portion. This contributed majority for derailment.

Responsibility:

Primary: Sri. K. Rambabu, SSE/P/Way/UGD

4. **Brief of the Accident** (Derailment): On 31.01.2020 at about 19.30 hrs. at ADB yard of NED division, while Spare empty coaching rake was stabled , rear most coach SR GSCN 96382 was caught fire.

Cause of the accident: miscreant activity

Responsibility: No staff

5. **Brief of the accident** (Derailment): On 01.02.2020 at about 19.30 hrs. at GNT yard of GNT division, GVSG up loaded goods train with rice commodity, after passing point No. 13B all the four pairs of wheels in 7th wagon from BV got derailed on to the left side i.e. outside of the curve and dragged in derailed condition for about 270 meters. Consequently resulting derailment of 8th and 6th wagons before coming to stop due to un coupling between 8th and 7th wagons.

Cause of the accident:

1. Significant gap on LH side of 7th wagons (first derailed wagon) and loading beyond the permissible top layer on 'RH side is he precipitating factor for a wheel getting off loaded.
2. The non-modified doors of the NDMHL wagon helped projection of load outwards on RH side there by spurring the process of vertical load shifting and the consequent wheel off loading.
3. The non-standard curve with varying degrees of curvature at different locations of its length.

Responsibility:

Primary: Anaparthi warehousing corporation, private siding agency

Secondary:

1. SSE.i/c ROH depot/BZA
2. SSE/P.Way/GNT

Blameworthy:

1. Sri. M.Sreenadh, LP/BZA
2. Sri. APS Bhaskara Rao, Sr.goods Guard/BZA

6. **Brief of the accident** (Derailment): On 05.02.2020 at 09.42 hrs at GDR station of BZA division, Train No. 12710 Exp. arrived into Platform No.1 of GDR station and at 09.47 hrs formation of Train movement given to Road No.6. At 09.52 hrs formation of the train cleared to top point and return disc given at 09.53 hrs and backed to Road No.6 at 10.00hrs ACLE No.37298/wap7/LGD detached from formation at 10.10 hrs.

After placement of train No.12710 Exp from Road -6 to Road-7 movement given at 10.27 hrs for light Engine from Road -7 to top point and back to Road-3. Light engine cleared top point at 10.31 hrs and return movement to at 10.33 hrs.

While backing the loop from Top point to Road -3, AC LE No.37298/WAP7/LGD leading truck (CAB-1) from 2 wheel sets (L1, L2 & R1, R2) got derailed at 10.38 hrs at nose of the crossing portion while passing of Point No. 37B.

Cause of the accident: Excessive check rail clearances in Point No. 37B in combination with excessive primary & secondary vertical clearances of Bogie-1 and defective spring height variations might have caused the derailment.

Responsibility:

Primary: .NIL

Secondary:

1. Sri. S. Karthik. SSE/P.Way/GDR due to non maintenance of check rail clearances within the limits.

Blameworthy: NIL

Matters brought to light: This point NO.37B

7. **Brief of the accident** (SPAD): On 11.02.2020 at 07.02 hrs at BGSF station of SC division, Diesel coupled engines while rolling into BGSF station passed Dn starter/LSS signal No.1 and 'ON' and stopped after passing LC no. 24E approximately 7 TPs length from LSS signal. Loco Pilot stopped the train only on advice of Dy.SS/BGSF through VHF set about the SPAD

Cause of the accident: LP & ALP failed to stop short of LSS signal which is at 'ON'

Responsibility:

Primary:

1. Sri. Dharamsingh Meena, LP/Goods/KZJ
2. Sri. Ramnarayan Kumar, ALP/KZJ

Blameworthy:

1. Sri. T. Naveen Raju, nominated CLI for not properly counselling the LP.
2. On duty TLC/SC for unnecessary hooking of LP to BPA and not arranging relief at RDM.
3. Dy.Punctuality/SC for over hours regulation of trains despite over hours working of the crew.

Matters brought to light:

1. It has come to notice that Sri Dharamsingh Meena, LP/Goods/KZJ was booked to Train No.13PA as pilot by 57136 pass on 09.02.2020 and reached at 03.50hrs. He availed out station rest from 03.50hrs to 17.10hrs (13.20hrs). Again he was booked at 17.10hrs to go as pilot to RDM to work Dn train from RDM. It seems that he was booked for 13PA unnecessarily without traffic demand.
2. It has come to know that the crews (13PA-9 crews & RDM 24 crews) available at BPA & RDM are not having main line learning. If some of these crew were given learning on main line, the crew pilot movements can be curtailed and there by idling of crew at out station for anticipatory train movements to be minimized.
3. ALP has some neurological/migraine issue for which he is taking treatment from CMC/Vellore and he is diabetic and taking treatment from last 6 months for diabetic with 300 to 350 sugar levels. He should be sent to special medical immediately to ensure proper treatment.
4. Average time taken by Goods trains from RDM to KZJ is very high to cover a distance of 92kms. On 11.02.2020 from 00.00hrs to 24.00hrs there are 18 Goods trains ran between

RDM-KZJ with an average speed of 13 kmph. This frequent stoppage/regulation makes crew to lose alertness and also over hours of crew contributes to safety lapses like SPAD).

During the safety audit inspection of GNT and NLPD stations and GNT – NDKD section of Guntur division on 09.01.20 and 10.01.20, the following irregularities are noticed.

1.0 Irregularities noticed in the working of Operating Department:

GNT STATION

SWR/GNT

- Para 2.5.2 : Two ART sidings are shown in SWR, whereas It is observed that present ART special is stabled on the dead end line towards BZA /TEL end. The other line is lying vacant as redundant line. Reconciliation of SWR with site to be done.
- Para 2.5.2 F) One ART Siding with CSR 160m in the extension of Rd No.2 after cut point No.8 towards NLPD end. This siding which has double entry is not used for ART.
- **Stabled Load Register:** It is observed that Empty coaching rakes are stabled regularly in the yard as per the rake links. The staff responsible for securing (Guard/Pointsmen/Loco Pilot) are not signing in the register, the signature column is kept blank for the following E/Rakes in the register.

Guntur South Cabin :

1. Safety Point Alarm is not fixed at this Cabin
2. Route Cancellation Register-III: Scrutinized the register and noticed 223 cancellations during December'19; 270 cancellations during November'19 after making movement from Old Pit Line to New Pit Line by taking 'off' Shunt Signal-54. Division has to examine this issue and make out a solution
3. BSNL Phone bearing number 7901094615 is not working. It should be restored immediately as it is one of the means of communication mentioned in G&SR 14.01(iii).
4. There was 35 Track Circuit Failure at 16.30 hrs on 17.09.2019. T.NO. 57381 Passenger was dealt during the failure. Apart from giving T.369-3(b) Shunt Signal-52 was taken 'off' for starting the train. Taking 'off' of shunt signal for a train movement is a wrong practice
5. Relay Room Key Register: The key was drawn on 09.12.2019 at 03.55 and returned at 17.19 hrs. The key was out for 13 hrs. The opening of Relay Room should be restricted.
6. CTM(G&PP) conducted inspection on 10.07.19. Action by was marked to branch officers. But SMR/GNT made compliance in the officer's inspection Register. SMR should not write compliance unless action by was marked to SMR. SMR should collect compliance/action

2.0 Irregularities noticed in the working of Engineering Department:

1. Trolley path at Platform No.2 KCC end is damaged on drainage portion. To be repaired by providing drainage cover.
2. In between Point no.36A and 38A non standard length (3.40m) of glued joint and at Point no.37 non standard length (3.2m) is provided. It should be rectified at the time of remodelling of yard. Till such time both the welded joints shall be clamped and supported with wooden block.
3. Road No.2 KCC end curvature is measured and found as 9 to 9.7⁰. Check rail is not available, to be provided for the entire length.
4. Main line Point No.39B – Glued joint behind crossing length is checked and found only 1.07 metre length. It should be rectified by providing standard glued joint length at the time of remodelling of yard. Till such time both the welded joints shall be clamped and supported with wooden block. Crossing top is also battered to be replaced with new/re-conditioned crossing.
5. During doubling SEJ No.14 got shifted for accommodating cross over. On LWR/SEJ board indicates date of laying of LWR. SEJ date of laying is not available. Date of laying of SEJ also to be mentioned on LWR board.

6. Heavy corrosion observed on down main line between cross-over of point No.45A-B, to be painted with anti-corrosive paint.
7. Garbage of pit line No.1 is thrown on down main line. This is also causing corrosion to the rails. DEN/W/GNT stated that despite giving complaints to Mechanical Department, no action has been taken in this regard.
8. Corroded check rail/brackets are available on inner rail of curve, where the degree measured as 4.55 at Km.0/30-34 down main line. Necessity of providing check rail to be checked as degrees of curvature is less than 6.
9. Point No.12B of GNT yard CMS crossing having wheel burns at three locations to be renewed immediately.
10. Point No.10B approach broken sleeper No.1, 1AS & 2AS are to be replaced.
11. At Point No.9A joint is provided with 4 inch closure. The same to be replaced with suitable cut rail and to be welded.
12. Painting of points and crossings portion to be done once in a year as heavy corrosion is observed at many locations.
13. At KM GNT/1029-1026 RH SKV combination (60kg/52kg) weld failed and protected with 52kg joggled fish plate with two far end bolts. LH combination FPJ with 10mm gap & rail ends are battered, to be attended.
14. Starter No. S12 (SH No.23)- earth pit damaged & earthling rod is in disturbed condition. Pathway at this location for 4 wheelers to be prevented.
15. PF No.5, 6 & 7 on KCC end extended platform portions to be done apron work. New & Old platform extended portion, other than apron track have combination fish plate joint with wide gap, SEJ and GJ are low. SEJ & LWR do not have numbers & reference pillar on PF side. Need to be attended.
16. Point No.35-ahead of crossing portion on RH side closure piece available in fish plate joint. LH side joint is welded. Fish plate joint need to be welded.
17. GNT yard – PF No.1 to 7 lines are neither LWR nor SWR track. It is found that one side provided SEJ and other side free joints provided or some of fish plate joints are available in middle portion of the track. (Road No.2,4 & 7 no SEJs provided on KCC end). Proper welding to be done and all lines to be converted into LWR.
18. CMS crossing joint gaps are wide in Point No.37
19. PF. No.4 NLPD end, RH side SKV weld failed in LWR track at KM 0/1E-3C few days back and provided with joggled fish plate with two far end bolts; needs to be attended.
20. Point No.15A (trap) –lead wires from TLJB to Point portion is very lengthy, TLJB needs to be relocated.
21. Point No.42A – CMS crossing joint gaps are wide. Track between Point No.43B crossing to Point No.42A have fish plate joints with wide and uneven gaps. 1.0M fish plates with 5 bolts only provided. Avoidable joints need to be welded.
22. In PF No.7, it was observed that sleeper replacement work under joint was going on, as the wooden Sleeper under the joint was damaged badly. Timely replacement of Sleepers under joints to be ensured before the complete damage of sleeper takes place which may cause sag during receiving/dispatch of train to PF no.7 and may lead to abnormal sound.
23. Stocking of maintenance material which was stocked in the stores is in zig-zag fashion i.e in disordered way. There is no display of the details of items stocked, its AAC, Stock on Hand etc. It was felt that by stocking like this, the small materials fixtures and fastenings may deform from its shape and may affect the maintenance of the track, as bulky material was thrown on those small items. It is advised to Stock the items in Bins properly with full description of the item and its quantity. This will help in correct inventory management.

24. Apron work to be done for extended platform portion. Avoid SEJ, Combination joints with wide gaps on apron track.
25. GNT yard - all the lines are neither LWR track nor SWR track. Avoidable fish plate joints to be welded and wide gaps to be avoided. Rail closures, scabbed rails are to be replaced.

3.0 Irregularities noticed in the working of S&T Department;

1. Time slot for disconnection to maintain S&T gears at GNT. Not permitted by operating staff.
2. Out sourcing (agency) to be planned for continuous engineering works in the yard from S&T side.
3. Cables are exposed at Bridge no 498A to be attended properly by concreting.
4. Cable meggering slots are given at GNT yard & end cabins which are practically not useful since power cables 24V DC, 110V AC unable to meggar. During cable meggering block 3hrs only permitted which is not sufficient and ask to reconnect the block in one hour. Proper cable meggering to be ensured.
5. At TC Nos; 34 TJ, 35T Polarity Joint, GFN Liners are not provided on Glued Joints. Clips are shorting to G/J Fish Plates.
6. GFN Liners at many Track Circuits are missing. To be provided on 34&35 Tracks.
7. Point No:13A Trap LH Chairs sleepers 6&7 chair plate spikes to be properly tightened, 13B RH housing is 2SL
8. GNT North cabin smoke detectors are frequently failing which were installed in April 2019
9. Single DC/RC is giving 20 minutes for ch1,ch 2,ch 3 & ch 4 11.55hrs/12.15hrs. Again single DC/RC is given 20" for ch 5,ch 6,ch 7 & ch 8 from 12.15hrs/12.35 hrs. Correct procedure should follow S&T Group C of Appendix XIII G&SR

4.0 Irregularities noticed in the working of Electrical (TRD) Department:

1. **Inspection of GNT crew lobby:**
2. CMS failure: - CMS failures are more in the lobby. During the month January till date of inspection total 13.00hrs
3. While perusing "CUG phone using" register noticed that ,on 22.12.19 ALP of train no.12604 mentioned that mobile phone using from 19.00 hrs to 22.00hrs bearing number 7702771964. Reason mentioned that spoken with PRC, LGD shed etc., same train LP also mentioned that his mobile number 7702771729 kept on from 17.10hrs to 22.10hrs.It seems that both LP & ALP CUG phones are in "ON" position during train is running condition. It is violation of Railway Board letter No.2006/Safety (A&R)/19/8 dated 11.5.2007.
4. **9hrs statement:** More than 14 hours cases are more. Divisional authorities should concentrate to control the more than14 hrs cases.
 5. PDD particulars of Goods trains: As far as possible, Divisional authorities should avoid or minimise the PDD.
6. As per G&SR 4.25.4.Running of trains without Guard should be avoided as far as possible. But, the above said figures are on high side. It seems that average per day 10 to 18 trains are run without Guard.
7. Sanchar make VHF sets are not working properly.
8. Crew Goods Working hours (10-14hrs) are more in NLPD- PGDP section

5.0 Irregularities noticed in the working of Mechanical Department:

C &W – R&D Office/GNT

1. There should be a system of communication between the Commercial and C&W Office (may be in the form of Memo) for ensuring that no train remains unchecked in which loading/unloading is being done.
2. In PF C&W office and as well as in NLPD C&W store DVs were not secured in polythene covers. There is possibility of entering moisture and foreign material in DVs which may block.
3. Rolling In/Out lights are available and glowing, but no numbering system for these lights. Numbering system will help for easy identification of the light during failure and also helps for proper maintenance . the DVs and affect the functioning of DV.

ART/MRT

- a. Wire rope of 36 mm dia slings are due for testing on 26/12/2019. It was told that Work order was initiated and it was pending with Accounts department.
- b. The LUKAS, HRE equipment commissioned on 23/10/2003 and has completed codal life of 15 years. Indent has been placed on COFMOW, the same needs to be chased.
- c. ART formation is stabled in one hook and having single entry/exit towards NLPD
- d. Direct exit & entry may be planned for moving dual entry/exit (towards BZA & NLPD directions

ATTENTION

STATION MASTERS

5.03. Obedience to orders and keeping of books and returns.—

The Station Master shall see that all orders and instructions are duly conveyed to the staff concerned and are properly carried out, and that all books and returns are regularly written up and neatly kept.

ATTENTION

LOCO PILOTS / SHUNTER / GUARD

S.R.5.14.1. At stations where separate shunting staff are employed, they shall attend to all shunting operations. At all other stations, shunting operations shall be supervised personally by the Guard of the train, under the orders of Station Master. In case

2. it is necessary to shunt a train from one line to another across the main line, the Guard shall travel in his brake-van and such shunting shall be conducted only under the supervision of Station Master.

3. While shunting wagons loaded with petrol, kerosene oil, liquid fuel, spirit and other highly inflammable liquids, the speed should be restricted to 8 KMPH.

ATTENTIONS&T STAFF

Appendix XI G&SR

'Dos' for S&T Staff:

1. Give disconnection notice before interfering with points, signals track circuit etc., or for taking out crank handle.
2. Replace the signal bulbs periodically without waiting for their getting fused

ATTENTION ENGINEERING STAFF

15.17. Duties of Gangmate and Gangman when apprehending danger.—

If a Gangmate or Gangman considers that the line is likely to be rendered unsafe, or that any train is likely to be endangered in consequence of any defect in the way or works or of abnormal rain or floods or any other occurrence, he shall take immediate steps for securing the stability of the line and the safety of trains, by using the prescribed signals for trains to proceed with caution or to stop, as necessity may require; and shall as soon as possible report the circumstances to the nearest Station Master and the Inspector of Way or Works.