

SOUTH CENTRAL RAILWAY
HEADQUARTERS SAFETY ORGANISATION
BI-MONTHLY SAFETY BULLETIN – SEPTEMBER & OCTOBER 2021

DETAILS OF ACCIDENTS AND UNUSUALS THAT TOOK PLACE
DURING SEPTEMBER & OCTOBER 2021

1. **Brief of the accident (Derailment):** On 22.09.2021 at about 06.52 hrs, at SVN station of HYB division, DN CHNMGE left UMRI at 06.35 hrs. As per SCOR instruction it is planned to take DN NMG through Main line signal but due to flashing of Point no.14, SCOR instructed SM to admit NMG on first loop line. While passing SVN via first loop line 2nd coach no. NER 930966 from loco derailed at Point No, 7A.

Cause of the Accident: Variation in cross levels, ballast level is very low and schedule 'A' was not ensured properly

Responsibility:

Primary:

1. SSE/P.Way/UMRI(in-charge)-not followed the para No.104(1) of IRPWM
2. SSE/C&W/TNPM/SR-not followed the para No.114c(ix) of ICF maintenance manual for BG coaches.

Secondary: Nil

Blameworthy: Dy.SS/NZB

2. **Brief of the accident (derailment):** On 19.10.2021 at about 12.40 hrs, between NRE-HAQ stations of GTL division, Train No' B-211with Loco No.32643, Train left NRE @ 1235 hrs. While approaching HAQ station next to Train Engine, wagon No.SE10079255158 was derailed.

Cause of the Accident: Derailment is attributed to some obstruction hitting the bogie frame of wagon. As there are no other obstruction other than 20RP rail which was laying in the close proximity might have caused the derailment

Responsibility:

Primary:

1. Sri.Suresh, SSE/P.Way/NRE (incharge)
2. Sri. Swaminadhan, SSE/P.Way/NRE

Secondary:SSE/C&W,BPC issued ADTP/CKP/SER

Blameworthy:Nil

**Inspection Notes of PCSO/SCR Renigunta Station on GTL division on
17th August' 2021**

S. No	ITEMS
1.0	In RU yard, It is noted that cess between the lines and the cess adjoining to the extreme lines is generally high and is found to be up to the top of the sleeper level. This cess is filled up with debris / muck at intermittent locations impairing the yard drainage system. Engineering officials should ensure that the cess should be cut and lowered so that the cess is lower by about 650 mm to 750 mm with respect to the top of the adjoining track rail level. This is a safety item and should be ensured so as to ensure proper drainage, retentivity of tamping & track parameters, prevention of pumping at the joints and also to reduce possible track circuit failures.
2.0	<p>Cross checked recent RU internal safety audit inspection dated 5th February'2021 of which the following items need to be attended:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. In South Cabin - In S&T failures register, summary of failures to be recorded. b. In North Cabin – Fire Detection and alarm system tested and found not in working condition. The same to be attended. c. Battery Room flooring was wooden platform, to be replaced with acid resistant tiles. d. Safety Point Alarm not provided at South, North and Bye-pass Cabins. e. Track surface need to be attended between top Point No.27A & BridgeNo.174. f. Curve No.5/DN: KM 83/23-27 & at KM 83/35 in circular portion of the curve, track has mis-alignment. Fish plated joints are not in square and with uneven / wide gaps. In straight track at KM 84/13-15 & 84/31-33 fish plate joints are not square. Fish plate joints are low. The said curve portion to be attended early. g. Vegetation to be cleared in Vent way of minor bridge no.173 at KM 84/13-15. h. ROB No.170A at KM 84/25-29 between RU-TCNR stations - guard rail to be provided.
2.1	<p>RU yard South Cabin: LC No.112 at Km.83/13-15 RU-TPTY stations:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Wicket gates to be provided. b. Flange-way to be cleared of muck on both UP & DN lines.
3.0	Interaction with CLIs on SPAD at Crew Lobby/RU:
3.1	<p>Meeting-cum-interaction was held with Power Officers, CLIs & TIs of GTL Division at crew lobby / RU. The following officers attended and participated:-</p> <p>ADRM/GTL, Sr.DEE/Tr/GTL, Sr.DSO/GTL, DEE/TRS, DOM/G & ADSO/GTL</p> <p>It was impressed upon the Power Officers & CLIs that the role of CLIs is vital with respect to counselling, guiding and monitoring the running staff (LPs, ALPs and</p>

	<p>Shunters) for safe and effective working of trains. CLIs should update themselves of the instructions issued from Headquarters and Divisional office including SOB from time to time and understand and grasp the same and ensure the availability of these instructions in all the crew lobbies. Further, CLIs should explain these instructions to the running staff and also clarify their doubts, if any, in regard to such instructions. Further, CLIs should get themselves updated with the latest features / modifications, if any, done / getting done in different types of locos and understand fully of the functions and working of such features and subsequently explain and counsel the running staff for proper safe working of the loco / train. CLIs should closely monitor the concerned running staff with respect to their enginemanship / driving skills, alertness etc. and counsel them for improving their working skills. In addition, surprise ambush checks should be conducted regularly to observe the alertness and working of the running staff such as exchange of all right signals etc.</p> <p>The subject of controlling of loaded freight train on falling gradient of 1 in 150 and steeper while approaching stop signal (home signal, starter, gate signal etc.) was discussed. During the interaction, it has come to notice that many of the CLIs were not properly conversant with regard to the laid down procedure issued by HQ / Division in regard to controlling of loaded freight train on such steep falling gradient while approaching STOP signals. They were advised to get themselves updated in regard to the instructions issued by HQ / Division on this topic and counsel the running staff for proper controlling of the train especially on steep falling gradient in view of the incident of SPAD on 10.8.2021 at UP Home Signal of BKPT of GTL Division.</p>
4.0	<p>Safety seminar at RU:</p>
4.1	<p>Safety seminar was held at Rail Kalyan/RU which was participated by running staff (LPs, ALPs, Shunters & Guards) and Pointsmen in addition to the Power Officers. During the seminar, power point presentation with regard to precautions / action to be taken to prevent SPAD, was given by CEE/OP/SC and Sr. DEE/TR/GTL. Subsequently, the incident of passing home signal at danger of loaded freight train on 12.8.2021 at UP home signal of BKPT was discussed. The contents of the following references / letters issued from HQ and Division in regard to controlling of the train on steep falling gradient sections approaching STOP signal have been discussed in detail:-</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. PCEE/SC's letter No. E.223/Optg./Technical Drive/Vol. IV dt. 7.12.2016. 2. JPO issued by CELE and CMPE/Dsl. vide their No. E.223/Optg./Technical Drive/Vol. IV dt. 11.3.2016. 3. SOB issued by Sr. DEE/TR/GTL vide their No. G/TP.45/77-SOB dt. 10.4.2019. <p>During the interaction, it came to light that most of the running staff and almost all the CLIs and Power Officers of GTL Division were not aware of these instructions.</p>

	<p>It was impressed upon the Power Officers, CLIs and the running staff to go through the relevant instructions and to strictly adhere to the same so as to prevent recurrence of such cases of SPAD in future. Subsequently PCEE vide letter No. E.195/TRS/Safety/Vol. XXIX dt. 27.8.2021 issued 32-point action plan (modified / revised) to avoid SPAD taking into consideration the various aspects involved in regard to controlling of the train based on the detailed analysis of different SPAD cases. These instructions should be read and understood thoroughly by all the Power Officers, CLIs and the running staff. It is the prime responsibility of CLIs to repeatedly counsel the running staff in regard to the contents of this modified 32-point action plan issued by PCEE. Power Officers of the Division should regularly monitor the working of CLIs and also to randomly check the running staff with regard to their knowledge on this subject of controlling of the train in steep falling gradient on approach of STOP signal and including their enginemanship duly conducting footplate inspections of loaded freight trains on such steep falling gradient sections. While all the 32-points indicated in the letter are to be ensured, the most vital and important point (Point No. 32) is as under:-</p> <p><i>“LPs to suitably reduce speed while passing signals at “caution” aspect and be prepared to stop short of stop signal at danger, as per GR 3.07. According to reports of simulation conducted in simulator for different types of trains at ETTC/BZA, while passing signal at caution aspect, the speed of 60 kmph for coaching trains and speed of 30 kmph for goods trains has been found safe to stop train smoothly before stop signal on falling gradient of 1 in 150 or steeper”</i> which should be strictly adhered to. The list of STOP signals located on / approach of such steep falling gradient sections are also furnished as Annexure to the above letter. These signals and their locations, as far as possible, should be memorized by the running staff in their working sections.</p>
4.2	<p>LPs & ALPs also not aware of the relevant instructions in this regard. However, some of the LPs were working on steep gradients such as HX-BKPT and RU-SF have stated that on such sections while working loaded freight train on observing distant signal showing as caution aspect they would control the train and bring down the speed about 30-35KMPH at inner distant 20KMPH at 500m in rear of STOP signal and stop the train at one OHE mast and further crawl up to calling-on zone. Some other LPs stated such cases they would bring the train to stop at 500m in rear of a STOP signal and further crawl. Some other LPs have stated that they would control the train a speed of 05KMPH at 500m in rear of STOP signal and further crawl.</p>

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ATTENTION

STATION MASTERS

S.R.5.13.2. At stations, where shunting is performed for attaching or detaching the coaches/slip coaches on Mail/Express, Passenger and other passenger carrying trains, such coaches/slip coaches shall not be kept on blocked lines in the rear of a train carrying passengers, either before or after the completion of shunting of the railway.

ATTENTION

LOCO PILOTS / ASISTANT LOCO PILOTS/GUARDS

S.R.6.01.3.4. In cases where the gap at the fractured location(rail/weld fracture) is more than 30mm or where multiple fractures have taken place resulting in a piece of rail or the head getting dislodged, the mate / patrolman / Keyman cannot pass the train. He should take immediate action to protect the line and only a PWM / PWI can pass the traffic, after attending to the fracture appropriately or taking necessary safety precautions.

ATTENTION S&T staff

Appendix XI, II-6-ii. I- Don'ts for S&T staff.

Do not

1. Adopt any short cut methods.
2. Bridge any relay contacts under any circumstances.
3. Interfere with points, signals and track circuits after the signals are cleared for movements.

ATTENTION Engineering

S.R.15.25.12. General:-

(4) Working of Motor Trolleys during total interruption of communications:-

(5) If there is a total interruption of communication, the Station Master on duty shall advise the official in-charge of Motor Trolley of the same and the Motor Trolley shall be worked on the section under the rules of working of trains during total interruption of communications.