

SOUTH CENTRAL RAILWAY

Safety.387/Fly Leaf/05/2022

Fly Leaf No. 05/2022

Attention... ENGINEERING AND OPERATING STAFF

DASHING OF TOWER WAGON WITH LIGHT MOTOR TROLLEY BETWEEN MCCLUSKEIGANJ (MMGE) AND NINDRA (NVA) STATIONS OF DHANBAD DIVISION ON EAST CENTRAL RAILWAY ON 11-01-2022.

Brief description of the Accident :

Power block was granted by on-duty SM/MGME from 14:20 hrs to 16:20 hrs to Tower Wagon No. 210025 (KLRE) to work & return to MGME in up line between MGME – NVA Stations for maintenance activities. The Tower Wagon was returning to MGME after completion of work. At the same time Motor Trolley was going in up line between MGME – NVA Stations without prior information or written authority from SM on duty of MGME. During run Tower Wagon dashed with Light Motor Trolley at Km.168/07 – 168/09 where there was sharp curve on Up line, between MGME – NVA Stations in Barkakana (BRKA) – Barwadih (BRWD) section under DHN division at about 16:20 hrs. On 11-01-2022 resulting in 02 Engg. Staff died on spot and one grievous injured staff died on the way to hospital. Another Engg. Staff got simple injury. All were travelling on Light Motor Trolley. Line fit was given at 18:25 hrs. and normal train movement in the section resumed. The prima-facie reason of this unusual incident was Trolley entered the Block section without authority and block protection.

The above accident happened on 11-01-2022 in Dhanbad division of East Central Railway and was inquired by a committee of SAG officers consisting of PCSO/ECR, CTE/ECR and ADRM/BRKA.

The inquiry report of above accident has been finalised and accepted by General Manager, East Central Railway. The above incident happened due to negligence of Railway staff by moving Trolley in the block section without Block Protection as required under provision of G&SR and further not observing due safety precautions as prescribed in G&SR and IRPWM at sharp curves, cuttings etc. where visibility is impaired.

In view of the above, Divisions are advised to look into the cause of the accident and recommendations and to take measures to prevent reoccurrence of similar accidents.

The inquiry committee concluded as follows:

Cause of the accident:

Having carefully considered all the relevant facts and evidences on record based on incident site visit, statements & cross-examination of witnesses, the circumstances and events leading to the dashing of Tower Wagon with Motor Trolley, the Committee has come to the conclusion as under :-

“ Incidence of dashing of Tower Wagon with Motor Trolley took place due to negligence of Railway Staff by moving Trolley in the block section without Block Protection as required under provisions of G&SR and further not observing due safety

precautions as prescribed in G&SR and IRPWM at sharp curves, cuttings etc. where visibility is impaired.”

PERSONS HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR ACCIDENT :

Primary :-

Engineering Department : In not adhering to the safety precautions, as covered under G&SR and IRPWM, while working on track with such topographical layout containing sharp curves and cuttings.

Secondary : - NIL

THE RULES VIOLATED ARE REITERATED HERE UNDER AND SR PERTAINING TO SOUTH CENTRAL RAILWAY (SCR).

S.R.15.25.7.1 A Motor Trolley shall always run under block protection and shall be treated and signalled as a train. Motor Trolley shall not be placed on any line without the permission of the Station Master in writing.

S.R.15.25.7.2. Procedure when working under block protection on double line and single line sections provided with tokenless block instruments:

S.R.15.25.7.2.1 Whenever a Motor Trolley has to enter a double line section or a single line section, where tokenless block Instruments are provided, the Station Master of the block station from where the Motor Trolley has to leave, shall obtain Line Clear from the Station Master at the other end of the block section on block telephone without the operation of the block instruments.

S.R.15.25.7.2.1.1 When a motor trolley is to be despatched into a block section provided with IBS, the block section between the two block stations shall be treated as one block section, till the motor trolley clears into the block station in advance.

S.R.15.25.7.2.1.2. Then Station Master shall prepare an authority to enter the block section in duplicate in the prescribed form (T/A1525) which includes (a) authority to proceed and (b) authority to pass LSS and IBS, if any, at 'on' and hand over one foil to the person in-charge duly obtaining his signature on the counterfoil.

S.R.15.25.7.2.1.3 While leaving the station, the relevant free starter signal, may however, be taken 'off'. Immediately after the departure of the motor trolley, the Station Masters at both ends of the block section shall immediately place the 'Trolley on line' cap on the plunger of the block instruments to serve as a visual reminder that the section is occupied by the Motor Trolley.

S.R.15.25.7.2.1.4 On double line section, the Station Master of the station from where Motor Trolley has left shall advise the Station Master of the station at which the Motor Trolley has to arrive, to turn the block commutators at his station to TOL and lock the same in that position. The TOL red indication shall serve as an additional visual warning at both the stations.

S.R.15.25.7.2.1.5. At the receiving station, the Station Master will arrange for the reception signals to be taken 'off'.

S.R.15.25.7.2.2 On arrival at the station in advance, the official in-charge of the Motor Trolley will deliver the authority to the Station Master with an endorsement to the effect, that the Motor

Trolley has arrived duly signing with date and time on it. The authority will be retained by the Station Master and pasted in the station diary.

S.R.15.25.7.2.3 On double line, the Station Master at the receiving station after verifying and ensuring that the Motor Trolley has arrived into his station, shall turn the block handle from TOL position to 'Line Closed' position and clear back the block section and inform the Station Master of the Station in rear at the other end the time of arrival supported with a private number.

S.R.15.25.7.2.3.1 On single line, Station Master of the station in advance, after the arrival of Motor Trolley into the station, shall inform the Station Master of the station in rear, the time of arrival of the Motor Trolley supported by a private number.

RECOMMENDATIONS :

- i. Divisions must ensure and rigidly follow that no Motorized/Self Propelled trolley should enter into the Block section without proper authority under block protection as required under G & SR and all safety precautions should be taken to protect the Trolley at sharp curves, cuttings, tunnels etc. as prescribed in G & SR and IRPWM to prevent recurrence of such cases in future.
- ii. Care should also be taken for push trolley and enter into the Block section with block protection wherever operationally feasible, otherwise with getting full details of train movement if the section from SM on duty and all safety precautions must be followed. At both end Stations, stationary man may be placed to provide continuous position of trains etc. over mobile or other means of communication.
- iii. As per PARA 815 (2) (a) of IRPWM, Whistle Indicator (W/L) is to be provided at a distance of 600 meter. This should be provided on either end of S/L, D/L & Multiple lines (Train/Machine can move in any direction during block or during single line working) where visibility is reduced /impaired/obstructed by sharp curves/cuttings/tunnels or in Ghat section etc. to prevent such type of incidence. Further, it is recommended that during Block Working speed of any track machine, locomotive, tower wagon, self propelled vehicle should remain restricted maximum to 40 kmph while crossing the distance between the W/L boards on either side of such vulnerable location. Divisions must ensure identification of all such vulnerable locations and take necessary action as detailed.
- iv. Provision of Trolley Refuges and Observation Posts (Para 834 of IRPWM) in area of sharp curve, cuttings etc. where visibility is reduced/impaired/obstructed must be ensured. In this case these were not available in the vicinity of the incident site. All divisions should immediately survey and list out such locations and corrective action should be taken.

PRINCIPAL CHIEF SAFETY OFFICER

SAFETY ORGANISATION

SOUTH CENTRAL RAILWAY