SOUTH CENTRAL RAILWAY

VIGIL

QUARTERLY SAFETY BULLETIN NO.3

SEPTEMBER - 2021

INDEX

Sl. No	Section	Subject	Page No.
1	**A**	Extracts of RB letters	1 - 22
2	**B**	Important rules	23 – 24
3	**C**	Latest amendments	25 – 43
4	**D**	Checklist– Inspection of Pantry car and powr car	44 - 47
5	**E**	Accident cases	48 – 50
6	**F**	Test your knowledge	51 – 52
7	**G**	Safety drives	53 – 53
8	**H**	Accident statistics	54 - 54

My dear Railway men

- In the second quarter of this financial year 2021-22, there was no consequential train accident, 2 other than consequential train accidents on this Railway when compared to nil and 6 respectively in the previous financial year for the same period i.e. July to September. Every field Official shall take all preventive measures to sustain this performance

- Number of indicative accidents has decreased from 2 during second quarter of 2020-21 to 1 during 2021-22 second quarter. That indicative accident is 'SPAD' case.

- The number of Yard Accidents has decreased from 2 during second quarter of 2020-21 to 0 during 2021-22.

- For the month of July, there was no consequential train accident, one other train accident..

- For the month of August, there was no consequential train accident, one other than consequential train accident and only one indicative accident (SPAD).

- For the month of September, there was no consequential train accident and one other than consequential train accident.

- In regard to the safety performance of Divisions, accidents / unusual incidences in SC-1, BZA – Nil, GTL – 1, HYB – 1, NED – Nil, GNT – Nil.

I hope that this booklet which contains important RB letters that are helpful in updating the knowledge of all field Officials, contribute for understanding the details of accidents, test your knowledge with key statistics etc.,

(M.Ravindranath Reddy)
Principal Chief Safety Officer

Section "A" KNOWLEDGE
Extracts of Railway Board letters

No.2021/,LMB-I/3/2 dated 04.08.2012
Sub: Roof Collapse incident of station building on Central Railway.

Recently an incident of a roof collapse was happened on 26.05.2021 on a station of Indian Railway which was discussed im Board's meeting held on 29.05.2021. In this connection following decision was taken by Board..

"The details of the roof collapse incident shall be obtained from Central Railway and instructions to check all the station buildings and Public premises shall be issued by Zonal Railways."

Accordingly, all Zonal Railways are advised that safety of all station/service buildings and Public premises may please be got done to avoid such type of incidents and Division wise report in this regard along with Action Taken Report sent to Railway Board(Land and Amenities Directorate)office at the earliest.

Encl (AA)

(Chandra Sekhar)
Director/Land Amenities(CPIO -61)
Railway Board

The inquiry committee concluded as follows

Prima facie cause:-

The 5 cantilever beams 1.8 m length along with Varandah roof slab of self-supporting brick masonry station building structurally failed at the junction of the wall due to improper execution of work and corrosion of reinforcement.

Responsibility

Primary:

SSE/W/IC/KNW who took the construction work of cantilever portion without any approved alteration in GAD and without any approved structural drawing.

Secondary:

1. JE/W/KNW failed in ensuring proper foundation of brick masonry column that is resting on foundation of outer brick masonry walls of building.
2. JE/W/BAU failed in insisting to get approved structural drawing for construction of cantilever varandah o building from his SSE/W/IC/KNW

Blameworthy: ADEN.KNW who had to ensure that work in his jurisdiction is going on as per approved GAD and design and drawings.

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No.2021/Safety (A&R)/2/3 dated 27.08.2021.

Sub: Derailment of Loco No.40349 WDP 4D of 02502 (ANVT-AGTL) Up Super fast Special at KUGT station of LMG Division over NEF Railway on 18.12.2020

The above accident, happened on 18.12.2020 in North East Frontier Railway, was inquired by a committee of SAG officers consisting of PCEE (L/A PCSO) as Convenor, CME/O&S, CSTE/Planning(A/C-CSE) and CTE as members.

The inquiry committee concluded that the accident happened due to improper maintenance of the curve to the desired standard and speed has resulted in above condition which explains derailment mechanism.

The inquiry report of above accident has been finalised and accepted by GM/NEF Railway. Further the details of inquiry report including recommendations for system improvements may kindly be perused from SIMS portal.

In view of the above, Zonal Railways are advised to look into the cause of the accident and recommendations and to take measures to prevent reoccurrence of similar accidents.

(Anupam Verma)
DD/Safety(Impl)/Railway Board

The inquiry committee concluded as follows:

The derailment through wheel mounting on outer rail of curve, occurred on curve of 5^0 where speed was raised from 50KMPH to 75KMPH but the ballast was deficient on outside of curve and in crib portion. Due to this, geometry of track was disturbed and resulted into sharp curvature at one station in curve. The train has entered at station with more than 69 KMPH (as per speed chart) and therefore, the wheel mounted on the rail.

The improper maintenance of the curve to the desired standard along with deficiency of shoulder and crib ballast has resulted derailment.

Persons held responsible and reasons:

Primary:

1. Sectional SSE/P.Way/PASG- Improper maintenance of track.
2. SSE/P.Way/IC/DMR- Improper maintenance of track and improper joint measurement

Secondary:

1. ADEN/KXJ – Lacking supervision for proper maintenance of track.
2. TI/KXJ – He did not involve himself in the measurement and signed on the improper measurement.

Blameworthy:

1. SSE/C&W/BD/AGTL – Improper joint measurement
2. Sr.DEN/V/LMG – Failed to assess the severity of the issue.
3. SSE/D/IC/SGJU – Allowing loco to leave shed bypassing the due 3 yearly & yearly maintenance schedule.

Important Recommendations:

- Digital measuring instruments should be introduced instead of analogue measuring instruments.
- Proper maintenance input may be given and ensured before raising speed on track.
- Supervisors should be nominated for joint measurement at the accident site.
- Proper training be given to the supervisors involved in joint measurement.
- Joint measurements should be taken as per prescribed guideline issued by the Railway Board.

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No, 2021/Safety(A&R)/2/23 New Delhi, 08.09.2021

Sub: Consequential train accidents in the month of August 202 1

During August 2021, the consequential accidents happened on CR, ECR & NFR. These accidents indicates deteriorating trend in safety scenario over Indian Railways. Brief descriptions of these accidents along with Prima Facie cause are as below:

Date of Accident	Rail way	Brief Description	Prima Facie Cause
15/08/21	CR	Derailment of train No. KRDS/BOXN Loaded between BD-CNDB section of BSL Division,	Rail Fracture and shifting of rail.
24/08/21	ECR	While train no.EC/BTSS/Goods/322 55 was on run between Natesar-Rajgir stations, in DNR Division, its 13 wagons got derailed in which 09 capsized, causing movement blocked.	Due to mud pumping location at the track causing vertical bouncing of empty wagon derailed.
25/08/21	NFR	While the train was entering on Line No.2 of CHAYGAON Station (Main line) between kYQ-GLPT section of	Train was received by OPT (as home signal was failed due to gate failure)

		RNY Division, with Proper Authority (due to failure of indication of Traffic L.C. Gate No.NN-249), 4 Coaches (Positioned-6,7,8 & 9 from TE) got derailed over Point No.102/104 & 106/108 blocking main line. No injury & no casualty to train passenger & Crew.	with clamp and pad lock of point 102/106, but clamp and pad lock was not used and also point under the wheel was operated by using EBPU button

Zonal Railways are advised to look into the Prima Facie cause of these accidents and take necessary measures to prevent recurrence of similar accident.

It is also advised that Zonal Railways take necessary measures to ensure (i) proper maintenance of assets, (ii) observation of rules & procedure during signal failure and (iii) observation of rules during maintenance of assets.

(Devender Singh)
Principal Executive Directur(Safety)

No.2020/Safety (A&R)/2/16 dated 06.09.2021.

Sub: Derailment of Loco of Train No. 02414 DN NZM – MAO Rajdhani Express Special at KM 190/0-4 in UKSHI-BOKE Section of Konkan Railway on 26/06/21

The above accident, happened on 26.06.2021 in Konkan Railway, was inquired by a committee of SAG officers consisting of CME as President and CE, CSO, Dy.COM as members

The inquiry committee concluded that the accident happened due to Boulder fall/detaching of weathered rock mass.

The inquiry report of above accident has been finalised and accepted by CMD/KRCL. Further the details of inquiry report including recommendations for system improvements may kindly be perused from SIMS portal.

In view of the above, Zonal Railways are advised to look into the cause of the accident and recommendations and to take measures to prevent reoccurrence of similar accidents.

(Anupam Verma)
DD/Safety(Impl)/Railway Board

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The inquiry committee concluded as follows:

Findings:

"A large weathered rock mass had fallen on one side of track from west side between arch & springing level of the tunnel before the train had arrived inside Karbude Tunnel and some part of the Boulder had hit to the Locomotive resulting into jumping off of both wheels of leading axle from Front trolley of the Leading Locomotive No 16836/R WDM3A of Train No.02414 Dn NZM - MAO Rajdhani Express Special".

It is clear and evident that the derailment of Loco occurred due to Boulder fall / detaching of weathered rock mass.

Responsibility

a. **Primary: Nil.**

b. **Secondary: AEN/RN** - in-charge had not inspected Karbude tunnel before monsoon 2021 as per schedule.

c. **Blameworthy:** Patrolman

RECOMMENDATIONS

i) Advanced inspection techniques with use of tools and equipment, Laser scanning etc may be adopted, especially for long tunnels.

ii) Inspection check list may be revised duly covering methods of inspection as presently only visual inspection and sounding with hammer in unlined portions are being carried out which appears to be not adequate/effective. Presently the Inspection Check List

is as per Indian Bridge Manual which may be elaborated by KRCL further.

iii) Reporting of Patrolman at every 02 hours interval or at two different ends of beats alternatively to be considered for night block section patrolling even though they are exchanging the diaries. However, this practice is already being followed by watchman in day time.

iv) Rest timings of adjacent beat patrolmen may be staggered, if feasible.

v) As KR section is prone for boulder fall, tree fall and OHE mast fall etc, Rock splitters, tree cutting equipment etc to be kept in SPARM cum MFD TVs also and SPARM cum MFD TV movement to affected section is only to be considered. Other machines movement can be resorted only on availability of sufficient time without detention of SPARM cum MFD TV, as SPARM cum MFD TV has got S&T, EL and MFD equipment which will help in simultaneously tackling. Establishing communication is most important in utilizing golden hour.

vi) The availability of EFT with CR crew plying on KR Route to be ensured as this is very much essential in optimum utilization of Golden hour.

vii) Unaffected coaches of affected train to be cleared from Tunnel, Bridge and cutting locations to adjacent block station whenever derailment occurs so as to

rescue/give relief to passengers from such locations immediately after the derailment.

viii) High power & lightweight torches to be provided to patrolmen / watchmen to ensure improved lighting for inspection during night time.

ix) Providing Rock-bolting in staggering, standard type & of Shotcreting in tunnel in a phased manner covering the entire area including those areas are not covered in the past in construction phase are to be taken up.

x) Inspection by a Geologist in Long and other identified tunnels once in a year after Monsoon.

xi) Although this derailment did not result in major consequences and there was a narrow escape, but this incident had all the factors for being fatal too. Hence, there is an urgent need to building capabilities for managing tunnel rescue operations with coordination of all concerned departments.

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No.2020/Safety (A&R)/2/12 dated 07.09.2021
Sub: Derailment of Coach No.SC 09472 GS trailing trolley all wheel, 2nd from Loco of train No. 02701 Dn (CSMT-HYB) after starting from PF No.9 at CSMT station of Mumbai division on CR on 31.01.2021

The above accident, happened on 31.01.2021 in Central Railway, was inquired by a committee of JAG officers consisting of Dy.CSO/Traffic, Dy.CSO/S&T, Dy.CSO/Engg., Dy.CME/Chg and Sr.DSO/BB as members

The inquiry committee concluded that the accident happened due poor maintenance of cross over where deficiency of ballast cushion, abrupt variation in versine, variation in gauge and poor fastening of rails.

The inquiry report of above accident has been finalised and accepted by GM, Central Railway. Further the details of inquiry report including recommendations for system improvements may kindly be perused from SIMS portal.

In view of the above, Zonal Railways are advised to look into the cause of the accident and recommendations and to take measures to prevent recurrence of similar accidents.

(Anupam Verma)
DD/Safety(Impl)/Railway Board

The inquiry report of above accident has been finalised and accepted by GM, Central Railway.

The inquiry committee concluded as follows:

Findings:

Derailment occurred on account of poor maintenance of cross over where deficiency of ballast cushion, abrupt variation in versine, variation in gauge and poor fastening of rails.

Responsibility:

a. **Primary:** SSE/(P.Way)/BY(In-charge CSMT)-for poor track maintenance

b. **Secondary:** SSE/P.Way/CSMT (Sectional PWI) - for poor track maintenance

c. **Blameworthy** :SSE/C&W/HYB-for not ensuring proper Clearance between Axle box crown and safety bolt and clearance between bottom at Bogie sole bar and top of bolster clearance of coach No.SC 09472 GS during primary maintenance.

Recommendations

- Last joint point and crossing inspection was overdue from 26.01.2021. All scheduled inspections should be done on time and deficiencies/compliance should be recorded.
- All committee members except SSE/Pway stated that check rail was attended before measurements and

shining mark on check rail bolt thread were also observed. Evidence of Accident site should not be disturbed till observation/measurement is recorded.

- Zero level tracks of minimum one coach length should be made available in all sick line for rolling stock measurement.
- The availability of duly calibrated track gauge and wheel gauge should be ensured for measurement during investigation and maintenance work.
- SSE/P.Way stated that design of this crossover is not standard due to this ERCs are slipping away from location frequently. They have been providing wooden strips with ERCs to protect the ERC from slipping. All turn out should be made available as per standard design till that time additional manpower and material should be provided for maintenance.
- Knowledge of SSE/P.Way/BY (in charge- CSMT) & SSE/P.Way/Sectional was poor. Proper training and knowledge up gradation is needed.

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Board's Lr No.2020/Safety (A&R)/2/20 dated 08.09.2021
Sub: Derailment of Loco+SLR+GS Train No. 01134 Exp.(MAJN-CSTM) due to land slide between LIM-DDS Section at 06.10 hrs at KM 39/800-900 of Hubballi division of SWR on 23.07.2021

The above accident, happened on 23.07.2021 in South West Railway, was inquired by a committee of SAG officers consisting of CRSE/SWR as President and CE/TP/SWR, CTPM/SWR as members.

The inquiry committee concluded that the accident happened due "sudden landslide in location."

The inquiry report of above accident has been finalised and accepted by GM, South Western Railway. Further the details of inquiry report including recommendations for system improvements may kindly be perused from SIMS portal.

In view of the above, Zonal Railways are advised to look into the cause of the accident and recommendations and to take measures to prevent reoccurrence of similar accidents.

(Anupam Verma)
DD/Safety(Impl)/Railway Board

The inquiry committee concluded as follows:

Findings:

The derailment of the Loco & 2 coaches of Train No, 011341 was due to sudden land slide at the said location due to continuous rain in the section.

Responsibility
a. **Primary: NIL**
b. **Secondary: NIL**
c. **Blameworthy :NIL.**

Recommendations:

1. GDR (LP, ALP &Guard) of MAO & VEN depot of KRCL shall have their currency of LRS at least up to CLR to work the train over SWR during exigency.(At present they maintain the currency of LRS of their VEN base crew up to QLM only). It may help to run the diverted trains without any hitch.
2. Railway shall establish its own communication network in this section through wired connection for better connectivity between vulnerable locations, bridges etc, with Station Master, Control office & SSE/P.Way.
3. Difficulty is being experienced in respect of communication between LP & LP of Banker locos

Guards & SMs in the Ghat section,. It is suggested to improve the same.

4. The information regarding diverted trains should be informed at least 4-6 hours before taking over to help planning of crew for working of Mail/Express/Passenger to avoid detention. Difficulty is being experienced in respect of communication between LP & LP of Banker locos Guards & SMn the Ghat section.
5. As scheduled passenger trains are covered by monsoon patrolmen and watchmen posted at vulnerable locations, advance intimation may also be given to the P.Way department regarding diversion of passenger trains so as to cover them as well,

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No.2020/Safety (A&R)/2/18 dated 13.09.2021

Sub: fire case in Power Car No.199393 NR LWLRRM of train No. 02004 (NDLS-LJN Shatabdi Express) at Ghaziabad station on platform no 02 on 20.03.2021

The above accident, happened on 20.03.2021 in Northern Railway, was inquired by a committee of SAG officers consisting of CRSE/Chg as Convenor, CCM/PS, COM/G, CESE, and CSC/RPF as members

The inquiry committee concluded that the accident happened due to spark in mobile batteries & gadgets which were in On condition and availability of highly inflammable litems i.e sanitizers, cloth etc., in the pantry car.

The inquiry report of above accident has been finalised and accepted by GM, Central Railway. Further the details of inquiry report including recommendations for system improvements may kindly be perused from SIMS portal.

In view of the above, Zonal Railways are advised to look into the cause of the accident and recommendations and to take measures to prevent reoccurrence of similar accidents.

(Tej Prakash Agrawal)
ED/Safety/Railway Board

The inquiry committee concluded as follows:

The consignment consists of electronic gadgets, inflammable liquid (Sanitizer), cloths, mobile batteries, speakers etc some of the gadgets were found in energized and in ON condition. It is quite possible that the fire has originated due to spark in mobile batteries in parcel or batteries in other electronic gadgets due to short circuit under the pressure of other parcels, which has been added by presence of highly inflammable items i.e. sanitizers which were also available in the same compartment.

Responsibility:

Primary Responsibility: Sh Abdul Muttalib Consignee who booked electronic gadgets & other inflammable items and declared them as Courier goods vide forwarding note and declared wrong details of the consignment.
Secondary Responsibility: Sh Dheerendra Yadav CS/New Delhi for failing in supervision to ensure safe handling and stacking parcel packages while loading at New Delhi.

Recommendations:

To prevent such type of fire incidents in future, the enquiry committee recommends the following steps:

1. Proper arrangement should be made to check and scan the luggage before booking of parcels as well as in luggage van.
2. The lease holders and their staff to give full details of the commodities before booking to avoid such incidences. They should be taken up stringently if such details are found false.
3. Precautions should be taken for stacking and loading of Red Tariff items as per rules. CCTV cameras should be installed at the booking as well as loading points.
4. Quality of CCTV presently installed should be improved so that all areas within station are covered.
5. Items like batteries, inflammable liquids such as sanitizers etc should be carried in secured containers to avoid contact with other items.
6. Guard of the train/RPF staff to be deployed while loading/unloading the material from the luggage van as well as sealing of the luggage van should be trained and counseled for such exigencies.
7. A monthly quota to super check the parcels for verification of their contents for various levels of officers and supervisors may be legislated to avoid any misdeclaration of items by the party
8. Luggage room light MCB should be properly identified and guard may be trained for switching off in such conditions.
9. Electronic gadgets should be allowed only after removal of batteries from them.

10. Red tariff manual should be reviewed with respect to loading of various goods in view of recent up gradation /change in technology.
11. List of items which can be booked as courier goods should also be made.
12. Automatic Fire detection and suppression system should also be installed in luggage portion of SLRs and Power Cars.
13. Furnishing materials used in coaches should be bought only from RDSO/PU approved vendors.
14. LP sheet (CK514) which is used for furnishing of ICF coaches is no more in any vendor list; it should be listed in RDSO/PU vendor list.
15. A metallic grill should be provided over the light fittings in ceiling of luggage portion to avoid breakage and short circuit.
16. It has been noticed that transportation of parcel from office to coach is done with help of some private labours having no authorization or identity card. Proper authorization and identity cards to be issued by competent authority. No such persons should be allowed in parcel area and platform without authorized identity cards or permit.
17. No batteries should be allowed for booking in luggage just like air line where no batteries are allowed in check in baggage.
18. Fire suite and masks should be made available to crew.
19. Fire Extinguishers may be made more effective. RDSO/Railway Board may examine possibility of installing

water mist type fire extinguisher of better capacity in place of DCP type fire extinguisher being used currently.

20. There should be proper and regular hands-on training of all escorting staf as well as coach attendant for operation of fire extinguishers and fire fighting. Mock drills may be conducted from time to time to check the capability of concerned staff during real time situation.
21. Heat insulation paints should be provided on panelling of luggage room and partition.
22. GZB has no water hydrant. All major stations to be provided with Water hydrants at the end of platform.
23. Kiosks of all types should be removed from platforms for better visibility from CCTV cameras.

Suggestions:

Guards are not ensuring switching off the lights of luggage portion after loading as per Rly Board's instruction circulated by Board's Freight Marketing Circular No. 17 of 2006 dated 10.04.2006. A special drive to be launched for the implementation of instructions

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Section "B"

***Some important instructions – G.R/S.R.* 4.19**

4.25. Guards.— (1) Except under special instructions or in an emergency, every running train shall be provided with one or more Guards. (2) The Guard of a running train shall travel in his brake-van, except- (a) in an emergency, or (b) under special instructions. (3) When a train is worked without a Guard, such of his duties as can be performed by the Loco Pilot shall devolve on him as may be specified by special instructions.

S.R.4.25.1.1. No person must be allowed to work as Guard in charge of any train unless he is qualified in initial/refresher training at ZRTI/MLY and holds valid certificate of competency (in form No.T.28) issued by the Principal/ZRTI/MLY. The booking official is responsible for complying with this rule.

S.R.4.25.1.2. Guards in charge of trains shall ordinarily ride in the rear brake-van. Every Assistant Guard when running on a passenger train will normally travel in the front brake-van and will be under the orders of the Guard of the train. S.R.4.25.2.

Combined Train Report (CTR)

1. The CTR on the prescribed form must be filled by the Guard. This form shall be used for every train (except suburban and material trains for which separate forms are provided). In explaining detentions to trains, the cause of each detention must be clearly explained. All irregularities in connection with the working of trains such as absence of signals or improper exhibition of signals, lax working of staff, complaints made by Loco Pilots or the travelling public or accidents must be

reported in the CTR. Remarks on the following heads must also be passed at the foot of the CTR—

2. Time checked with the SCOR, number of inches of vacuum maintained in the brake-van, weather conditions, whether cautious driving observed, condition of the rolling stock and fittings, defects in lighting on the train, correctness of the brake-van, side and tail lamps and other brake-van equipment. In the case of passenger and special trains, the number of the first aid box and portable field telephone must be recorded;

3. The Guard of a train must, at the end of each trip, before he leaves the station, make over his CTR to the Station Master for submission to the DRM. Before doing so, he must see that Caution Orders, Line Clear tickets, etc., if any, are obtained from the Loco Pilot and attached to the CTR;

4. Station Masters must maintain a register on the prescribed form (to be kept in carbon process) in which particulars of trains run and CTR received should be recorded. One foil will be retained by the Station Master and the other will be sent to the DRM's office with the CTR daily. In the case of passenger and mixed trains, a copy of the CTR should also be forwarded to the PCOM;

5. Dating of Guard's CTR and Vehicle Guidance:

   The advertised departure according to the time table or train ordering message is to be taken as being the date on which a train runs, i.e., if a train is timed to leave a terminal station, for example at 23.20 hours on the 1st , but does not start till, 00.10 hours on the 2nd it should be shown as a train running on the 1st. S.R.4.25.3. Vehicle guidance.

Section "C"
Latest Amendments

No. T.157/G&SR/AS/02 to 2020 /Date: 08.07.2021..

Sub: Amendment Slip no. 2 toSCR G&SR - 2020.

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The following amendments have been given for implementation:

Item No.	Rule No. of Appendix-II to SCR G&SR	Existing Rule	Rule after Amendment/Addition
Item no.1	Wherever appears in G&SR	Station Master/Switchman	Station Master
Item no. 2	Wherever appears in G&SR	red light	red flashing light
Rule numbers in Annexure – I of Appendix - II			
Item no. 3	NIL	NIL	**Inserted as (iii) of 4 in page no. 365** If Sliding Booms are available, Gateman shall secure the gate against road traffic by using them for closing the Gate and take off the signals. Before resorting to the use of sliding booms for closing the gate,

			Gateman shall make an entry in the Gate Timing Register and exchange PN with station master. After resuming working of Lifting Barriers/Leaf Gates, again entry to be made and PN to be exchanged with SM to this effect.

Rule numbers in Annexure – I of Appendix - II			
Item no. 4	(iii) of 4 in page no. 365	Gateman shall secure the gate against road traffic by means of safety chains and padlocks.	**Renumbered as (iv) of 4 and amended.** Where Sliding Booms are not available/not working, Gateman shall secure the gate against road traffic by means of safety chains and padlocks.
Item no. 5	Note under (iii) of 4 in page no. 365	<u>If sliding boom arrangement is available, Gateman has to shall use them for closing the Gate against road traffic.</u> <u>If the interlocking arrangement is available for sliding booms, after closing the gate with sliding booms signals can be taken off. Before resorting to the use of sliding booms for closing the gate, Gateman shall make an entry in the Gate Timing</u>	Deleted

		Register and exchange PN with station master. After resuming working of normal booms again entry to be made and PN to be exchanged with SM to this effect.	
Item no. 6	(iv) of 4 in page no. 365	After securing the gate against road traffic, Gateman shall show green hand signal to the Loco Pilot of the approaching train.	Renumbered as (v) of 4 No change in content.

Rule numbers in Annexure – I of Appendix - II			
Item no. 6 Contd.	(v) of 4 in page no. 365	Station Master on duty shall issue Caution Order to the Loco Pilot of a departing train.	**Renumbered as (vi) of 4 and amended.** When chains are used to secure the Gate, the Gate Controlling Station Master on duty shall issue Caution Order to the Loco Pilot of a departing train intimating the gate is closed using Safety Chains. He shall also advise the Station Master at the dispatching end, under exchange of PN,to similarly issue a Caution Order to the Loco Pilot intimating that the gate is closed using safety chains before despatching a train into the block

			section.
Item no. 7	(vi) of 4 in page no. 365	He shall also advise the Station Master at the dispatching end, to similarly issue a Caution Order to the Loco Pilot before dispatching a train into the block section from his end.	Deleted since it is clubbed with existing rule no. (v)of 4.
Item no. 8	(i) of 6 in page no. 366	<u>If the gate key cannot be extracted from winch, gate signal lever or key transmitter, then Gateman must immediately inform the Station Master on duty on telephone.</u>	If the gate key cannot be extracted from winchor key transmitter, then Gateman must immediately inform the Station Master on duty on telephone.
Item no. 9 of AS-2	NIL	NIL	**Inserted as (iii) of 6 in page no. 366** If Sliding Booms are available, Gateman shall secure the gate against road traffic by using them for closing the Gate and take off the signals. Before resorting to the use of sliding booms for closing the gate, Gateman shall make an entry in the Gate

			Timing Register and exchange PN with station master. After resuming working of Lifting Barriers/Leaf Gates, again entry to be made and PN to be exchanged with SM to this effect.

Rule numbers in Annexure – I of Appendix - II			
Item no. 10	(iii) of 6 in page no. 366	Gateman shall secure the gate against road traffic by means of safety chains and padlocks.	**Renumbered as (iv) of 6 and amended.** Where Sliding Booms are not available/not working, Gateman shall secure the gate against road traffic by means of safety chains and padlocks.
Item no. 11	Note under(iii) of 6 in page no. 366	If sliding boom arrangement is available, Gateman has to use them for closing the Gate against road traffic.	Deleted.
Item no. 12	(iv) of 6 in page no. 366	If the interlocking arrangement is available for sliding booms, after closing the gate with sliding booms signals can be taken off. Before resorting to the use of sliding booms for	Deleted.

		closing the gate, Gateman shall make an entry in the Gate Timing Register and exchange PN with station master. After resuming working of normal booms again entry to be made and PN to be exchanged with SM to this effect.	
Item no. 13	(v) of 6 in page no. 366	Station Master on duty shall issue Caution Order to the Loco Pilot of a departing train.	When chains are used to secure the Gate, the Gate Controlling Station Master on duty shall issue Caution Order to the Loco Pilot of a departing train intimating the gate is closed using Safety Chains and pad locks. He shall also advise the Station Master at the dispatching end, under exchange of PN,to similarly issue a Caution Order to the Loco Pilot intimating that the gate is closed using safety chains and pad locks before despatching a train into the block section.

Rule numbers in Annexure – I of Appendix - II			
Item no. 14	(vi) of 6 in page no. 366	He shall also advise the Station Master at the despatching end to similarly issue a Caution Order to the Loco Pilot before despatching a train into the block section from his end.	Deleted. Since this rule is clubbed with rule no. (v) of 6.
Item no. 15	(vii) of 6 in page no. 366	Station Master shall advise S & T staff responsible for maintaining the key transmitter to repair the same at the earliest.	Renumbered as (vi). No change in content.
Item no. 16	(viii) of 6 in page no. 366	Normal working will be resumed only after S & T staffrepair the key transmitter and issue reconnection/fit memo for the same.	Renumbered as (vii). No change in content.
Item no. 17	(ix) of 6 in page no. 366	<u>After rectification, the emergency key shall be replaced in the emergency key box and resealed by the S & T maintainer.</u>	Deleted. Since use of emergency key is not mentioned in the rule, there would be no question of replacing it.
Item no. 18	NIL	NIL	**The following is inserted as Rule (xi) of 8 of Annexure-I of Appendix-II (in page 367):**

			If Sliding Booms are available, Gateman shall secure the gate against road traffic by using them for closing the Gate and take off the signals. Before resorting to the use of sliding booms for closing the gate, Gateman shall make an entry in the Gate Timing Register and exchange PN with station master. After resuming working of Lifting Barriers/Leaf Gates, again entry to be made and PN to be exchanged with SM to this effect.
Rule numbers in Annexure – I of Appendix- II			
Item no. 19	(xi) of 8 in page no. 367	Gateman shall secure the gate against road traffic by means of safety chains and padlocks and thereafter exhibit green hand signal, if the gate is not obstructed.	**Renumbered as (xii) of 8 and amended.** Where Sliding Booms are not available/not working, Gateman shall secure the gate against road traffic by means of safety chains and padlocks and thereafter exhibit green hand signal, if the gate is not obstructed.
Item no. 20	(xii) of 8 in page	Station Master shall advise maintenance staff responsible for maintaining the lifting	Renumbered as (xiii). No change in content

	no. 367	barriers/leaf gates to repair the same at the earliest.	
Item no. 21	(xiii) of 8 in page no. 367	Normal working will be resumed only after maintenance staff rectify the defective lifting barriers/leaf gates and issue reconnection/fit memo for the same.	Renumbered as (xiv). No change in content
Rule numbers in Annexure – II of Appendix - II			
Item no. 22	NIL	NIL	**Inserted as Rule (iii) of 4 in page no. 369** If Sliding Booms are available, Gateman shall secure the gate against road traffic by using them for closing the Gate and take off the signals. Before resorting to the use of sliding booms for closing the gate, Gateman shall make an entry in the Gate Timing Register and exchange PN with station master. After resuming working of Lifting Barriers/Leaf Gates, again entry to be made and PN to be exchanged with SM to this effect.
Item	(iii) of	Gateman shall secure	**Renumbered as (iv) of 4**

no. 23	4 in page no. 369	the gate against road traffic by means of safety chains and padlocks.	**and amended.** Where Sliding Booms are not available/not working, Gateman shall secure the gate against road traffic by means of safety chains and padlocks.
Rule numbers in Annexure – II of Appendix - II			
Item no. 24	Note under (iii) of 4 in page no. 369	If sliding boom arrangement is available, Gateman has to use them for closing the Gate against road traffic. <u>If the interlocking arrangement is available for sliding booms, after closing the gate with sliding booms signals can be taken off. Before resorting to the use of sliding booms for closing the gate, Gateman shall make an entry in the Gate Timing Register and exchange PN with station master. After resuming working of normal booms, again entry shall be made and PN shall be exchanged with SM to this effect.</u>	Deleted.

Rule numbers in Annexure – II of Appendix - II			

Item no. 25	(iv) of 4 in ppage no. 366	After securing the gate against road traffic, Gateman shall show green hand signal to the Loco Pilot of the approaching train.	Renumbered as (v) of 4. No change in content.
	(v) of 4 in page no. 369	Station Master on duty shall issue Caution Order to the Loco Pilot of a departing train.	**Renumbered as (vi) of 4 and amended.** When chains are used to secure the Gate, the Gate Controlling Station Master on duty shall issue Caution Order to the Loco Pilot of a departing/receiving train, intimating that the gate is closed using safety chains. The Station Master shall also advise the Station Master at the dispatching end, under exchange of PN,to similarly issue a Caution Order to the Loco Pilot intimating that the gate is closed using Safety Chains before despatching a train into the block section.

Item no. 26	(vi) of 4 in page no. 369	He shall also advise the Station Master at the dispatching end, to similarly issue a Caution Order to the Loco Pilot before dispatching a train into the block section from his end.	Deleted. Since this rule is clubbed with rule no. (v) of 4.
Item no. 27	(a) under Note Under 4 in page no. 369	In case of failure of lifting barriers/leaf gates worked from the cabin, Station Master will send Station Porter to secure the gate against road traffic by safety chains and padlocks.	In case of failure of lifting barriers/leaf gates worked from the cabin, Station Master shall send Station Porter to secure the gate against road traffic by Sliding Booms/safety chains and padlocks.
Item no. 28	NIL	NIL	**Inserted as Rule (iii) of 6 in page no. 370** If Sliding Booms are available, Gateman shall secure the gate against road traffic by using them for closing the Gate and take off the signals. Before resorting to the use of sliding booms for closing the gate, Gateman shall make an entry in the Gate Timing Register and exchange PN with station master. After resuming working of Lifting Barriers/Leaf Gates, again entry to be

			made and PN to be exchanged with Station Master to this effect.
Item no. 29	Note under (iii) of 6 in page no. 370	If sliding boom arrangement is available, Gateman has to use them for closing the Gate against road traffic. If the interlocking arrangement is available for sliding booms, after closing the gate with sliding booms signals can be taken off. Before resorting to the use of sliding booms for closing the gate, Gateman shall make an entry in the Gate Timing Register and exchange PN with station master. After resuming working of normal booms, again entry to be made and PN to be exchanged with SM to this effect	Deleted.

Rule numbers in Annexure – III of Appendix - II			
Item no. 35	NIL	NIL	**Inserted as Rule (iii) of 4 in page no. 373.** If Sliding Booms are available, Gateman shall secure the gate against road traffic by using them for closing the Gate. Before resorting to the use of sliding booms for closing the gate, Gateman shall make an entry in the Gate Timing Register and exchange PN with station master. After resuming working of Lifting Barriers/Leaf Gates, again entry to be made and PN to be exchanged with SM to this effect.
Item no. 36	(iii) of 4 in page no. 373	Gateman shall secure the gate against road traffic by means of safety chains and padlocks.	**Renumbered as (iv) of 4 and amended.** Where Sliding Booms are not available/ not working, Gateman shall secure the gate against road traffic by means of safety chains and padlocks.
Item no. 37of AS-2	-	-	Existing Rule Nos. (iv), (v), (vi) (vii) & (viii) of 4 in page no. 373 are renumbered as (v), (vi) (vii) (viii) & (ix) respectively.
Item no. 38	(a) under Note	In case of failure of lifting barriers/leaf gates worked from	In case of failure of lifting barriers/leaf gates worked from the cabin, Station

	Under 4 in page no. 373	the cabin, Station Master will send Station Porter to secure the gate against road traffic by safety chains and padlocks.	Master shall send Pointsman to secure the gate against road traffic by means of Sliding Booms/Safety Chains.
Item no. 39	(b) under Note Under 4 in page no. 373	Authority to pass signals at 'On' position as per rules shall also be issued to the Loco Pilots of both arriving and departing trains.	Deleted. Since no authority is given for Loco pilot in this regard, as the LC Gate is a non-interlocked Gate.

Rule numbers in Annexure – IV of Appendix - II			
Item no. 40	NIL	NIL	**Inserted as Rule (iii) of 4 in page no. 375.** If Sliding Booms are available, Gateman shall secure the gate against road traffic by using them for closing the Gate. Before resorting to the use of sliding booms for closing the gate, Gateman shall make an entry in the Gate Timing Register and exchange PN with station master. After resuming working of Lifting Barriers/Leaf Gates, again entry to be made and PN to be exchanged with SM to this effect.
Item no. 41	(iii) of 4 in page no. 375	Gateman shall secure the gate against road traffic by means of safety chains and padlocks.	**Renumbered as (iv) of 4 and amended.** Where Sliding Booms are not available/ not working, Gateman shall secure the gate against road traffic by means of safety chains and padlocks.
Item no. 42	-	**-**	Renumbered existing Rules nos. (iv), (v), (vi), (vii) & (viii) of Annexure-IV of Appendix-II (in page 375&376) as (v), (vi), (vii) (viii) & (ix) respectively**.**
Rule numbers in Annexure – V of Appendix - II			
Item no. 43	NIL	NIL	**Inserted as Rule (iii) of 4 in page no. 378:** If Sliding Booms are available, Gateman shall secure the gate against road traffic by using them

			for closing the Gate. Before resorting to the use of sliding booms for closing the gate, Gateman shall make an entry in the Gate Timing Register and exchange PN with station master. After resuming working of Lifting Barriers/Leaf Gates, again entry to be made and PN to be exchanged with SM to this effect.

Item no. 44	(iii) of 4 in page no. 378	Gateman shall secure the gate against road traffic by means of safety chains and padlocks.	**Renumbered as (iv) of 4 and amended.** Where Sliding Booms are not available/not working, Gateman shall secure the gate against road traffic by means of safety chains and padlocks.
Item no. 45	(v) of 4 in page no. 378	Station Master on duty shall issue Caution Order to the Loco Pilot of a departing train.	**Renumbered as (vi) of 4 and amended.** The Gate Controlling Station Master on duty shall issue Caution Order to the Loco Pilot of a departing/receiving train, intimating that the gate is closed using safety chains and pad locks. The Station Master shall also advise the Station Master at the dispatching end, to similarly issue a Caution Order to the Loco Pilot intimating that the gate is closed using Safety Chains and pad locks before despatching a train into the block section.
Item no. 46	(vi) of 4 in page no. 378	He shall also advise the Station Master at the dispatching end, under exchange of PN, to similarly issue a Caution Order to the Loco Pilot before despatching a train into the block	Deleted Since it is clubbed with rule no. (v).

		section from his end.	
Rule numbers in Annexure – VI of Appendix - II			
Item no. 47	(ii) of 2 in page no. 380	Gateman shall secure the gate against road traffic by means of safety chains and padlocks.	Gateman shall secure the gate against road traffic by means of Sliding Booms/safetychains and padlocks.

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Section “D”
Checklist - Inspection of Pantry Car and Power Car

Pantry Car

1	Check for presence of any inflammable material like Gas cylinders(kept outside the nominated room),Petrol , Kerosene etc.
2	Check whether there are any gas leakages and condition of gas pipe line.
3	check whether LPG connections are periodically checked and certified(Daily and 15 day check)
4	Check whether gas regulators , fire back arrestors and pressure gauge are in working order.
5	Check whether the specified number of outlets only being used.
6	Check whether the gas cylinders are kept on proper rack duly clamping.
7	Chec**k** whether fire extinguishers (4 Nos), in Pantry car are kept in proper location and not over due for refilling.
8	Check whether pantry car staff is having adequate knowledge in usage of fire extinguishers.
9	Check whether pantry car staff are aware of the action to be taken in case of fire in pantry car.
10	Check whether ACP is working in pantry car.
11	Check the exhaust fans are available and are in working order.

12	Check whether all main doors are free to open and the passage kept free for movement.
13	Check whether any empty cartons, gunny bags, plastic crates/bags or any other material kept in Gas room.
14	Ensure vestibule area, passage of Pantry car and Gas Cylinders room are kept clean.
15	Check proper rating and types of fuses are used for Battery, Fan circuit, light circuit in junction boxes. Re-wirable fuses are not to be used in place of HRC fuses.
16	Check tightness of terminal connections at junction boxes, EFT terminals and Battery terminals.
17	Check for earth in wiring. If any earth is noticed investigate and remove earth. Check if any excessive sparking is noticed in fans.
18	Check whether electrical equipment provided are as per prescribed standard. Additional equipments, non standard equipment is not to be connected.
19	Check the register for maintenance of electrical equipment. The equipments are to be periodically maintained and tested.
20	Ensure surface surrounding the equipment is clean. Check the plug &sockets for loose connection, burnt marks.
21	Check the condition of inverters for any overheating

	.Check sufficient natural ventilation for the inverters.
22	Check over voltage protection is working in Rectifier cum-regulator unit (RRU).
23	Check proper cleaning of battery terminals. Check proper sealing of fuse disconnection board to avoid entry of foreign material.
24	Check provision of gas proof electrical fitting in gas cylinder room.
25	Ensure no perished/damaged cables and no open wiring in the pantry car.
26	Ensure the unauthorized tapping of electrical connection is not resorted to .
27	Any other items noticed related to safety.

Power Car

1	Check for leakages in fuel pipe line
2	Ensure proper cladding of exhaust manifold
3	Ensure proper working of fire suppression system provided in power cars

4	Escorting staff should be well conversant of manual operation of fire suppressant system
5	Conditions of air intake filters to be checked and to be replaced if chocked.
6	Lube oil levels to be checked, and if any abnormal consumption is there, which is to be recorded.
7	IR value of the power car to be maintained within prescribed limit
8	Remote monitored system of DG set has to be in working order, wherever such provisions are made
9	Long Continuous working of single engine may be avoided .
10	Working of all engine safety system to be ensured
11	Continuous monitoring of engine room temperature for any temperature rise
12	Any notable difference in layout/ design or joints in fuel pipe line/ exhaust manifold in MCF manufactured and ICF/RCF manufactured power cars including temperature related safety
13	Any other items noticed related to safety.

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Section "E"
Accident cases

1. ***Brief of the accident*** *(Derailment):* On 19.07.2021, between BVRT- BVRM stations of BZA division, as part of ongoing doubling work between BZA-NS LC No.117 at KM No. 107/9-7 is proposed for elimination by providing RUB (4X3m) at KM No. 107/6-8 by RVNL. Open line engineering supervisors were nominated to monitor the work. The mega line block was planned from 11.45 hrs to 17.45 hrs. Before the arrival of Railway open line engineering officials at 08.45 hrs, the work of lifting of track was undertaken by the PMC supervisor without intimation to nominated open line staff or without taking line block and without ensuring proper ramping of lifted track. This has resulted in excessive twist in the track and could have caused the derailment of Goods train BCN/PAGM Engine No. 14522/WDG3A/VSKP.

Cause of the Accident: due to negligence on the part of RVNL, PMC staff has resulted in excessive twist beyond the tolerance permitted in IRPWM para no.526.

Responsibility:

Primary**:** Sri. B.Sudhir, supervisor(P.Way) Pmc of Systra MVA consulting(India) Pvt. Ltd. ***Blameworthy***: Manager Civil (export) RVNL, Package-III/TNKU

Matters brought to light:

1. RVNL has not deputed a competent PMC P.Way supervisor to carry out the work of track lifting.
2. Incompetent flagman without competency as per ESO 65 had been deputed by RVNL.

3. Safety precautions had not been followed.

2. ***Brief of the accident*** *(SPAD):* On 12.08.2021 at about 08.45 hrs, at BKPT station of GTL division, LP of Train no AWY/OLR BCN L with Loco No.41058/KJM passed UP Home signal S-1 of BKPT at ON and stopped beyond 23m from Home signal. LP stated that he applied A-9 brake along with RB (regenerative brake) at the location of Inner Distant signal. Subsequently, ALP applied Emergency Brake at about 200m in rear of Home signal. Thereafter, LP applied SA-9 also but the train could not be controlled and passed Home signal at ON for a distance of about 23m.

Cause of the Accident: the LP has not reduced the speed of the train as desired and also he has failed to control the train a prescribed.

Responsibility:

Primary:

1. Sri. P.Uday Kumar, LP/NRE has failed to stop before the Home signal S-1 of B KPT station and passed at 'ON' position.
2. Sri. MD. Rizwan, ALP/NRE for not alerring the LP and failed to apply emergency brakes in time.

Secondary:

1. Sri.K.R.Mohan CLI/NRE nominated CLI of Sri. P.Uday Kumar P/NRE, for inadequate counselling to LP.
2. Sri. C.Penchalaiah, CLI/NRE nominated CLI of Sri. MD. Rizwan, ALP/NRE, for inadequate counselling to ALP.

Blameworthy:

1. Sri. Y.Srinivasa Bbu, SCOR 2. Sri. M.Eranna TLC .

3. ***Brief of the accident*** *(Derailment):* On 22.09.2021 at about 06.52 hrs, at SVN station of HYB division, DN CHNMGE left UMRI at 06.35 hrs. As per SCOR instruction it is planed to take DN NMG through Main line signal but due to flashing of Point no.14, SCOR instructed SM to admit NMG on first loop line. While passing SSVN via first loop line 2nd coach no. NER 930966 from loco derailed at Point No, 7A.

Cause of the Accident: Enquiry Report awaited.

Section "F"
Test Your Knowledge

1. In _____ gradient area and terminal goods yards constant speed control (CSC) of 3 phase loco should not be used.
2. In 3 Ø loco, acknowledge the fault message by pressing _____ button.
3. Signal posts, lever frames to be painted _____.
4. Approach locking, back locking, indication locking should be tested_____
5. A circular curve in vertical plain is called _____.
6. Maximum cant permitted on BG in Group A, B & C is_____
7. Successful trials of TCAS(Train Collision Avoidance System) have been completed in Absolute Block section of_____
8. For the first time, _____ station of Hyderabad Division in the state of Andhra Pradesh has been able to start loading of Sodium Hydroxide (new commodity) commonly known as "Caustic Soda Lye". 80 Tank containers consisting of around 2,200 Tonnes of Caustic Soda is being loaded in 40 BLL flat wagons
9. Who is Minister of State in the Ministry of Railways?
10. South Central Railway successfully operated four long distance trains in three different directions in the zone. This innovative initiative has been named as_____

KEY

1. Undulating
2. BPFA
3. Once in three years
4. Once in three years.
5. Vertical curve.
6. 165mm.
7. Lingamapalli – Vikarabad – Wadi, Vikarabad - Bidar section
8. Veldurti
9. Shri Danve Raosaheb Dadarao & Smt. Darshana Jardosh
10. Triveni**.**

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Section "G"
Safety drives launched

Month	Details	from	to	No. of days
July -21	Maintenance of Points and Crossings	23.07.20	06.08.21	15
Aug – 21	To ensure safe train operations	11.08.21	25.08.21	15
Sep - 21	Winter precautions in P.Way maintenance and Train operations.	11.10.21	30.10.21	20
In addition to above safety drives following calendar safety drive was also conducted.				
July-21	"Working on running lines" and "Safety at work sites.	01.07.21	15.07.21	15
Aug-21	Exchange of 'all-right' signals	01.08.21	15.08.21	15
Sep-21	Examination during Crew Changing by LP/ALP	01.09.21	15.08.21	15

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Section "H"
Accident Statistics

- In the second quarter of this financial year 2021-22, there was no consequential train accident, 2 other than consequential train accidents on this Railway when compared to nil and 6 respectively in the previous financial year for the same period i.e. July to September. Every field Official shall take all preventive measures to sustain this performance

- Number of indicative accidents has decreased from 2 during second quarter of 2020-21 to 1 during 2021-22 second quarter. That indicative accident is 'SPAD' case.

- The number of Yard Accidents has decreased from 2 during second quarter of 2020-21 to 0 during 2021-22.

- For the month of July, there was no consequential train accident, one other train accident..

- For the month of August, there was no consequential train accident, one other than consequential train accident and only one indicative accident (SPAD).

- For the month of September, there was no consequential train accident and one other than consequential train accident.

- In regard to the safety performance of Divisions, accidents / unusual incidences in SC-1, BZA – Nil, GTL – 1, HYB – 1, NED – Nil, GNT – Nil.

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